No cause for panic: Key lessons from the political science literature on nuclear proliferation
| DOI | 10.1177/0020702014521565 |
| Author | Jacques EC Hymans |
| Date | 01 March 2014 |
| Published date | 01 March 2014 |
| Subject Matter | Policy Brief |
International Journal
2014, Vol. 69(1) 85–93
!The Author(s) 2014
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DOI: 10.1177/0020702014521565
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Policy Brief
No cause for panic: Key
lessons from the political
science literature on
nuclear proliferation
Jacques EC Hymans
School of International Relations, University of Southern
California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
Abstract
This paper provides a brief overview of the progress of political science research on the
causes of nuclear weapons proliferation and non-proliferation. Based on the findings of
that literature, the author draws out some general lessons for today’s policymakers.
Keywords
Nuclear proliferation, political intentions, technical capacities, threat perception
In 1963, President John F. Kennedy declared himself ‘‘haunted’’ by the expectation
that the club of nuclear weapon states would grow to 15 or even 25 members by the
mid-1970s, unless the world could come together on a global nuclear test ban
treaty.
1
Despite Kennedy’s efforts, his hoped-for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
finally materialized only in 1996, and as of 2013 the treaty had still not yet garnered
enough state adherents to enter into force.
2
Nevertheless, there are fewer than 10
nuclear weapon states in the world today, 50 years after Kennedy’s dark prediction.
Why are nuclear weapons arsenals still so uncommon? Political scientists have
wrestled with this puzzle ever since the proliferation issue surged to prominence
after the end of the Cold War.
Corresponding author:
Jacques EC Hymans, School of International Relations, University of Southern California, VKC 330,
University Park, Los Angeles, CA 90089–0043, USA.
Email: hymans@usc.edu
1. ‘‘Text of President Kennedy’s News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Affairs,’’ New York
Times, 22 March 1963, 4.
2. Kennedy’s push did result in the creation of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, which banned
nuclear testing above ground; but this was a half-measure at best. See Lassina Zerbo, ‘‘The chal-
lenges to ratifying the CTBT: Can the no-test norm be maintained indefinitely?’’ European
Leadership Network, 10 September 2013, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-
challenges-to-ratifying-the-ctbt–can-the-no-test-norm-be-maintained-indefinitely_777.html
(accessed 29 December 2013).
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