Objective Conditions Count, Political Beliefs Decide: The Conditional Effects of Self-Interest and Ideology on Redistribution Preferences
| Author | Klaus Armingeon,David Weisstanner |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0032321721993652 |
| Published date | 01 November 2022 |
| Date | 01 November 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321721993652
Political Studies
2022, Vol. 70(4) 887 –900
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321721993652
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Objective Conditions Count,
Political Beliefs Decide: The
Conditional Effects of Self-
Interest and Ideology on
Redistribution Preferences
Klaus Armingeon1,2
and David Weisstanner3
Abstract
How can we explain variation in demand for redistribution among cross-pressured voters? We
argue that redistributive preferences reflect an interaction between material self-interest and
political ideology. The self-interest argument predicts growing opposition to redistribution as
income increases, while the argument of ideologically driven preferences suggests that left-leaning
citizens are more supportive of redistribution than right-leaning citizens. Focusing on cross-
pressured voters, we expect that the difference in redistribution preferences between left- and
right-leaning citizens is smaller at the bottom of the income hierarchy than at the top. Among
the group of left-leaning citizens, the role of material self-interest is expected to be smaller than
among right-leaning citizens. We provide evidence in line with our argument analysing data from
the European Social Survey in 25 European democracies between 2008 and 2018.
Keywords
redistribution preferences, political ideology, left-right, self-interest, cross-pressured voters
Accepted: 15 January 2021
Introduction
Self-interest-based models of redistributive preferences in comparative political economy
are premised upon rational voters who derive their policy preferences from their position
in the income distribution. Probably the best-known example is the Meltzer-Richard
model, suggesting that preferences for redistribution are a function of the difference
1Department of Political Science, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
2Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Trento, Trento, Italy
3 Department of Social Policy and Intervention, Institute for New Economic Thinking, and Nuffield College,
University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Corresponding author:
David Weisstanner, Department of Social Policy and Intervention, 32 Wellington Square, Oxford, OX1 2ER,
UK.
Email: david.weisstanner@spi.ox.ac.uk
993652PSX0010.1177/0032321721993652Political StudiesArmingeon and Weisstanner
research-article2021
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