No umbrella for the rain: Canadian implications following the global revolution in reconnaissance–strike technologies
| Published date | 01 June 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/00207020211019301 |
| Date | 01 June 2021 |
| Author | Marc Kieley |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essay |
2021, Vol. 76(2) 221 –237
Scholarly Essay
No umbrella for the rain:
Canadian implications
following the global
revolution in
reconnaissance–strike
technologies
Marc Kieley
Joint Command and Staff Programme, Canadian Forces
College, Toronto, Canada
Abstract
Global conflicts in 2020 have highlighted the unexpected employment of advanced
ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles by developing military powers. The
development of ballistic missiles by Iran, or the export of advanced drones by
Turkey, are ultimately the result of the American-led revolution in military affairs
that, during the Gulf War, established the potential of precision guided weapons and
reconnaissance systems. In response, America’s competitors have adapted their military
doctrines and developed weapons designed to both counter and copy the West’s
technological advantages. As the Government of Canada implements its defence
policy—Strong, Secure, and Engaged—it has promised to procure a ground-based air
defence system for the Canadian Armed Forces. Careful consideration and analysis are
required, however, to ensure that Canada procures the best possible solution given
limited funding and a wide array of potential threats.
Keywords
Reconnaissance–strike, ground-based air defence, precision weapons, unmanned aerial
vehicles, ballistic missile defence, drone defence, air defence, revolution in military
affairs, Anti Access/Area Denial (A2AD) weapon system
Corresponding author:
Marc Kieley, Canadian Forces College, 215 Yonge Boulevard, Toronto, Ontario, M5M 3H9, Canada.
Email: marc.kieley@gmail.com
International Journal
!The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00207020211019301
journals.sagepub.com/home/ijx
222 International Journal 76(2)
Introduction
On 8 January 2020, Iran launched ballistic missile attacks at American military
bases in Iraq in retaliation for the targeted killing via drone strike of Major
General Qasem Soleimani five days earlier. Eleven missiles hit the Al-Asad airbase,
inflicting light damage and minor injuries. An additional missile hit the Erbil
International Airport, since 2014 the hub for 200 Canadian soldiers involved in
Canada’s counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria mission in Iraq. Canada’s mil-
itary was thus caught in the blast radius of a struggle between an established global
hegemon and an aspiring regional power. Thankfully, the Qiam-2 short-range
ballistic missile failed to explode and caused no reported injuries.
1
In response,
the Canadian military announced temporary troop redeployments until the secu-
rity situation stabilized. It appears that Ottawa assumed the threat posed to
Canadian expeditionary operations would be resolved along with the political
tensions. Such an assumption is unwise. Rather than interpreting the experience
as an isolated incident, this event should serve as a dire warning to the Government
of Canada about the proliferation of advanced military technologies around the
world and the rapid ascension of peer-powers that threaten the security of
Canada’s expeditionary forces.
The line drawn directly from a drone strike to a ballistic missile attack under-
scores an idea only beginning to emerge in Canadian military thinking: that the
revolution in military affairs (RMA) that began in earnest in 1991 with Operation
Desert Storm during the Gulf War did not apply only to Western states.
2
While the
Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) were consumed by a decade of counter-insurgency
in Afghanistan, potential adversaries were undergoing their own military revolu-
tions, with the benefit of observing exactly how Western militaries intended to
fight future battles. Starting from a unique second-turn advantage, these adver-
saries began an effort to counter and copy the tenets and technologies of the West.
Although the Western RMA included elements of both weapons and information
technology, it is the combination of precision guided weapons and surveillance
systems that have begun to proliferate widely and rapidly around the world. This
paper will demonstrate that competitor reactions to the RMA have liberalized the
employment of precision-guided weapons, creating significant capability gaps that
undermine the CAF’s ability to conduct major combat operations while dramat-
ically increasing risk to all expeditionary activities. Reviewing the efforts of com-
petitors to both counter and copy this RMA will highlight the Canadian capability
deficiencies that must be resolved to ensure success in future operations.
1. Agn
es Levallois, Vincent Tourret, and St
ephane Delory, “Iranian operations against El-Asad and
Erbil: What can be learned from the imagery?” Fondation Pour La Recherche Strat
egique, 12
February 2020, https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/strategic-imagery/iranian-operations-
against-el-asad-and-erbil-bases-what-can-be-learned-imagery-part-one-2020(accessed 15 November
ember 2020).
2. Elinor C. Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO (Montr
eal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014), 9.
2International Journal 0(0)
To continue reading
Request your trial