Norton v Ellam
Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
Judgment Date | 01 January 1837 |
Date | 01 January 1837 |
Court | Exchequer |
English Reports Citation: 150 E.R. 839
EXCH. OF PLEAS.
S. C. M. & H. 69; 6 L. J. Ex. 121; 1 Jur. 433. Referred to, In re Bethell, 1887, 34 Ch. D. 566; In re George; Francis v. Bruce, 1890, 44 Ch. D. 630; In re Brown's Estate, [1893] 2 Ch. 304.
[461] norton . ellam. Exch. of Pleas. 1837. - On a note payable with interest on demand, the Statute of Limitations begins to run from the date of the [S. C. M. & H. 69; 6 L. J. Ex. 121; 1 Jur. 433. Referred to, In re Bethell, 1887, 34 Ch. D. 566; In re George; Francis v. Bruce, 1890, 44 Ch. I). 630; In re Brown's Estate, [1893] 2 Ch. 304.] Assumpsit on a promissory note, payable on demand, with lawful interest. Plea, that the cause of action did not accrue within six years. At the trial before Lord Abinger, C. B., at the Middlesex sittings after last Michaelmas term, the note given in evidence was in the following form : - " I promise to pay 4001. on demand, with lawful interest." The question was, whether the statute rail from the date of the note, or from the time of the demand. A verdict was taken for the plaintiff', with liberty to the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit, if the Court should be of opinion that the statute began to run from the date of the note, there having been a demand within six years after the date of the note, but no subsequent promise to pay. Butt having in Hilary Term last obtained a rule accordingly, Petersdorff now shewed cause. When a note is payable on demand, a demand is necessary before the statute can begin to run. In the old editions of Selwyn's N. P. a case is quoted, Christie v. Foiisick, in which it is stated to have been held that a note payable on demand is payable immediately, and that the Statute of Limitations runs from the date ; but, in a subsequent edition (the 7th), p. 334, it is said : " With respect to promissory notes payable on demand, the statute runs not from the date of the note, but from the time of the demand ; " and a " late case in B. R., overruling Christie \. Fonsick," is referred to. A strong argument arises from the circumstance of its being made payable with interest, as it shews that the parties intended some time to elapse before a demand. In Rmnhtll v. Ball (10 Mod. 38), it was certainly held that in debt on a note pay-[462]-able on demand, it is not necessary to allege a demand in the declaration ; because the bringing the action was a demand : but that was in an action by bill. That is now altered, the writ of summons being...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Kong Ming Bank Bhd. v Sim Siok Eng
... ... ( 1933 ) 2 M.L.J. 198 ... Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Margolis [ 1954 ] 1 W.L.R. 644 ; [ 1954 ] 1 All E.R. 734 ... Norton v. Ellam ( 1837 ) 2 M. & W. 461 ... Tricomdas Cooverji Bhoja v. Gopinath Jiu Thakur ( 1916 ) 44 Ind.App. 65 , P.C ... ...
-
Gobind Lalwani v Basco Enterprises Pte Ltd
...(distd) Irving v Veitch (1837) 3 M & W 90; 150 ER 1069 (folld) Knowles v Michel (1811) 13 East 249; 104 ER 366 (refd) Norton v Ellam (1837) 2 M & W 461; 150 ER 839 (folld) Siqueira v Noronha [1943] AC 332 (refd) Statute of Frauds 1677 (c 3) (UK) Arjan Chotrani (Arjan & Co) for the plaintiff......
- Stage Club Ltd v Millers Hotels Pty Ltd
-
Leibson Corporation v TOC Investments Corporation
...any stipulation as to the time of repayment, a present debt is created which is repayable at once without any previous demand; see Norton v Ellam (1837) 150 ER 839. But, as Mr Hollington rightly accepted, the context may well require otherwise. Here the use of the word “advance” was, as the......
-
Business Transactions and the Limitations Act, 2002
...periods after the issuance of the loan in order to restart any applicable limitation period. 76 See, for example, Norton v. Ellam (1837), 150 E.R. 839; Royal Bank v. Dwigans, [1933] 3 D.L.R. 178. 77 See M. Sclisizzi, "Preserving Commercial Obligations" in The Limitations Act, 2002: Learn th......