NOTES OF CASES
| Date | 01 December 1937 |
| Published date | 01 December 1937 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1937.tb00021.x |
Dec.,
1937 MODERN
LAW
REVIEW 239
NOTES
OF
CASES
Damages-Law
Reform
(Miscellaneous
Provisions)
Act,
1934
Rose
v.
Ford,
[I9371
A.C.
826.
At long last the House of Lords has been
given the opportunity of settling what had become to be known as
“
the
problem in
Rose
v.
Ford.’’
It
would involve an unwarrantable trespass
on the space of this Review to describe in detail how the subjects involved
in the case became
a
“problem.” The writer of this note endeavoured to
disentangle the various threads in the complicated skein of its history in
the
Annual Survey
of
English Law,
1935,
pp.
158-162,
to which he ventures
to draw the attention
of
the curious.
The first point authoritatively settled by the House of Lords is that
Flint
v.
Lovell,
[1g35]
I
K.B.
354
was correctly decided and that damages
can be given to a person negligently injured by another in respect of the
objective
fact
of
the shortened expectation of life.
“I
am satisfied,” said
Lord Atkin “that it has always been a usual element in the assessment
of damages in such cases” (p.
834).
“I
think he has a legal interest entitling
him to complain if the integrity of his life is impaired by tortious acts, not
only in regard to pain, suffering, and disability, but also in regard to the
continuance of life for its normal expectancy.” (Lord Wright, at p.
847.)
‘‘
I
regard impaired health and vitality, not merely
as
a cause of pain and
suffering, but also as a loss of a good thing in itself.
Loss
of expectation
of life is a form in which impaired health and vitality mayexpress them-
selves as a result. In such a loss there is a
loss
of a temporal good, capable
of evaluation in money, though the evaluation
is
difficult.” (Lord Roche,
Their Lordships admitted the difficulties involved in the assessment
of damages on this head. Lord -4tkin (see pp.
834-835),
although he raised
one or two interesting queries, preferred to leave the matter until
it
is
properly brought before their Lordships.
“
It
would be paradoxical
if
the
law refused to give any compensation at all, because none would be
adequate.
.
. .
Special cases may occur, such as that of an infant, or an
imbecile, or an incurable invalid, or a person involved in hopeless diffi-
culties. The judge or jury must do the best they can, in the circumstances,
in this case as in other cases.” (Lord Wright, at pp.
848
and
850.)
Lord
Roche, who, as a member of the Court of Appeal, had very reluctantly
concurred in its decision in
Flint
v.
Lovell.
now expressed his full agreement
with the rule of law laid down in that case but still doubted whether
it
had been rightly decided on its particular facts and gave lengthy expression
to his anxieties concerning the assessment
of
damages on this head (see
pp.
859
et
seq.).
He agreed with Lord Sands’ view in
Reid
v.
Lanarkshire
Traction
Co.,
[I9341
S.C.
79,
that “the matter is
so
hedged about with
metaphysics” that in directing a jury he would
be
content to tell them
“that the weight to be given to this element must be moderate, and that
they must not consider what price the man would have put upon his life.”
Lord Roche commended the manner of assessment adopted by the Court
of Appeal in the instant case.
“It
was obviously and rightly arrived at
without regard to the question of the amount of future earnings, and
solely
on the basis of what life was going to be worth to a healthy young woman,
earning her own living, with dependent parents, and with some prospects
of
marriage. This method seems to me to be correct.
It
eliminates,
and rightly
so.
the question of rich and poor, and pays regard to
the
at P.
859.)
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