Obstacles to Japanisation: The Case of Ford UK
| Date | 01 January 1990 |
| Published date | 01 January 1990 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/01425459010002359 |
| Pages | 17-21 |
| Author | Barry Wilkinson,Nick Oliver |
| Subject Matter | HR & organizational behaviour |
OBSTACLES
TO
JAPANISATION:
THE
CASE
OF
FORD
UK 17
Obstacles to
Japanisation:
The Case of
Ford UK
Barry Wilkinson and Nick Oliver
T
he higher dependency of the new pro-
duction systems places increased power in
the labour force.
The concept of Japanisation is currently attracting
considerable attention. The term refers to the emulation
of Japanese industrial practice by British companies. On
one hand it has been argued that the "Japanisation of British
Industry is unequivocal"[1], on the other the usefulness
of the Japanisation concept has been questioned[2, 3]. This
article takes the perspective that Japanisation is a useful
shorthand term for the emulation of Japanese industrial
practice by Western companies. A recent survey of The
Times
1000
manufacturing companies clearly points to such
emulation; approximately two-thirds of replying companies
reported the use of just-in-time
(JIT)
production and supply,
with a median date of introduction of 1986. The use of
practices such as total quality control and statistical process
control were also very much in evidence[4].
However, as the authors have argued elsewhere, a key
characteristic of Japanese-style production systems (particu-
larly those operating on JIT principles) is that they
dramatically increase the
dependency
between the various
agencies involved in the production process[5, 6]. With little
in the way of buffer stocks as insurance against disruption,
the effects of problems at one point in the process quickly
ripple through the whole system. Total quality control places
different demands on a workforce; activities tend to be
grouped around products or flowlines rather than divided
along functional lines; work teams governed by output-
based controls are the norm, with responsibility for
functions such as quality and routine maintenance devolved
to the team and reduced demarcations according to skill
levels.
These heightened dependencies stretch between
organisations as well as within them, as bought-out parts
are sourced from a restricted set of suppliers and delivered
just-in-time, with quality assured.
The article considers the issues arising from the
Japanisation process by examining two sets of events at
Ford UK in 1988; the national strike and the row and
subsequent withdrawal by Ford over the planned
electronics plant at Dundee.
The 1988 Strike
February 1988 saw the start of Ford's first national strike
for a decade after a secret ballot of the workforce produced
a rejection of
a
three-year deal on pay and conditions which
took official union leaders and Ford management by
surprise. Ironically, both Ford and the unions placed much
of the blame for the industrial action on the government's
ballot legislation. Trade union officials had already endorsed
the deal, and without the secret ballot of the rank and
file members a strike may well have been averted.
The offer which was rejected by shopfloor workers with
the support of their stewards but not sanctioned by union
leaders until after the ballot result met with disagreement
on three main fronts. First, the deal included a 7 per cent
pay rise followed by two further annual increases of 2.5
per cent above the rate of inflation. Given Ford UK's
respectable financial performance workers felt that the
company could afford a more substantial rise. Second,
many did not like the idea of being locked into a three-
year deal. Finally, the "strings" — an acceptance of
flexible working practices — were considered
unacceptable, particularly by skilled workers. In a
reference to the company's emulation of Japanese practice
picket line banners proclaimed "We're Brits not Nips"[7].
Part of the antagonism towards the new flexible work
practices was based on workers' experience of changes
introduced after a two-year agreement in 1985. One
assembly line worker commented that:
Flexibility means that every 102 seconds a car comes by,
and not only do you have to screw something into the car,
but in between you have to tidy
up,
check your tools, repair
things and check you've got enough parts.
You
do not have
a single job any more. If there is no work on the line they
move you to where there is work.
You
are working the whole
time[8].
Similarly, a skilled craftsman — craftsmen have been
particularly critical of the changes introduced since 1985
— commented:
I was taken on as a millwright. I now have to double up as
a rigger, welder or plumber. The training is a joke
—
we
had three days learning welding skills... Now they want to
shove us on the lines when they want. It's not
on[9].
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