Norwegian Foreign Policy in the 1980s, edited by Johan Jørgen Holst, Norwegian University Press, distributed world-wide, excluding Scandinavia, by Oxford University Press, £20

Date01 April 1987
DOI10.1177/004711788700900112
Published date01 April 1987
AuthorPeter Scott
Subject MatterArticles
91
These
criticisms
notwithstanding,
Professor
James’
range
is
broad.
His
knowledge
of
the
interesting
cases
is
encyclopaedic
and
accurate,
and
he
displays
a
particular
gift
for
pinning
down,
in
language
both
precise
and
simple,
their
salient
features.
For
that
alone,
the
book
is
a
stimulating
read.
-Frank
Berman
Norwegian
Foreign
Policy
in
the
1980s,
edited
by
Johan
Jørgen
Holst,
Norwegian
University
Press,
distributed
world-wide,
excluding
Scandinavia,
by
Oxford
University
Press,
£20.
This
book
of
seven
lectures
delivered
in
April
1983
to
seminars
in
the
United
States
of America
arranged
by
the
Norwegian
Institute
for
International
Affairs
as
part
of
their
presentation
of
&dquo;Scandinavia
Today&dquo;,
is
an
authoritative
piece
of
officially
supported
information
work.
I
found
them
very
well
worth
reading.
These
lectures
give
a
frank,
and
not
always
complimentary,
account
of
how
Norwegian
Foreign
Policy
is
made
today.
For
example,
Norwegian
officials
do
not
use
standing
interdepartmental
Official
Committees
to
make
sure,
as
far
as
possible,
that
any
diplomatist
or
other
official
when
he
speaks
or
writes
to
a
foreign
government,
does
so
in
the
knowledge
that
he
is
expressing
the
agreed
view
of
all
interested
Norwegian
Departments.
On
the
contrary,
it
appears
that
decisions
on
oil,
gas
and
economic
and
commercial
policy
at
the
official
level,
are
left
more
to
individual
Ministries
than
would
seem
prudent
in
a
larger
country-and
this
at
a
time
when
there
is,
according
to
Birger
Fredriksen
(Lecture
No. 4),
an
increasing
volume
of
&dquo;delegated
legislation&dquo;
coming
onto
the
statute
book.
By
contrast;
co-ordination
at
the
Ministerial
and
Parliamentary
levels
(Norwegian
Ministers
are
not
necessarily
Members
of
Parliament)
appears
to
be
both
close
and
regular.
This
is
achieved
by
means
of
the
&dquo;Extended
Foreign
Affairs
Committee&dquo;
of
the
Parliament.
That
Committee
is
very
like
an
enlarged
Cabinet
Sub-Committee
in
Great
Britain.
It
has
26
Members
who
include,
in
addition
to
the
12
members
of the
Foreign
Affairs
Committee
of
the
Parliament,
the
President
and
Vice-President
of
the
Parliament,
the
Chairman
and
Vice-Chairman
of
the
Parliamentary
Defence
Committee,
the
Minister
for
Foreign
Affairs
(who
convenes
the
Committee’s
meetings),
the
Prime
Minister
and
the
Minister
of
Defence.
Ministers
in
charge
of
other
Departments
attend
when
subjects
of
interest
to
them
are
under
discussion,
and
officials
also
attend
as
required.
Despite
its
constitutionally
paramount
role
in
Foreign
Policy
matters,
the
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
and
successive
Foreign
Ministers
have
found
it
necessary
and
valuable
to
consult
government
colleagues,
leaders
of
the
major
Parliamentary
Parties,
and
through
them,
the
dozen
or
so
influential
groups
-
from
the
Norwegian
TUC
to
the
Alcoholic
Abstinence
Organization
-
who
have
an
interest
in
Foreign
Policy,
by
means
of
this
Committee.
This
wide
consultation
and
co-ordination
helps
to
sustain
that
broad
consensus
on
important Foreign
Policy
questions
on
which
Norwegian
Governments
of
all
parties
have
traditionally
sought
to
rely.
Norway’s
principal
Foreign
Policy
interests
are
listed
in
these
lectures
as,
a
stable
and
prosperous
Europe,
her
own
defence
as
part
of
Western
European
security,
and
as
much
freedom
of
action
as
her
international
treaty
obligations
will
allow.
In
addition,
Norway
is
shown
to
have
a
genuinely
benevolent,
and
financially
generous, interest
in
under-developed
countries-accompanied
by
a
proper
regard
for
such
Norwegian
commercial
advantage
as
can
legitimately
be
denved
from
Foreign
Aid.
The
lectures
suggest
that
the
pursuit
of
these
interests
by
a
Norway
incomparably
richer
than
she
was
before
1970
has
been
a
not
always
agreeable
education
in
the
drawbacks
and
responsibilities
of
power.
Lecture
No.
5
contains
repeated
complaints
(possibly
for
effect)
of
United
States’
and
Allied
pressure
on
Norway
both
to
increase
her
oil
production
(in
spite
of her
known
policy
of conservation)
as
an
insurance
for
her Allies
against
possible
difficulties
in
obtaining
supplies
of
Middle
East
Oil,
and
also
to
increase
her
sales
of
natural
gas
to
Western
Europe
in
order
to
reduce
Allied
dependence
on
cheaper
Soviet
gas
exports.
For
sound
economic
and
diplomatic
reasons,
Norway
may
well
find
it
very
difficult
fully
to
comply
with
such
requests,
and
she
has
not
in
fact
done
so.
As
the
author
suggests.
Norway
may
very
well
have
to
make
her
oil
and
gas
policies
important
elements
in
her
Foreign
Policy-he
claims
that
this
is
not
the
case
at
present,
as
the
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
has
almost
nothing
to
do
with
oil -
in
order
to
guard
against
provoking
acute
differences
with
the
governments
of
the
USSR
and
the
United
States
and
with
her
European
Allies.
All
this
seems
obvious

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