Non-Judicial Review in Ethiopia: Constitutional Paradigm, Premise and Precinct

Pages120-139
DOI10.3366/ajicl.2014.0083
AuthorK. I. Vibhute
Published date01 February 2014
Date01 February 2014
INTRODUCTION

Ethiopia, at different periods, has experienced imperial (1890–1974) and democratic ways of state governance (initiated in 1991), interrupted by the Italian occupation (1936–41) and military junta (1974–91).1

See, M. Abir, Ethiopia: The Era of the Princes, Longmans (1968); J. C. N. Paul and C. Clapham, Ethiopian Constitutional Development – A Sourcebook, vol. I, Artistic Printers (1971); F. Nahun, Constitution for a Nation of Nations: The Ethiopian Prospect, Red Sea Press (1997), ch. 1.

In 1995, contemporary Ethiopia, through the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (hereafter the FDRE Constitution or the Constitution),2

Proclamation No. 1/1995: A Proclamation of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Federal Negarit Gazeta, No. 1, 21 August 1995, p. 1.

has opted for the ‘federal’, ‘democratic’ and ‘republic’ way of governance and polity.3

In Ethiopia, codification of the Constitution was started during the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie I (1930–74). Prior to 1931, Ethiopia had a complex traditional, unwritten constitution nested in the ideal of the monarchy. During his reign, the Constitution of 1931 and the Revised Constitution of Ethiopia of 1955 were enacted. In 1974, when the Emperor Haile Selassie I was overthrown by the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army (commonly known as ‘Derg’), a pan-military dictatorship with communist aspirations, the 1955 Constitution was suspended. Ethiopia operated without any constitution for more than twelve years. The military regime enacted in 1987 the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The 1931 and 1955 Constitutions prominently legitimised imperialism, while that of 1987 witnessed oppressive Derg rule. See generally J. W. van Doren, ‘Positivism and the Rule of Law, Formal Systems or Concealed Values: A Case Study of Ethiopian Legal System’, 3 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy (1994): 165; K. M. Wigger, ‘Ethiopia: A Dichotomy of Despair and Hope’, 5 Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law (1998): 389. Against the backdrop of these three pre-1995 Constitutions, the FDRE Constitution concretises federalism and democratic polity in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Federation is constituted by nine ethnically based States (for a list see article 47) and the City Administrations of Addis Ababa and of Dire Dawa. In a democratic polity, wherein people, in essence, are considered as ultimate guardians of their interests, a constitution strives for empowerment of the people; however, the FDRE Constitution designs and enforces ethnic federalism. It constitutionalises Ethiopia's ethnic diversity and recognises the various ethnic groups as units of self-government. Representatives of ‘Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia’ (NN&Ps), which are a group of persons with a common culture, a common language, a common identity, a common psychological make-up and a predominantly contiguous territory, constitute the House of Federation (HoF), the Upper House of the Parliament. Sovereignty of Ethiopia rests with the NN&Ps. They have the right to self-determination and to secede. (See Preamble to the Constitution and articles 8, 39, 61 and 62.) For further comments see Nahun, supra note 1, ch. 1; A. G. Selassie, ‘Ethnic Federalism: Its Promise and Pitfalls for Africa’, 28 Yale Journal of International Law (2003): 51; E. A. Baylis, ‘Beyond Rights: Legal Process and Ethnic Conflicts’, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law (2004): 529.

Conventionally, the constitution of a nation occupies the highest place in the hierarchy of its laws. It is the supreme law of the land. It operates as the basic norm in the national legal system. Every state power is derived from the constitution. The legal validity of any law or executive action depends on its derivation from the constitution. A law or an executive action in contravention thereof becomes unconstitutional.4

See generally, M. D. A. Freeman, Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence, Sweet and Maxwell (2008), pp. 305–21; J. Stone, ‘Mystery and Mystique in the Basic Norm’, 26 Modern Law Review (1963): 34; H. Kelsen, ‘Professor Stone and the Pure Theory of Law’, 17 Stanford Law Review (1965): 1130; J. Raz, the Authority of Law, Oxford University Press (1979). ch. 7.

A constitution, with a view to preserving and enforcing its supremacy, confers on a court of law, ordinary or constitutional, the power of judicial review and of the determination of legality of a legislative and executive action. It authorises such a court to declare a law or an action that goes against the letter or spirit of the constitution unconstitutional and thereby of no legal effect.

The FDRE Constitution, in line with this principle, occupies the highest place in the Ethiopian legal system and renders any law in contravention thereof invalid. It also imposes a constitutional duty on all citizens, state organs, political organisations and their officers to observe and obey the Constitution. Article 9(1) of the Constitution reads:

Article 9. Supremacy of the Constitution:

The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Any law, customary practice or a decision of an organ of state or a public official which contravenes this Constitution shall be of no effect.

All citizens, organs of state, political organizations, other associations as well as their officials have the duty to ensure observance of the Constitution and to obey it.

It is prohibited to assume state power in any manner other than that provided under the Constitution.

The FDRE Constitution, however, unlike those of most other countries in the African continent,5

For example see the Constitutions of Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Sudan, Zaire and Zambia, which confer the power of judicial review on respective regular courts, and of Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali and Togo, and South Africa, which provide for constitutional review by constitutional courts.

neither allows regular courts of Ethiopia nor does it establish a constitutional court to interpret the Constitution and decide the constitutional validity of any ‘law’ or ‘decision of an organ of a state or a public official’. It confers the power of judicial review and of the interpretation of the Constitution exclusively on the HoF, which is a representative body of all the NN&Ps.6

FDRE Constitution, supra note 1, article 61(1).

No court of law, including the highest court of the land, the Federal Supreme Court, is assigned any significant role to play in either the constitutional review or interpretation of the Constitution.7

However, it is argued that courts in Ethiopia have willingly relinquished their jurisdiction over constitutional matters. See T. S. Bulto, ‘Judicial Referral of Constitutional Disputes in Ethiopia: From Practice to Theory’, 19(1) African Journal of International and Comparative Law (2011): 99, at 110–11.

The FDRE Constitution, arguably, strips the courts of their power of judicial review.8

For further details see part IV of this article.

The system of non-judicial review seems to be one of the unique features of the FDRE Constitution.9

For further details see part II.B of this article.

This paper seeks to offer a constitutional perspective on the novel system of non-judicial review designed under the FDRE Constitution, to highlight and assess the rationality of the constitutional premise on which the non-judicial review is based, and to examine whether the courts still have some role to play in the contemporary non-judicial review. After giving a sketch of the constitutional paradigm of non-judicial review, the paper examines the theoretical and constitutional premise thereof. It then delves into a few pertinent issues relating to, or arising from, non-judicial review.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARADIGM Judicial system – the constitutional outlay

The FDRE Constitution, overhauling the unitary judicial system in the imperial era and the military junta, provides for the establishment of a three-tier ‘regular’10

The phrase ‘regular’, it seems, is used in FDRE Constitution, supra note 1, article 78(5) to distinguish ‘Regular Courts’ from the Religious Courts (Sharia Courts), which are recognised under, and protected by, its article 34(5), and the Customary Courts (referred to in its article 78(5)).

court system at the federal and regional (state) levels. The judicial system envisaged at the federal level is comprised of: (1) the Federal First Instance Courts; (2) the Federal High Court; and (3) the Federal Supreme Court. On a regional (state) level, the Constitution envisages a court system composed of: (1) State First Instance Courts (Woreda Courts); (2) State High Courts (Zonal Courts); and (3) the State Supreme Court.11

The material part of FDRE Constitution, supra note 1, article 78 reads: ‘2. Supreme Federal judicial authority is vested in the Federal Supreme Court. The House of Peoples’ Representatives may, by two-thirds majority vote, establish nationwide, or in some parts of the country only, the Federal High Court and First-Instance courts it deems necessary. Unless decided in this manner, the jurisdictions of the Federal High Court and of the First-Instance Courts are hereby delegated to the State Courts. 3. States shall establish State Supreme, High and First-Instance Courts. Particulars shall be determined by law. 4. Special or ad hoc courts which take judicial powers away from the regular courts or institutions legally empowered to exercise judicial functions and which do not follow legally prescribed procedures shall not be established.’

The Constitution vests the ‘judicial power’ of the federal government and the regional state governments in the Federal and State Courts, respectively.12

FDRE Constitution, supra note 1, articles 79(1) and 50(7).

The Federal Supreme Court, which is the highest court of the land,
...

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