Not Talking about Jerusalem: Reply to Miller
| Author | Michael Lessnoff |
| Date | 01 December 1980 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1980.tb01262.x |
| Published date | 01 December 1980 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
NOT TALKING ABOUT JERUSALEM:
REPLY TO MILLER
MICHAEL
LESSNOFF*
University
of
Glasgow
MY
article equated socialism with social ownership of the means
of
produc-
tion. Miller demurs from this equation, and
I
shall return to the point. But first
I
shall reconsider my other equation, between social ownership
of
the means of
production and unfettered democratic control of the economy. Put briefly, my
position was and is that social
(or
common,
or
public) ownership must mean
ownership by society
(or
the community,
or
the public). If ownership of the
means of production is distributed among individuals
or
groups within society,
then
society
itself owns nothing.
I
cannot find any cogent argument against this
in Miller’s critique. To follow Miller in defining social ownership as a situation
such that ‘the means of production are not privately owned by a sub-section of
the population’ entails categorizing Macpherson’s simple market society as
ips0
fucto
a system
of
social ownership, which still seems to me absurd.
Presumably in order to avoid such an absurdity, Miller argues elsewhere
(inconsistently with the above definition) that a system which
divides
rights of
ownership in productive units between worker co-operatives and a democratic
state is a system of social ownership, if and only
if
the state also uses its powers
so
as
to
prevent exploitation, repression and injustice. But
I
do not think it can
be right to equate social ownership with the absence of injustice
by
de$nition.
We should keep separate the questions of what social ownership is, and
whether it is just,
or
promotes justice. On my approach, since ownership is
power, whether social ownership promotes justice depends on how the power
in question is used. It may well be that it should be used to establish just such
an economic system as Miller describes. That is not the issue
I
was concerned
with.
If Miller’s account
of
social ownership
is
unsatisfactory, what of my own?
Put briefly, my claim is that
social
ownership is ownership by society, and that
social
ownership
of assets is, most basically, control by society (as a whole)
of
the use
of
these assets and
of
the benefits created thereby.
I
argued, further,
that this control is realized by (and only by) a democratic state with unfettered
economic authority.
I
think the argument stands,
so
long as one admits that
democratic political institutions (whatever exactly these are) do give effective
controlling power to society as a whole. And
I
am inclined to add, that
if
democratic institutions cannot thus realize social ownership, then nothing can.
But this alternative to my original position is not one
I
think Miller would be
happy to adopt.
*
I
am grateful
to
David Miller for his comments
on
my article, and
to
the editor
of
Polirical
Studies
for this opportunity
to
reply.
Politkal
Studies.
Vol.
XXVIII,
No.
4
(590-591)
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