NOTES OF CASES
| Date | 01 July 1949 |
| Published date | 01 July 1949 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1949.tb00134.x |
NOTES
OF
CASES
THE JURISDICTION
OF
RENT TRIBUNALS
R.
v.
Paddington and St. Maylebone Rent Tn'bfdnal,
Ex
p.
Dell
London
and Provincial Properties, Ltd.
119491
1
All E.R.
720,
deserves special attention for two reasons.
It
is one of the most
important cases yet decided on the interpretation of the Furnished
Houses (Rent Control) Act,
1946,
and it raises issues of outstanding
general interest on the relationship between administrative tribunals
and the ordinary courts.
The facts were that, purporting to act under powers given by
section
2
(1)
of the Act, the Paddington Borough Council referred
to
the tribunal the contracts of all but
two
of
a
block
of
555
flats.
The original block reference was improperly made out, and the
council subsequently referred
802
of the contracts individually.
Four
of the flats were not subject to the Act;
832
of the others
were subject to the Rent Restriction Acts, and therefore the tribunal
had no power
to
reduce their rents:
R.
V.
Paddington and
St.
Maylebone Rent Tribunal,
EX
p.
Bedrock
Investments, Ltd.
[1947]
K.B.
973.
All were described as furnished though the majority
were not, and the names of some of the lessees were given incor-
rectly. The rents
of
the two flats not originally referred by the
council had previously been referred by the tenants to the tribunal,
which had reduced them. The remainder were referred by the
council in pursuance
of
a decision by its Public Health Committee
that where two
or
more reductions of rent had been made by the
tribunal in the case of any property, all other contracts of letting
to which the Act applied relating to that property would be referred
to
the tribunal. The tribunal considered the rents of eight of the
furnished flats and ordered them to be reduced (though in ordering
the reductions it was influenced by
a
misinterpretation
of
earlier
cases on the Act
:
see
per
Lord Goddard
C.J.
at pp.
728-0).
At
the hearing the representative
of
the council explained the reason
for the references, but called no evidence and did not cross-examine
the witnesses for the landlords. The landlords moved for certiorari
to quash these eight determinations, and prohibition to order the
tribunal not
to
proceed with the other references.
Lord Goddard
C.J.,
delivering the judgment of the Divisional
Court, held that the proceedings were bad
ab initio
because the
action of the council in referring all the flats without ascertaining
the wishes of the tenants and without inquiring into the facts of each
individual case was not a bona fide exercise
of
its powers under the
Act. The Act was
'
designed for the protection
of
the tenants and
not
for
the penalising of landlords
'.
A further reason for ordering
363
864
THE
MODERN
LAW
REVIEW
VOL
12
certiorari was that the landlords had been given no opportunity
to deal with one of the points mentioned by the tribunal in
announcing its decision to reduce the rents. This was that the flats
did not come up to present-day standards because in no caw were
the ceilings more than eight feet high. Members of the tribunal
had noted the height of the ceilings before the hearing while
inspecting the flats in the presence of two of the landlords’
employees, one of whom had agreed that it was less than was.
required by modern standards.
‘
Surely
’,
said his Lordship,
‘
in
common fairness, if this was to be considered by the tribunal, they
ought to have given the applicants sonle opportunity of dealing with
it
.
.
.
In our opinion to take into account a matter of this kind,
of
which
no
intimation had been given
to
the landlords, brings
this case exactly within the decision
of
the House
of
Lords in
Board
of Education
v.
Rice,
the judgments
in
which are
so
well known
that we need not set them out.’
The first part of the judgment rests
on
the assumption that,
if
it
be accepted that the local authority used its statutory powers for
a
purpose alien to that for which they were conferred, then it must
be
accepted that the reference was invalid.
It
is submitted, with
great respect, that this assumption is not well founded. An attempt
might perhaps be made to justify the rrssumption in the following
manner. Firs:, it might be said, if
a
tribunal reduces the rent of
premises with respect to which there is
no
contract to provide
services
or
furniture and which are not
in fact
furnished, it has
acted outside its jurisdiction and its decision will be quashed
:
R.
v.
Blockpool Rent Tribunal,
Ex
p.
Ashton
[l948]
1
All
E.R.
900.
If,
therefore, the local authority refers such premises to a tribunal,
prohibition will lie to prevent the tribunal from entertaining the
reference. (It may be observed at this point that in many cases
the courts have conceded to inferior tribunals the right to determine
conclusively the existence of facts on which their jurisdiction
depends: see,
e.g.,
R.
v.
Ministcr of Health
[1939]
1
K.B.
282;
R.
v.
Ludlow,
Ex
p.
Barnsley Corporation
[1947]
K.B.
634;
D.
M. Gordon in
(1944)
60
L.Q.R.
244.)
Secondly, a local autho-
rity may act
ultra vires
by using its statutory powers for an
improper purpose
(dttournement de
pouvoir)
as well as by excecding
them. Assuming that the Divisional Court was right in holding
that the local authority had misconceived the purpose of the relevant
section of the Act, then surely (it might be said) the reference in
the present case was as bad as a reference in the first type of case
would
be.
These arguments, however, fail to recognise the places
of
the tribunal and the local authority in the scheme of the Act.
The Act is intended to give the tribunal
a
very substantial measure
of
independence of the ordinary courts. Thus, the courts will not
order certiorari solely on the grounds that a tribunal has failed to
take into account matters which
it
ought to have taken into account,
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