A Note On Section 14 (1) And (2) Of The Sale Of Goods Act, 1893
| Author | A. D. Hughes |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1959.tb00555.x |
| Date | 01 September 1959 |
| Published date | 01 September 1959 |
A NOTE ON
SECTION
14
(1)
AND
(2)
OF
THE
SALE
OF
GOODS
ACT,
1898
THE
purpose of this note is to examine the present effect of these two
subsections in the light of subsequent judicial interpretation, and to
suggest a revised version of them which would be more in line with
modern doctrine.
Section
14
runs as follows:
“Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any statute
in that behalf, there is no implied warranty
or
condition as to
the quality
or
fitness for any particular purpose of goods
supplied under a contract of sale, except
as
follows
:
-
“
(1)
Where the buyer, expressly
or
by implication, makes
known
to
the seller the particular purpose for which
the goods are required,
so
as to show that the buyer
relies on the seller’s skill
or
judgment, and the goods
are of a description which it is in the course of the
seller’s business to supply (whether he be the
manufacturer
or
not), there is an implied condition
that the goods shall be reasonably
fit
for such purpose,
provided that in the case of a contract for the sale
of a specified article under its patent
or
other trade
name, there is no implied condition as to its fitness
for any particular purpose
:
“
(2)
Where goods are bought by description from a seller
who deals in goods of that description (whether he
be the manufacturer
or
not), there is an implied
condition that the goods shall
be
of merchantable
quality; provided that
if
the buyer has examined the
goods, there shall be no implied condition as regards
defects which such examination ought to have
revealed.”
I
shall be mainly concerned in what follows with subsection
(l),
and for the time being we can leave subsection
(2)
on one side.
Similarly,
I
am leaving out of account for the moment the proviso
to subsection
(1).
What we have left of subsection
(1)
is, apart
from two expressions, delightfully clear and has given rise to no
dimculty whatsoever.
The two expressions to which
I
refer are these
:
first,
“
particular
purpose,” and secondly,
“
so
as to show that the buyer relies on
the seller’s skill
or
judgment.”
As
to the first, it is now well settled
that a purpose may
be
a
“
particular purpose
”
within the meaning
of this subsection even though it is the normal purpose for which
the article sold
is
used, and that the act of ordering goods whose
purpose is evident from their name
“
makes known
”
to the seller
484
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