Nuclear Britain: the "Population Explosion"
| Author | Gary Jacobs |
| Published date | 01 April 1967 |
| Date | 01 April 1967 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/004711786700300104 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
61
NUCLEAR
BRITAIN:
THE
"POPULATION
EXPLOSION"
GARY
JACOBS
There
are
several &dquo;
population
explosions &dquo;
threatening
world
stability
today.
One
of
the
most
difhcult
to
control,
and
the
one
with
potentially
the
most
danger,
is
the &dquo;
explosion &dquo;
in
the
number
of
countries
with
actual
or
possible
nuclear
weapons
capabilities.
Now
there
are
only
five
nuclear
powers,
but
a
rapid
increase
in
the
number
of
these
countries
is
expected
as
other
states
begin
to
&dquo; keep
up
with
the
Jones’s
&dquo;.
Nuclear
weapons
are
no
longer
comparable
to
a
Cadillac
in
this
loose
sociological
analogy
-
they
can
be
purchased
for &dquo;
Volkswagen
&dquo; prices,
and
even
a
&dquo;
Miniforce &dquo;
can
serve
a
purpose.
Britain’s
decision
to
build
nuclear
weapons
followed
almost
inevitably
from
the
aftermath
of
World
War
II.
One
factor
in
this
decision
was
the
collapse
of
Allied
unity
and
the
coming
of
the
Cold
War,
in
which
Britain,
as
the
only
undefeated
Western
European
power,
regarded
herself
as
almost
on
a
par
with
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union,
and
therefore
as
a
Great
Power
who
naturally
should
have
the
latest
weapons.
Furthermore,,
British
scientists
had
contributed
greatly
in
developing
the
bomb
- the
United
States
did
not
reciprocate
this
co-operation,
especially
after
the
Fuchs
case.
The
MacMahon
Act,
which
closed
off
the
sharing
of
nuclear
secrets
between
the
United
States
and
any
nation
without
considerable
nuclear
knowledge
and
achieve-
ment
of
its
own,
formalized
this
collapse
in
collaboration.
It
became
evident
that
if
Britain
was
to
have
a
bomb,
she
would
have
to
develop
one
on
her
own,
hopefully
thus
reviving
the
strained
Anglo-American
wartime
intimacy.
It
seemed
vital
for
Britain
to
be
a
nuclear
power
because
it
was
feared
that
America
would
lapse
into
her
traditional
isolationism,
leaving
the
defence
of
Britain
and
Europe
up
in
the
air.
Although
the
Americans
subsequently
confirmed
their
commitments
to
defend
Britain
and
Europe,
the
very
possibility
of
having
to
go
it
alone
has
made
the
possession
of
nuclear
weapons
attractive
insurance.
Economically,
a
nuclear
Britain
seemed
to
make
sense,
especially
after
the
4.7
billion
pounds
rearmament
program
fcllowing
Korea
proved
to
be
too
great
a
strain.
Nuclear
weapons
promised
a
shift
to
deterrence,
allowing
reductions
in
conventional
armaments
while
increasing
British
fire-power,
permitting
resources
to
be
redirected
to
domestic
development
and
strengthening
sterling.
There
was
also
the
hope
for
great
benefits
from
peaceful
application
of
atomic
energy.
Along
with
these
economic
advantages,
it
was
hoped
that
a
nuclear
Britain
could
better
maintain
her
prestige
and
Great
Power
status,
a
status
obviously
on
the
decline.
In
short,
the
decision
to
build
and
maintain
an
independent
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