Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia
| Author | James Lo |
| Published date | 01 September 2003 |
| Date | 01 September 2003 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002070200305800308 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
JAMES
LO
Nuclear
deterrence
in
South
Asia
Theory
and
practice
NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
HAVE
REVOLUTIONIZED
the
practice
of
war
in
the
20th
century.
Prior
to
the
invention
of
such weapons
in 1945,
states
in
conflict
could
weigh
their
chances
of
military
success
against
an
adversary
based
on the
expected
costs
and
benefits
of
going to
war.
Since
the
introduction
of
nuclear weapons,
however,
the
balance
of
this strategic
calculus
has
changed considerably.
Deterrence theorists
argue
that
nuclear weapons now
take
the
risk
out
of
this
calculation-
the
incredible
destructive
capacity
of
these
weapons
imposes such
a
high
price
on
both
warring
parties
that
it
renders
any
military
victory
virtually
meaningless. In
his
pioneering work
The
Absolute
Weapon,
Bernard
Brodie
expressed
this
sentiment:
"thus
far
the
chief
purpose
of
our
military
establishment
has
been
to
win
wars.
From
now
on
its
chief
purpose
must
be
to
avert
them.
It
can
have
no
other
useful
purpose."'
This
paper questions
the
basic
soundness
of
the
nuclear
deterrence
regime
between
India
and
Pakistan,
and
argues
that
the
possibility
of
deterrence
failure in
this
context
is
significant.
Given
the
historical,
geographic
and
psychological
context
of
these
rival
states,
nuclear
weapons
are
more
likely
to
create
greater
insecurity
(than
security)
for
James
Lo
is
an
MA
student
at
Brock
University.
He
would
like
to
thank
Pierre Lizle
and
the
anonymous
referees
for
their
comments
on
an
earlier
draft
of
this
article.
1
Bernard
Brodie,
ed,
The
Absolute
Weapon
(New
York:
Harcourt
Brace
1946),
69.
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Summer
2003
James
Lo
the
states
involved.
This
view
stands
in
stark
contrast to
the
analysis
by
South
Asian
security
experts,
like
University
of
Texas
professor
Sumit
Ganguly,
who
argues
that
"the
presence
of
nuclear
weapons
[in
the
region]
has
actually
made
things
better,
for
now."
'
2
The
central argu-
ment
is
that
new
nuclear
states
such
as
India
and
Pakistan
are,
inevitably,
drawn
towards
nuclear war
by
their
need
to
undertake
low-
level
aggressive
actions
to
maintain
the
credibility
of
their
nuclear
forces.
Such
actions,
however,
are
in sharp
contrast
to
the
distant
bat-
tles
that
were
fought
between
the
us
and
the
Soviet
Union during the
Cold
War,
and
these
actions
have
a
significantly
higher
probability
of
triggering
a
catastrophic
deterrence
failure.
Beginning
with
an
examination
of
the
evolution
of
nuclear
deterrence
theory,
this
paper
pays
special
attention
to
developments
particularly
important
to
India
and
Pakistan.
It
then
proceeds
with
a
case
study
of
the
nuclear weapons
issue
in
India
and
Pakistan,
up
to
the
present
day.
Drawing
on theoretical
insights
provided
in
the
first
sec-
tion,
it
will
then
critically
analyze
the
stability
of
the current
deterrence
regime. Finally,
it
examines
some
of
the
implications
that
these
find-
ings
have
for
security
studies,
setting
the
agenda
for
future
research.
DOES
DETERRENCE
WORK?
THEORETICAL
INSIGHTS
Deterrence
is
fundamentally
based
on
an expressed
threat
that
exacts a
cost greater
than
the
potential
benefits
of
an
adversary's
unwanted
action,
leading
an
adversary
to
avoid
that
unwanted
action.'
It
can
be
based
on
a
threat
of
punishment,
where
a
state
threatens
to
destroy
assets
that
are
valuable
to
its
adversary
if
its
own
assets
are
destroyed.
These
punitive
threats
usually
focus
on
targets
such
as
cities
and
their
economic infrastructure,
objects
that
states value
but
which
are
unre-
lated
to
military
operations.
Deterrence
can
also
be
based
on
a
threat
of
denial, where
a
state
takes
the
action
of
convincing
its
adversaries
that
their unwanted
actions, such
as
an
invasion,
will
be
stopped
and
they
will
not
achieve
their military
or
political
objectives.
Denial
threats
usually
target counterforce
targets
such
as
military units
and
weapons
of
mass
destruction,
which prevent
the
unwanted
military action
from
2Peter
Grier,
A
Big
test
of
Nuclear
Deterrence,
i
December
2002,
available
at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/olo4/plS2-wosc.html.
3
Keith
Payne
and
Dale
Walton, "Deterrence
in
the
Post-Cold
War
World,"
in
John
Baylis
et
al.,
eds,
Strategy
in the
Contemporary
World
(New
York:
Oxford
University
Press
2002),
162-3.
396
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Summer
2003
To continue reading
Request your trial