No substitute for victory? Why just war theorists can’t win
| Author | Cian O’Driscoll |
| Published date | 01 March 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066119864706 |
| Date | 01 March 2020 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119864706
European Journal of
International Relations
2020, Vol. 26(1) 187 –208
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066119864706
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E
JR
I
No substitute for victory?
Why just war theorists
can’t win
Cian O’Driscoll
University of Glasgow, UK
Abstract
Victory has historically been regarded as the ‘telos’ or ‘very object’ of war. As one well-
placed commentator has noted, war is all about winning. It is baffling to note, then, that
contemporary just war theory, the predominant framework for addressing the moral and
legal questions that war raises, makes no allowance for victory. Today’s just war theorists
shun the language of victory, preferring instead to speak about the ‘endings’ of warfare.
This article investigates why just war theorists have been so reluctant to engage with the
idiom of victory. It identifies seven principal objections to accommodating victory in just
war theory and subjects them to cross-examination. It concludes that while there are good
reasons for regarding the discourse of victory as deeply problematic, these same reasons
could (and arguably should) be taken as an argument for embracing rather than ignoring
victory within the just war framework. Such a move would not only spare just war theory
of the charge of irrelevance by ensuring that it remains connected to the material realities
of modern warfare, it would also illuminate the tragic character of just war itself, revealing
both its necessity and limitations.
Keywords
Victory, just war, tragedy, jus post bellum, jus ex bello, conquest, ethics of war,
Augustine, Cicero, Grotius
Introduction
Victory has historically been regarded as the ‘telos’ (Aristotle, 1996: 3; Cicero, 1998: 83)
or ‘very object’ of warfare (MacArthur, 1951). War, as many commentators have noted,
is all about winning (Baldwin, 2002: 187; Biddle, 2004; Gray, 1979; Lewis, 2010;
Corresponding author:
Cian O’Driscoll, University of Glasgow, Adam Smith Building, Glasgow G12 8RT, UK.
Email: cian.odriscoll@glasgow.ac.uk
864706EJT0010.1177/1354066119864706European Journal of International RelationsO’Driscoll
research-article2019
Article
188 European Journal of International Relations 26(1)
Martel, 2011). It is intriguing to note, then, that contemporary just war theory, the pre-
dominant framework in international society for addressing the moral and legal ques-
tions that war raises, makes scant reference to victory. Today’s just war theorists shun the
language of victory (and defeat), preferring instead to speak about the ‘endings’ of war-
fare (e.g., May, 2012; Patterson, 2012). This article investigates why contemporary just
war theorists have been so reticent to engage the concept of victory. It identifies seven
objections to accommodating victory in just war theory. The purpose of this manoeuvre
is neither to debunk these objections, nor to affirm them. Rather, it is to ascertain what
they tell us about the idea of just war itself.
I argue in this article that the principal reason just war theorists have refrained from
talking about victory is because it raises questions that they would, generally speaking,
prefer to avoid. What does victory mean in the context of a just war? What would win-
ning a just war look like, and can it ever be worth the suffering it causes? Going against
the grain, however, I conclude that the fact that victory brings these issues to the surface
is a reason, not for ignoring it, but for thinking more deeply about it. In doing so, I argue,
it reveals hard truths about the idea of just war itself. On the one hand, it forces us to
confront the fact that ‘just war is just war’ (Booth, 2000: 316–317). On the other, it chal-
lenges us to see in that realisation a case, not for disavowing the task of just war theory,
but for committing ourselves to it with a renewed awareness of its tragic dimensions.
The victory of just war
Before going any further, it is first necessary to clarify exactly what it is that I wish to
focus upon. To this end, I will devote a brief section to setting out the basic elements of
the idea of just war, the concept of victory, and the relation between them. This will pave
the way for the analysis that follows.
Just war
The idea of just war rests on the dual claim that war may sometimes be justified and
that it is possible to discern between just and unjust uses of force.1 This way of think-
ing about war has a long history (Johnson, 1975, 1981; Reichberg et al., 2006; Russell,
1975). Scholars usually trace its origins to early Christian political theology, though
there is evidence to suggest that its roots extend much further back in time (Cox, 2017;
O’Driscoll, 2015, 2018; Raymond, 2010). Over time it coalesced around three discrete
but interlocking sets of principles bearing on the conditions that justify the recourse to
war (jus ad bellum), the limits that constrain the conduct of war (jus in bello), and the
desiderata that should guide its conclusion (jus post bellum). Scholars sometimes quib-
ble over the relative weighting assigned to different principles and how they relate to
one another, but this should not obscure the fact that there is considerable consensus
regarding the identity of these principles. Most scholars agree that jus ad bellum
inquiries necessarily revolve around the principles of just cause, proper authority, right
intention, aim of peace, last resort, and reasonable chance of success; that jus in bello
pivots on the principles of discrimination (i.e., non-combatant immunity) and propor-
tionality; and that the task of jus post bellum analysis is to parse the responsibilities of
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