Normanton (Earl of) v Giles

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
Date1980
Year1980
CourtHouse of Lords
[HOUSE OF LORDS] EARL OF NORMANTON RESPONDENT AND GILES AND ANOTHER APPELLANTS 1979 Nov. 1; Dec. 13 Lord Wilberforce, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Diplock, Lord Salmon and Lord Russell of Killowen

Agriculture - Security of tenure - Agricultural worker - Gamekeeper employed to rear pheasants for sport - Whether employed in “agriculture” - Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976 (c. 80), s. (1) (a) (2)

By section 1 of the Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976: “(1) In this Act — (a) ‘agriculture’ includes — (i) … livestock keeping and breeding … (2) For the purposes of the definition in subsection (1) (a) above — … ‘livestock’ includes any animal which is kept for the production of food …”

The appellant, as gamekeeper employed by the respondent, reared pheasants for shoots, catching birds for laying, clipping their wings, putting them into pens and, after the incubation of the eggs, putting the poults into release pens which they left, becoming wild and available for shooting. Most of the birds killed were sold to game dealers and butchers the proceeds being used to maintain the shoots. All the birds killed and retrieved were consumed as food. After the termination of the appellant's employment he was required to give up possession of the cottage he occupied with his wife on the respondent's estate but he refused to do so on the ground that he was a protected occupier by virtue of section 2 (1)F1 of the Act of 1976. The respondent brought an action in the county court to recover possession.

The judge found as a fact that the purpose for which the birds were reared was not the production of food but sport, shooting and enjoyment and he therefore held that the appellant was not “employed in agriculture” within paragraph 3 (1) of Schedule 3 to the Act so as to be a “qualifying worker” within section 2 (1) whose occupation of the cottage was protected. The Court of Appeal affirmed his decision.

On appeal by the appellant: —

Held, dismissing the appeal, that on the facts found the pheasants were neither “kept for the production of food” within section 1 (2) of the Act nor was the keeping and rearing of them for sport an agricultural occupation so as to come within the scope of “agriculture” in section 1 (1) (a) (i) of the Act and accordingly the appellant was not “employed in agriculture” so as to be a “qualifying worker” within section 2 (1) (a)(post, pp. 30F–H, 33F–H, 36A–D, H, 38D, 39E–F).

Lord Glendyne v. Rapley [1978] 1 W.L.R. 601, C.A. approved.

Decision of the Court of Appeal affirmed.

The following cases are referred to in their Lordships' opinions:

Belmont Farm Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government (1962) 60 L.G.R. 319, D.C.

Glendyne (Lord) v. Rapley [1978] 1 W.L.R. 601; [1978] 2 All E.R. 110, C.A.

Hardwick Game Farm v. Suffolk Agricultural Poultry Producers Association [1969] 2 A.C. 31; [1968] 3 W.L.R. 110; [1968] 2 All E.R. 444, H.L.(E.).

Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food v. Appleton [1970] 1 Q.B. 221; [1969] 3 W.L.R. 755; [1969] 3 All E.R. 1051, D.C.

Peterborough Royal Foxhound Show Society v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1936] 2 K.B. 497; [1936] 1 All E.R. 813.

Smith v. Coles [1905] 2 K.B. 827, C.A.

Stephens' Application, In re [1938] 2 K.B. 675, [1938] 3 All E.R. 311.

Vellacott's Application, In re [1922] 1 K.B. 466.

Walters v. Wright (1938) 159 L.T. 555; [1938] 4 All E.R. 116 D.C.

The following additional cases were cited in argument:

Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Savoy Hotel Ltd. [1966] 1 W.L.R. 948; [1966] 2 All E.R. 299.

Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Joiner [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1701, [1975] 3 All E.R. 1050, H.L.(E.).

Lanarkshire Assessor v. Smith, 1933 S.C. 366.

Lean v. Ball, 1926 S.C. 15.

Portsmouth Corporation v. Smith (1883) 13 Q.B.D. 184, C.A.

Smithers v. Wallis [1903] 1 K.B. 200, C.A.

APPEAL from the Court of Appeal.

This was an appeal by Stanley Giles and Diana Mary Giles, the first and second appellants, by leave of the House of Lords from an order of the Court of Appeal (Stephenson and Lawton L.JJ.) dated July 25, 1978, dismissing their appeal from an order of Judge Lee made on February 18, 1977, in the Salisbury County Court whereby it was adjudged that the Earl of Normanton, the respondent, should recover possession of the cottage premises known as Old Somerley, Somerley Park, Ringwood, HamPshire.

The appellant, Stanley Giles, appeared in person.

Robert Johnson Q.C. and Hugh Bennett for the respondent.

Their Lordships took time for consideration.

December 13, 1979. LORD WILBERFORCE. My Lords, is a gamekeeper a person working wholetime in agriculture? If so, he is, as a qualifying worker, entitled to the protection conferred by the Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976 as regards occupation of his cottage.

This is partly a question of impression — partly a question of statutory interpretation. It is no easier to discard deep-seated preconceptions as to the former than it is to unravel the confusions of the latter. There is no doubt that the apparent simplicity of the case is deceptive.

Mr. Giles was gamekeeper to the Earl of Normanton, and as such, until he was given notice to quit, he occupied Old Somerley, a cottage on the estate. There was detailed evidence as to his duties and the case must be decided upon it, but it is probably true to say that they were fairly typical. He had the normal task of producing pheasants during shoots and of preventing poaching: he cleared vermin and controlled deer Also (and this was what he relied on) he was responsible for rearing pheasants. In the spring he would catch birds for laying, clip their wings and put them in pens. These were in a walled garden adjoining his cottage. After laying, and incubation of the eggs, the poults were put into release pens and as they grew they walked out and in due course, it was hoped, became wild and available for shooting. Some figures were provided as to the number of birds reared and shot in several seasons, interesting to the sportsman but not legally significant. The one relevant point was that the great majority of the birds shot were sold to butchers and game dealers, and no doubt ultimately to individuals by whom they were consumed as food. The proceeds went to maintain the shoot.

I must now refer to the relevant provisions in the Act of 1976. These are the following:

“1 (1) In this Act — (a) ‘agriculture’ includes — (i) dairy-farming and livestock keeping and breeding (whether those activities involve the use of land or not); … (2) For the purposes of the definition in subsection (1) (a) above — ‘consumable produce’ means produce grown for consumption or other use after severance or separation from the land or other growing medium on or in which it is grown; ‘livestock’ includes any animal which is kept for the production of food, wool, skins or fur, or for the purpose of its use in the carrying on of any agricultural activity, and for the purposes of this definition ‘animal’ includes bird but does not include fish.”

On these facts and this law the case was tried in Salisbury County Court by Judge Lee who, it can safely be assumed, was not blind or oblivious to the realities of country life. Before him, and subsequently, the main reliance was placed on subsection (2) above. Mr. Giles contended that pheasants, or at any rate his pheasants, were animals kept for the production of food; therefore were “livestock.” This made them livestock kept and bred within section 1 (1) (a) (i), therefore keeping and breeding of them was “agriculture.”

My Lords, I think that there are two good reasons why this argument does not succeed. First, it was found by the judge that

“the production of food is not the purpose for which birds are reared or for which the defendant” (Mr. Giles) “was employed. The job of the gamekeeper is to get as many pheasants into the woods (sic) so that they become wild … A gamekeeper is there to keep game, for the purpose of shooting and enjoyment. The purpose of shooting pheasants is sport. It is no part of food production or the keeping of livestock.”

There was clearly evidence to support these findings and they are fatal to the argument. It may be the case that unless people in general were willing to eat pheasants and to pay for that pleasure, shooting would become uneconomic, but it does not follow from this that pheasants are produced for food. If they were to be so produced many easier ways of rearing and killing them could be found.

But, secondly, the argument fails, in my opinion, on another ground. The section does not say “produced for food” but “kept for the production of food.” This seems to me to be a different thing altogether and to be directed towards animals such as bees, or (as to skins or fur) mink or silver foxes. Animals kept and bred for food — i.e., to be eaten, such as cattle or chickens, come under subsection (1). The presence of “wool” in subsection (2) is puzzling, but I cannot believe that sheep, kept as prospective mutton or lamb, do not come under subsection (1) — there could scarcely be anything which more obviously does. Subsection (2) is not needed to bring them in under “agriculture.” If this is right, it is clear that pheasants do not come within subsection (2) at all. whatever they do, they do not produce food: on the contrary they consume it.

This conclusion however does not, as seems to have been thought, conclude the matter. It only leads to the real point as I see it: i.e., whether pheasants are livestock and whether Mr. Giles kept and bred livestock. Section 1 (1) (a) is quite independent of section 1 (2): the latter says what is included in livestock, not what “livestock” means. That “includes” here signifies “includes” is shown by the preceding definition n of “consumable produce” which takes the form “means …”. So we still have to consider whether apart from the special inclusions, pheasants can be described as “livestock.” Though many people would instinctively deny this, it does, on the authorities, seem to be a puzzling question.

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6 cases
  • Wetherall v Smith
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 8 Febrero 1980
    ...because such jumping could be regarded as a recreational purpose and, within the recent decision of the House of Lords in Earl of Normanton v. Giles and Another (1980) 1 WLR 29, would not be used for agriculture. 16 The plaintiff started his action in November 1977 and by his particulars of......
  • Hemens v Whitsbury Farm and Stud Ltd
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 5 Noviembre 1986
    ...within subsection (2), nor would any hut used for the purposes of the shooting be within subsection (4). Cf. Earl of Normanton v. Giles (1980) 1 W.L.R. 28. Nevertheless, the fact that not all operations carried out on agricultural land are themselves agricultural does not of itself meet Mr.......
  • Wilkins and Another v Lewis
    • United Kingdom
    • Chancery Division
    • 29 Julio 2005
    ...of are agriculture. In the case of shooting the claimants pray in aid the observations of the House of Lords in Normanton v Giles [1980] 1 WLR 28. That case was concerned with whether the rearing of pheasants for sport was an agricultural occupation so as to come within the meaning of "agri......
  • William Agnew McPhail and Another (Appellants (Plaintiffs) v Philip Edwin Greensmith (Respondent
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    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 6 Agosto 1987
    ...of which the one relevant to this appeal is the production of food." This was approved by Lord Wilberforce in Normanton v. Giles [1980] 1 WLR 28. I refer also to the case' of Smith v. Coles [1905] 2 KB 827. The headnote reads: "A workman was employed on a farm as farm carpenter, and assiste......
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