Nixon v Attorney General
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Date | 1930 |
| Year | 1930 |
| Court | Court of Appeal |
Superannuation - Allowances - Civil Service - Rights of Civil Servants under Superannuation Acts - Jurisdiction of Civil Courts - Power of Court to make Declaration of Right - Alleged Formation of Contract with Civil Servant based on Treasury Minute -
An established civil servant of the Crown has on the true construction of the
The plaintiffs Nixon, Clarke and Samuel respectively entered the Civil Service in 1877, 1882 and 1880, and subsequently each of them adopted the provisions of the Superannuation Act, 1909, pursuant to s. 3, sub-s. 1. Nixon in 1883 was transferred from the Home Office to the Metropolitan Police Courts Department, in which he remained till his retirement in 1922. Clarke and Samuel retired in 1922 and 1925 respectively. The plaintiff Scott entered the service of the National Telephone Co., Ld., in 1895, and on the transfer of the telephones to the Post Office under the Telephone Transfer Act, 1911, he assigned his share in a contributory pension fund to the Postmaster-General, and was appointed to a pensionable office in the Post Office and became entitled to a superannuation allowance under s. 6 of that Act, which by s. 10 had to be read as one with the
In an action by the plaintiffs claiming to have their superannuation allowances computed on the more liberal scale and to have the application of the minute of March 20, 1922, declared ultra vires:—
Held, by the Court of Appeal (affirming Clauson J.):
(1.) That the plaintiffs had no legal right enforceable in a Court of law to superannuation allowances calculated according to the scale fixed by s. 2 of the Act of 1859 as amended by s. 1 and s. 3, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1909.
(2.) That, although on the evidence two of the plaintiffs had entered the Civil Service in reliance on a statement as to superannuation allowances contained in a Treasury minute dated June 14, 1859, which was published in the Civil Service Year Book and there seen by them, no contract was thereby created conferring an enforceable right to a superannuation allowance on the scale therein mentioned. The minute was not issued as the basis of a contract and the Civil Service Year Book was not published by the authority of the Treasury.
(3.) That the plaintiff Scott was not given by the Telephone Transfer Act, 1911, a legal right to a superannuation allowance.
Per Clauson J. The power of the Court to make a declaratory order in regard to rights extends only to rights legally enforceable.
As regards any legal right to an allowance, the plaintiff Nixon was not in any better position under the
WITNESS ACTION.
The plaintiffs were four retired civil servants of the Crown. The plaintiff John Nixon who entered the Home Office in 1877 was transferred in 1883 to the Metropolitan Police Department and retired in 1922. The plaintiff John Scott entered the service of the National Telephone Company in 1895 and contributed to the pension fund until January 1, 1912, when, under the provisions of the Telephone Transfer Act, 1911, he became a transferred officer and having assigned his share in the company's pension fund to the Postmaster-General was appointed to a pensionable office, which qualified him for a superannuation allowance under the
Each of the plaintiffs, except John Scott, adopted the provisions of the Superannuation Act, 1909, in pursuance of s. 3, sub-s. 1, of that Act; and all four plaintiffs duly complied with all statutory provisions required to enable them respectively to qualify for a superannuation allowance.
The Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury purporting to act in accordance with the provisions of a Treasury minute dated March 20, 1922, decided that each of the plaintiffs was entitled to superannuation and awarded to each superannuation allowances, but in calculating the annual allowance or pension to which each was entitled instead of computing it in the manner prescribed by the provisions of s. 2 of the Superannuation Act, 1859, as amended by s. 1 and s. 3, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1909, awarded to each: (1.) a fixed annual allowance or pension of one-eightieth of his actual annual basic or substantive salary and emoluments exclusive of his “bonus” emolument multiplied by the appropriate number of his years of pensionable service, and (2.) a further allowance described as an addition or supplement on one-eightieth of a hypothetical sum substituted for his “bonus” emolument which was less than his actual annual “bonus” emolument at the date of his retirement multiplied by the appropriate number of his years of pensionable service; and they directed that the addition or supplement so computed should be varied quarterly by reference to the official average cost of living index figure for the last preceding quarter with a limitation that the addition or supplement should not exceed an overriding maximum equal to the amount which would have been arrived at, if the addition or supplement had been calculated upon his full actual annual “bonus” emolument, and, in calculating the additional lump sum superannuation allowance to which each was entitled, instead of calculating it as a single sum upon the full aggregate amount of his actual annual salary and emoluments, including his actual annual “bonus” emolument at the date of his retirement they calculated it as: (1.) a substantive allowance computed upon his actual annual basic or substantive salary and emoluments exclusive of his “bonus” emolument, and (2.) an addition or supplement calculated upon three-fourths only of the hypothetical sum substituted for and being less than his actual annual “bonus” emolument at the date of his retirement.
Each of the plaintiffs Nixon, Clarke and Samuel claimed that he entered the service on the basis and in reliance on a Treasury minute dated June 14, 1859 (the terms of which are hereinafter stated), and that accordingly he was entitled to a superannuation allowance calculated in the manner prescribed by the provisions of s. 2 of the Superannuation Act, 1859, as amended by s. 1 and s. 3, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1909, as follows: (a) to an annual allowance or pension as from the date of his retirement during the remainder of his life of a fixed and invariable amount equal to one-eightieth of the aggregate amount of the actual annual basic salary and emoluments and his actual annual “bonus” emolument at the end of his retirement multiplied by the number of completed years (not exceeding forty years), which he had served in an established capacity, and (b) to a lump sum by way of an additional allowance equal to one-thirtieth of the aggregate amount of his actual annual basic salary and emoluments and his actual annual “bonus” emolument at the time of his retirement multiplied by the number of completed years (not exceeding forty-five years), which he had served in an established or pensionable capacity, and (c) to an addition to the lump sum equal to one-half per cent. of such lump sum in respect of each completed year which he had served at the passing of the Superannuation Act, 1909.
The Treasury minute dated June 14, 1859, was as follows: “With regard to persons appointed or to be appointed subsequent to the passing of the Superannuation Act, 1859, my Lords observe that the language of the Act is precise and that such persons are to be held entitled to the retiring allowances prescribed by the 2nd section of the Act, provided they fulfil the conditions of the 17th section and provided my Lords do not find it necessary to exercise the power conferred upon them by the 9th section of reducing the allowance on account of the demerits of the person claiming it.”
In this action against the Attorney-General the plaintiffs claimed: (1.) a declaration that each was entitled as of right to have the amount of his superannuation allowances calculated in the manner prescribed by s. 2 of the Superannuation Act, 1859, as amended by s. 1, and s. 3, sub-s. 1, of the Act of...
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