Obama and the use of force: a discursive institutionalist analysis of Libya and Syria
| Author | Morgan Thomas Rees |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211033942 |
| Published date | 01 September 2022 |
| Date | 01 September 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211033942
International Relations
2022, Vol. 36(3) 382 –402
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/00471178211033942
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Obama and the use of force:
a discursive institutionalist
analysis of Libya and Syria
Morgan Thomas Rees
Griffith University
Abstract
What factors explain variation in decisions to use force in American foreign policy? Consider the
Obama administration’s decision to intervene in Libya. Upon assuming office, Obama outlined a
foreign policy marked by a self-professed doctrine, ‘don’t do stupid shit’. In short, Obama sought to
avoid the unnecessary use of military force, but when the threat of mass atrocity emerged, despite
strong protests from senior advisers, he became drawn into the 2011 Libya intervention. By contrast,
following chemical weapon attacks in Syria in 2013, Obama reneged on upholding his so-called ‘red-
line’, pursuing diplomatic measures even though support for a military response was strong. But
what explains this variation? Rationalist perspectives across the board have tended to overrate
interpretive efficiency. Yet, such assumptions obscure the capacity for interests to be interpreted
in different ways. To redress this issue, I build on discursive institutionalist insights, developing a
model to show how principled and cognitive ideas act as weapons in institutional debates, serving
to repress or displace information. To show how agents come to rely on principled or cognitive
ideas, I develop a three-part model offering two mechanisms – cognitive repression and normative
displacement – by which agents displace and repress certain types of information, depending on the
‘form’ in which that information is presented. This enables a more comprehensive understanding of
how different interpretations lead to policy variation at critical moments of decision.
Keywords
American foreign policy, discursive institutionalism, Libya, national interest, Obama, Syria
Introduction
What explains variation is decisions to use force in U.S. foreign policy? Upon assuming
the presidency in 2009, Barack Obama advocated for a restrained foreign policy. Through
years of foreign policy missteps by the Bush administration, Obama had become
Corresponding author:
Morgan Thomas Rees, School of Government and International Relations, Griffith University, 170 Kessels
Road, Nathan, QLD 4111, Australia.
Email: m.rees@griffith.edu.au
Twitter: @Morgan_T_Rees
1033942IRE0010.1177/00471178211033942International RelationsRees
research-article2021
Article
Rees 383
convinced of the need for humility in the use of American power.1 Such a position would
be reflected throughout his presidency by a foreign policy doctrine encompassed by
‘retrenchment and accommodation’,2 and ‘case-by-case’ policy formation.3 His widely
reported self-described mantra was ‘don’t do stupid shit’.4 Indeed, during the early years
of his presidency, Obama consistently advocated restraint, highlighted by his resistance
to any U.S. involvement in democratic or anti-establishment, grassroots movements dur-
ing the Arab Spring beginning in late 2010. However, he departed from this preferred
position by leading the U.S. and other states in the 2011 NATO military intervention in
Libya, despite the U.S. having ‘no strategic interests’5 there. Then, in 2013, having read-
ied U.S. forces for a retaliatory strike against the Assad regime following chemical
weapons attacks – Obama relented despite the ongoing humanitarian crisis given that
‘there was no Benghazi to be saved’.6 Instead, he decided to pursue diplomacy, much to
the dismay of U.S. allies, members of his own administration, and many in Congress.
But what explains this variation?
While providing important insights regarding the foundations of state interests, most
theories of International Relations, from realism7 to constructivism,8 have struggled to
provide a comprehensive explanation for variation in foreign policy decision-making.
There is an implied and shared assumption that agents interpret information efficiently.
Therefore, change in state interests only occurs following inexplicable ‘exogenous shocks’
to either the material or ideational foundations of state interests. As such, these theories
tend to overlook the endogenous sources of variation, which emerge from interpretive
tensions between foreign policy agents as they continually contest the significance of
events to state interests. Such approaches to foreign policy decision-making, which focus
on balance of power considerations or logics of appropriateness, are therefore limited.
State interests are constantly being re/interpreted and contested by agents with competing
values and ideas. As such, instances with similar circumstances may yield vastly different
responses. But why is this the case, and what factors explain how decision-makers reach
different interpretations of state interests amid similar circumstances?
To address this question, and redress some of the shortcomings in conventional
approaches, I adopt the discursive institutionalist9 distinction between principled and
cognitive ideas,10 which I argue are ultimately used as ‘weapons’11 to contest the mean-
ing of events in terms of foreign policy interests. I develop a three-part model offering
two mechanisms – cognitive repression and normative displacement – to show: first,
how different ‘types’ of ideas reduce uncertainty in cognitive and principled ways; sec-
ond, that these ideas are used as weapons in coordinative, institutional debates to repress
or displace12 different types of information and third, ideas come in different ‘forms’
which may push decision-makers, in this case, the president, towards either more princi-
pled or cognitive interpretations of foreign policy interests.
Empirically, I work to explain variation in Obama’s decisions to use force across the
crises in Libya and Syria. To do so, I examine the discursive interactions between foreign
policy agents within the Obama administration in the lead up to the decision to intervene
in Libya, and the decision to pursue diplomatic solution in Syria. In doing so, I demon-
strate how different ‘types’ of ideas were used as ‘weapons’ resulting in inconsistent
interpretations of U.S. interests and policy variation across the two cases. These are
important cases given that, in both instances, Obama displayed a willingness to use force
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