Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Inequality of States
| Published date | 01 December 1977 |
| Date | 01 December 1977 |
| Author | Ian Bellany |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1977.tb00470.x |
| Subject Matter | Review Articles |
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND
THE INEQUALITY
OF
STATES
IAN
BELLANY
University
of
Lancaster
THE
book-length literature’ on the subject of nuclear proliferation is not of the sort
that has much patience with theorising; there is very little interest in constructing
models,
or
outlining frameworks for enquiry. It is not for the most part then, strictly
speaking,
of
much academic interest. Not that its authors have sought the attention
of
scholarly audiences particularly. More usually they have been addressing opinion-
formers (government officials, leader writers and the like), warning them about the
‘dangers’
of
a world
of
widespread ownership
of
nuclear weapons; teaching them the
facts,
or
some
of
them, of nuclear technology and economics; and advising them, and
through them governments,
or,
at any rate Western governments, of the necessity for
international agreement to slow
or
stop further nuclear proliferation.
This both complicates and simplifies the job
of
a reviewer. If there
is
little in
the
literature that is appropriate for him to comment on, he at least has the opportunity
of
fitting his own framework of enquiry over the facts. Not
only
does this bring some order
to an untidy subject, but it also gives the reviewer an outside chance of saying something
original and useful.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (N.P.T.) came ‘into force’
in
1970.
Its
principal provisions are three. First, states without nuclear weapons (non-nuclear)
on
signing the treaty undertake neither to manufacture nor import them. Secondly, states
with nuclear weapons (nuclear powers) undertake not to transfer them to non-nuclear
states. And thirdly, the treaty provides for a neutral inspectorate with
the
job
of
identifying and bringing
to
light attempts to contravene the treaty. The initiative for
bringing the treaty into existence was largely that
of
the super-powers-the United
States and the Soviet Union. The United Kingdom associated itself with the super-
powers’ position. The remaining acknowledged nuclear powers, France arid China,
chose to have nothing to do with the treaty, but have never done anything seriously
to
imperil its prospects.
If we leave to one side the motives for becoming a nuclear power that have nothing
to do with security (not, in general, too bold a simplification when looking
to
the
future) a qualitative application of game theory makes a useful way of modelling the
position
of
a
potential nuclear power.
The well known ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ can easily be translated into the potential
nuclear power’s dilemma. Two adversary states might conclude separately that their
I
William
B.
Bader,
The United States and the Spread
of
Nuclear Weapons
(New
York,
Pegusus, 1968);
C.
F.
Barnaby (ed.)
Preventing the Spread
of
Nuclear Weapons
(London,
Souvenir Press, 1969); Leonard Beaton,
Must the
Bomb
Spread?
(Harmondsworth, Penguin,
1966); Leonard Beaton and John Maddox,
The Spread
of
Nuclear Weapons
(London, Chatto
and Windus, 1962); Bennet Boskey and Mason Willrich (eds.)
Nuclear Proli/eration: Prospects
for Control
(New York, Dunellen, 1970);
William
Epstein,
The Last Chance: hiuclear Prolijera-
tion and Arms Control,
(New York, Free Press,
1976);
Ashok Kapur,
India’s Nuclear Option:
Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Makin,?,
(New
York, Praeger,
1976);
George
H.
Quester,
The
Politics
of
Nuclear Proliferation
(Baltimore,
John
Hopkins
University
Press,
1973).
R.
N.
Rosecrance (ed.),
The Dispersion
of
Nuclear
Weuppons
(New
York, Columbia
University
Press, 1964).
Political Studies,
Vol.
XXV,
No.
4
(594-598).
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