Objectivity and accountability in migration control using risk assessment tools
| Date | 01 March 2019 |
| Published date | 01 March 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1477370818771831 |
| Author | Tim Dekkers,Robert Koulish,Maartje van der Woude |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
771831EUC0010.1177/1477370818771831European Journal of CriminologyDekkers et al.
research-article2018
Article
European Journal of Criminology
2019, Vol. 16(2) 237 –254
Objectivity and accountability
© The Author(s) 2018
in migration control using risk
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assessment tools
https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370818771831
DOI: 10.1177/1477370818771831
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Tim Dekkers
Function: PhD Candidate, Department: Criminal Law and Criminology, Leiden Law School, Netherlands
Maartje van der Woude
Function: Professor, Department: Criminal Law and Criminology / Van Vollenhoven Institute, Leiden Law
School, Netherlands
Robert Koulish
Function: Professor, Department: MLAW, University of Maryland, USA
Abstract
In recent years immigration control has seen an increase in the implementation of risk assessment
technology. According to proponents, such technologies would lead to more objective decision-
making compared with the discretionary decisions made by street-level bureaucrats. However,
because empirical research on risk assessment technology is limited, it is not quite clear how
risk assessment technology in migration control impacts the decision-making process and to
what extent it does make the decision-making process more objective. This article aims to shine
a light on this issue by making use of a case study of Amigo-boras, a smart camera system used
by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (RNM) for migration control purposes. Qualitative data
show that Dutch immigration officers are still able to exercise discretion in the execution of their
tasks, placing doubt on claims to objectivity. This finding is confirmed in quantitative data based
on a US case study. Although quantitative data on the decision-making process would be able to
show if these doubts were justified, the RNM has no such data on the outcomes and selection
process using Amigo-boras. This information gap raises new issues regarding the objectivity of the
selection process and the individual accountability of RNM officers.
Keywords
Accountability, discretion, migration control, risk assessment, technology
Corresponding author:
Tim Dekkers, Department of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University, Turfmarkt 99, The Hague,
The Netherlands.
Email: t.j.m.dekkers@fgga.leidenuniv.nl
238
European Journal of Criminology 16(2)
Risk assessment and migration control
Since the abolition of border control as a result of the Schengen Agreement, European
countries have been facing a dilemma. On the one hand, the open borders give the oppor-
tunity of free travel and trade, resulting in great economic benefits. On the other hand,
open borders create risks regarding migration and crime, because not only will tourists
and the transportation industry be able to benefit from the lack of border control, but so
will criminals and irregular migrants. Immigration is increasingly framed as a security
issue because immigrants are presumed to bring risks of terrorism, cross-border crime
and illegal immigration (Barker, 2012; Bosworth and Guild, 2008; Dekkers et al., 2016;
Provine and Doty, 2011; Van der Woude et al., 2014), a development also referred to as
‘crimmigration’ (Stumpf, 2006, 2011; Van der Woude et al., 2014). Schengen member
states have thus been searching for ways to balance economic benefits and border secu-
rity measures, by trying to distinguish bona fide travellers from dangerous criminal
immigrants (Aas, 2011; Koulish, 2013). Because the legal possibilities for physical bor-
der control using walls and border guards to tackle this issue are limited owing to the
Schengen Border Code, a solution to this issue is often sought in information technology.
The EU has seen an upsurge in border technologies aimed at controlling migration and
border mobility (Broeders and Hampshire, 2013; Kenk et al., 2013) by differentiating
between wanted and unwanted immigrants using actuarial and risk assessment methods
(Haddal, 2010; Harris, 2012; Rosenblum, 2012).
A country that has been receiving an increasing amount of attention in this regard is
the Netherlands. Since August 2012, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (RNM),
which is responsible for migration control in the Netherlands, has been using a smart
camera system called Amigo-boras. The system is used during migration checks called
the Mobile Security Monitor (MSM), aimed at combatting irregular migration, identity
fraud and human smuggling. Amigo-boras is used, amongst other things, to detect vehi-
cles that carry a high risk related to those offences using automated risk profiling. Since
the introduction of Amigo-boras other countries have been watching the system with
great interest. Sweden, Denmark (Sveriges Radio, 2017), Belgium (NOS, 2016, 2017)
and, according to sources within the RNM, Germany have expressed interest in develop-
ing or are developing smart camera systems similar to Amigo-boras.
Such systems are not implemented without reason, of course. Research has indicated
that policy-makers have much faith in technology to address complex social issues
(Broeders and Hampshire, 2013; Hayes and Vermeulen, 2012; Kearon, 2013; Kemshall,
2003; Meijer, 2011; Muller, 2004; Nye, 2004; Wilson and Weber, 2008) and the wide
array of border technologies shows that migration is no exception. The development
towards technology-assisted decision-making is often praised by policy-makers for its
efficiency, its effectiveness and – more importantly in the context of this article – its
alleged objectivity. It would have many benefits over traditional human decision-making
by immigration officers. The technology and actuarial methods used to separate high-
risk from low-risk individuals are viewed as objective: computers do not have opinions
and biases to which humans are prone, they would be able to pinpoint high-risk individu-
als making migration controls effective, and, because fewer resources are wasted on
checking low-risk individuals, they would increase the efficiency of migration controls.
Dekkers et al.
239
The academic literature on decision-making does give reason to question how realis-
tic the imagined scenario of technology-assisted decision-making is. As Lipsky ([1980]
2010) writes in his classic work on decision-making in public services, street-level
bureaucrats are difficult to manage and they value their ability to make discretionary
decisions. Implementing information technology to (partially) replace their ability to
make decisions as they see fit could therefore meet resistance. Empirical studies in vari-
ous disciplines and professional settings have shown that this can be the case (Broadhurst
et al., 2010; Fitzgibbon et al., 2010; Kemshall, 2011; Lynch, 1998; Oleson et al., 2011;
Schneider et al., 1996). Of course, if the individuals who are supposed to use the infor-
mation technology do not actually do so, this has implications for the objectivity of deci-
sions and, by extension, the broader goals regarding migration and security for which the
technology was introduced.
The above leads to the question: ‘To what extent does the use of risk assessment tools
such as Amigo-boras increase the objectivity of decisions that would otherwise be taken
by street-level bureaucrats?’ This question will be answered by using a case study of
Amigo-boras. Observations, interviews and quantitative data will be used to see how
Amigo-boras is used to make decisions during MSM checks. To further reflect on the
results of the Amigo-boras case study, insights from other risk assessment technologies
– in particular a US case study of a comparable system – will be used.
Discretion, human agency and technology
For a long time human input was seen as a crucial factor for decision-making (Lipsky,
2010). The real world can be complex and many situations need careful consideration
and the weighing of possibilities by human beings because ‘the nature of service provi-
sion calls for human judgement that cannot be programmed and for which machines
cannot substitute’ (Lipsky, 2010: 161). Decision-makers therefore need to be able to
exercise discretion to solve the issues without being completely bound by rules, regula-
tion and rigid protocols. Discretionary decision-making allows for the nuance and effi-
ciency needed to solve the complex situations professionals face on a daily basis (Lipsky,
2010; Spader, 1984). Now that risk assessment technology is widely available, oppo-
nents fear that technology is taking the place of individual professionals in the decision-
making process. In the words of Hannah-Moffat et al.: ‘Risk technologies are often
characterized as having supplanted much of practitioners’ discretionary decision making
with structured, quantitatively derived decision-making templates’ (2009: 391). The
rigid procedures and formats that can come with the use of risk assessment technology
possibly prohibit or limit human influence on the decision-making process (Buffat,
2015), comparable to Weber’s ‘iron cage’ analogy in the context of bureaucracy. The
concept of the iron cage entails ‘an ever increasing focus on rationality, technical superi-
ority, and efficiency [which] can imprison people in an iron cage of rationality’ (Maguire,
2014: 70). The striving for rationality and efficiency within organizations would result in
a plethora of rules and regulations, which would act as a cage for the individual worker,
restricting individual expression and the...
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