Nonideal theory and compliance—A clarification
| Author | Naima Chahboun |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885114559040 |
| Published date | 01 April 2015 |
| Date | 01 April 2015 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
E J P T
European Journal of Political Theory
2015, Vol. 14(2) 229–245
! The Author(s) 2014
Nonideal theory and
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compliance—A clarification
DOI: 10.1177/1474885114559040
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Naima Chahboun
Stockholm University, Sweden
Abstract
This paper examines the various ways in which nonideal theory responds to noncom-
pliance with ideal principles of justice. Taking Rawls’ definition of nonideal theory as my
point of departure, I propose an understanding of this concept as comprising two
subparts: Complementary nonideal theory responds to deliberate and avoidable non-
compliance and consists mainly of theories of civil disobedience, rebellion, and retribu-
tion. Substitutive nonideal theory responds to nondeliberate and unavoidable
noncompliance and consists mainly of theories of transition and caretaking. I further
argue that a special case of substitutive nonideal theory may arise when noncompliance
is a result of a lack of motivation among citizens. This situation, I suggest, calls for
nonideal theorizing (1) when our aim is to evaluate the political actions undertaken by
specific members of a society (in particular the ruling elite) whose set of feasible options
is constrained as a result of others’ lack of motivation and (2) when a situation of
mutually reinforcing distrust and noncooperation—sometimes called a ‘‘social
trap’’—constrains the feasible option set of the entire population. The main advantage
of the twofold conceptualization of nonideal theory is that it bridges the theoretical gap
between actor-oriented and situation-based accounts of justice: It allows us to preserve
the term ideal justice for justice under minimal feasibility constraints, while recognizing
that a situation where all agents comply with their duties must in some sense be
characterized as just.
Keywords
Collective duties, compliance, feasibility, ideal theory, social traps
Introduction
What is ‘‘nonideal theory,’’ and when do we have reason to engage in this kind of
theorizing? Recently, political theorists have called attention to the conceptual
dichotomy of ideal and nonideal theory. So far, however, most contributions to
this discussion have focused on the uses and characteristics of ideal theory, either
Corresponding author:
Naima Chahboun, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Stockholm 10691, Sweden.
Email: naima.chahboun@statsvet.su.se
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European Journal of Political Theory 14(2)
contesting or defending the adequacy of this approach (Farrelly, 2007; Lawford-
Smith, 2010; Mills, 2005; Stemplowska, 2008; Valentini, 2009). Much less theoret-
ical effort has been devoted to exploring the concept of nonideal theory. As a
consequence, ‘‘nonideal theory’’ is often used in an imprecise way, referring to
anything from pure descriptive research to fact-sensitive normative approaches
and comparative normative accounts (Galston, 2010; Geuss, 2008; Hamlin and
Stemplowska, 2012; Sen, 2006).1 This paper aims to clarify the concept of nonideal
theory by examining its relation to compliance. Studying this relation not only
provides important insights into the various uses of nonideal theory but also sug-
gests a way in which the theoretical gap between ‘‘actor-oriented’’ and ‘‘situation-
based’’ conceptions of justice can be bridged.
My argument proceeds as follows. In the first section, I present my understand-
ing of nonideal theory as consisting of two subparts, complementary and substitu-
tive nonideal theory. Section II examines how this twofold conceptualization
relates to different kinds of noncompliance. The upshot is that complementary
nonideal theory responds to deliberate and avoidable noncompliance, whereas
substitutive nonideal theory responds to nondeliberate and unavoidable noncom-
pliance with ideal principles of justice. Section III presents and addresses the pos-
sible objection that nondeliberate and unavoidable noncompliance contains no
injustice, and therefore is part of ideal, rather than nonideal, theory. Thereafter,
I proceed to cases where noncompliance arises due to citizens’ lack of motivation.
Sections IV and V explore situations where substitutive nonideal theory provides
the only relevant response to this particular kind of noncompliance. Section VI
summarizes the paper’s main conclusions.
I. Two subparts of nonideal theory
The terms ideal and nonideal theory were coined by John Rawls in his influential
book A Theory of Justice (1971). While ideal theory, he explains, assumes strict
compliance and aims at providing principles characteristic of a well-ordered society
under favorable circumstances, nonideal theory asks which principles to adopt
under less happy conditions (Rawls, 2005: 245). Rawls further distinguishes
between two subparts of nonideal theory. For my argument to unfold as clearly
as possible, I will here present them in reversed order.
The first subpart of nonideal theory produces principles for dealing with injust-
ice. This comprises ‘‘the theory of punishment, the doctrine of just war, and the
justification of the various ways of opposing unjust regimes, ranging from civil
disobedience and militant resistance to revolution and rebellion.’’ Further, it deals
with compensatory justice, and with ranking different institutional injustices
(Rawls, 2005: 8, 245). The first kind of nonideal theory, that is, tackles issues
that do not arise in ideal theory as a result of the assumption of full compliance.
The prevalence of partial or full noncompliance with the principles of justice gives
rise to at least two distinct problems. First, we may ask how our own duties are
affected when others fail to comply with theirs (do we, for instance, have a duty to
‘‘pick up the slack?’’). Second, we may wonder how to deal with those who do not
Chahboun
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comply. In both cases, nonideal theory in this sense is a complement to ideal
theory, which tells us what to do when faced with states and individuals that fail
to comply with the rules and regulations derived from the principles of justice
governing a well-ordered society. I will call this complementary nonideal theory.
The second subpart of nonideal theory fulfills a different task: It produces prin-
ciples for governing adjustments to natural limitations and historical contingencies,
which, temporarily and under certain conditions, replace or modify Rawls’ two
principles of justice. For example, as Rawls explains, it may be justified to adopt an
unequal distribution of liberties, given that such measures enable transition of
society from less favorable circumstances to a state where equal liberties can be
enjoyed (Rawls, 2005: 245–249). In this case, nonideal theory does not concern
special issues that do not arise in ideal theory. Rather, it concerns precisely the
same issue as ideal theory, namely which principles should guide just institutions.
The difference between the two is that while ideal theory acts on the premise of
favorable circumstances, nonideal theory takes into consideration prevailing obs-
tacles to achieving perfect justice. Another way of putting this would be to say that
while ideal theory assumes only ‘‘hard,’’ or minimal, feasibility constraints, non-
ideal theory incorporates also ‘‘soft,’’ or less than minimal, feasibility constraints,
characteristic of a particular historical situation (Horton, 2010: 436, Simmons,
2010: 6; Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, 2012). It is in this sense, and no other,
that nonideal theory offers ‘‘guidance here and now’’ in a way which ideal
theory does not (given that circumstances here and now are less than favorable)
(Freeden, 2012: 8; Jubb, 2012: 233).2
There seems to be at least two reasons why unfavorable circumstances call for
nonideal, rather than ideal, theorizing. The first reason is provided by the ‘‘general
theory of the second best,’’ which states that in cases where we cannot realize all
aspects of a complex ideal (like justice), we may well prefer less to more of one of its
components (Goodin, 1995: 53–54; Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956). Say that our ideal
breakfast is pancakes with maple syrup. If we cannot have the pancakes, we will
probably not want the maple syrup either (Estlund, 2011: 216). This shows that
what is best under favorable conditions (where all aspects of our ideal is realizable)
may not be a good guide to what is best under unfavorable ones (where they are
not) (Mason, 2004: 267).3 The second reason is that in order to embark on a
transitory path that will eventually lead to the realization of our ideals, we may
have to opt for a less ideal outcome here and now. If what hinders us from estab-
lishing just institutions are the unfavorable circumstances we find ourselves in, we
should do what we can in order to overcome these circumstances, and this may
conflict with the attempt to maximize justice here and now (even when understood
in the ‘‘nonideal’’ sense invoked by the general theory of the second best) (Gilabert,
2012a: 48).4 Nonideal theory, in this understanding, does not tell us how to respond
to deviations from the rules and regulations issued by just institutions. Instead, it
addresses situations where the attempt to establish fully just institutions (since
bound to fail) would actually prove counterproductive for promoting justice,
now or in the future (Simmons, 2010: 12–13). I will call this subcategory substitutive
nonideal theory.
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European Journal of Political Theory 14(2)
II. Nonideal theory and compliance
Now, the twofold definition of nonideal theory outlined...
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