New Weapons and the Resort to Force
| Published date | 01 June 1975 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070207503000204 |
| Author | Colin S. Gray |
| Date | 01 June 1975 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
COLIN
S.
GRAY
New
weapons
and
the
resort
to
force
The
political
history
of
the world
may
be
told
in
terms
of
changes
in military
technology
and
military
organization.'
However,
as
with
the
adjective
economic
in
the writings
of
Karl
Marx,
so
military
might
be
devalued
to
the
status
of a
portmanteau
word.
The
social
relations
of
weaponry,
to
employ
a
Marxist
formula,
constitute
a
two-way
traffic.
Particular
weapons
imply
armed
forces
of
a
certain
character,
but
some
societies
are
better
able
to
adjust
their
military
organizations
to
new weapons
than
are
others.
If
one
looks
at the German
campaigns
in
Poland,
France,
the
Balkans,
and
the
Soviet
Union
from
September
1939
until
November
1941,
what
is
one
to
conclude?
That
the
offensive
em-
ployment
of
Stukas
and
concentrated
armoured
forces
was
tem-
porarily
on the
ascendant
against
contemporary
defensive
weapons
and
tactics?
That
Polish,
French,
and
Soviet
forces
were
malde-
ployed
and
badly
handled
(in
which
case, why?)?
The
fact
that
too
few
Frenchmen
were
prepared
to
stand
and
fight,
and
thereby
risk
death
in
1940,
may
well
have
had
very
little
to
do
with the
military
technology
of
the
Third
Reich
as
compared
with
that
of
France.
It
is
rather
more
probable
that
French
soldiers suffered
a
demoralization
born
of
expectations
of
death
stemming
from
memories
(first
and
second
hand)
of
The
Great
War,
of
an
apathy
traceable
to
reactions
to
the
social
and
political
history
of
France
Assistant
Director,
International
Institute
for
Strategic
Studies;
author
of
numerous
articles on
strategic
themes
and
of
Canadian
Defence
Priorities:
A
Question
of
Relevance
(Toronto
1972).
i
A classic
illustration
of
this
thesis may
be
found
in
Lynn
White's study
of
the
social
consequences of
the introduction
and
widespread
adoption
of
the
stirrup: Medieval
Technology
and
Social
Change
(London
1964;
first
pub.
1962),
chapter
i.
NEW WEAPONS
AND
THE
RESORT
TO
FORCE
239
in
the
193os,
and
of
the
diffusion
of
pacifist
sentiments
among
France's
conscript
soldiers.
2
Lurking
behind
every
military
tech-
nological
explanation
of
national
success
or
failure
lies
a
plethora
of
political
and
social
candidates
for explanations.
At
different
levels
of
causality,
one
may
argue
that
Prussia
defeated
Austria
in
1866
largely
because
its
army
was
equipped
with
the
needle
gun,
and
because
its
Great General
Staff
made
effective
use
of
strategically
laid
railways,3
while
Austria
lost
the
war in
good
part
because
it
lacked
the
needle
gun
and
was
acutely
short
of
strategic
railways.
Of
no
less
importance
were
the
obsolete
shock
tactics
of
Austrian infantry and
a
marked
shortage
of
strategic
inspiration
among
the
senior
members
of the
Austrian
high
command.
4
One
explanation
would
direct
attention
to
changes
in
infantry
firepower
and
to
the
management
of
mobiliza-
tion
and
the
concentration
of
forces,
another
to
the political,
economic,
and
social
inadequacies
of
Austria.
If an
author
endeavours
to
relate
new
weapons
to
'the
utility
of
force,'
he
is
embracing
two
distinct
questions.
First,
how
does
the
development
of
new weapons
alter
expectations of the
utility
of
the
resort
to
force?
Secondly,
how
does
the
development
of
new weapons
alter
the
actual
utility
of
the
resort
to
force?
In
short, expectations
of new
weapons
may
prove to
be
false.
The
reasons
for
the
disappointment
registered
via
a
process
of
reality-
testing
in
action
might include
the
following:
counter-weapons
are employed;
the
weapon
was
not
employed
in
an
optimal
mode;
and
the
weapon
contained
either
inherent
limitations
unappre-
ciated
prior
to
operational
use,
or
limitations
that
could
be
cor-
2
The
low
morale
of
key
French
divisions
is
indicated
as
the
precipitating
military
(really
sociological
and
psychological)
cause
of
the
d~bkcle
in
Henry
Chabert,
'A
Possible
Historical
Mistake:
The
Causes
of
the Allied
Military
Collapse
in
May
1940,'
Military
Review,
LIV
(September
1974),
8o-gi.
Memories
of
losses
in the
Great
War
were,
of
course,
shared
by
the allied
and
German
armies.
3
See
Bernard
and
Fawn
Brodie,
From
Crossbow
to
H-Bomb
(rev
ed;
Bloom-
ington
1973),
pp
137-8.
4
Hajo
Holborn,
'Moltke
and
Schlieffen:
The
Prussian-German
School,'
in
Edward
M.
Earle,
ed,
Makers
of
Modern
Strategy:
Military
Thought
from
Machiavelli
to
Hitler
(Princeton
9g6i;
first
pub.
3941),
pp
181-4.
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