Ohochuku v. Ohochuku1—A Variation Of Thynne v. Thynne2

Published date01 May 1960
AuthorP. R. H. Webb
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1960.tb00608.x
Date01 May 1960
MAY
1960
NOTES
OF
CASES
327
even when, as in
Kiriri,
the statute, on its true construction, does
not appear to contemplate the possibility of a civil action.
GEORGE
J.
WEBBER.
OHOCHUKU
‘u.
OHOCHUKU l-A VARIATION
OF
THYNNE
v.
THYNNE
THE decision of Wrangham
J.
in the
Ohochluku
case cannot fail to
interest conflict lawyers and family lawyers alike. The facts present
a polygamy problem
primae
impressionis
with a rather nice twist.
The situation was as follows: the petitioning wife and her husband
were Nigerian Christians whom the learned judge found to be
domiciled in Nigeria at all material times. They had married in
Nigeria according to local custom in
1949.
According to expert
evidence given
at
the trial the effect of this ceremony was to consti-
tute a valid marriage according to Nigerian law. The evidence also
showed that the marriage was potentially polyandrous and poten-
tially polygamous, since Nigerian law would permit both the wife
and the husband-even though they were Christians-to contract
lawful marriages with other spouses during the subsistence
of
that
marriage. In the course of her evidence, the wife stated that she
had intended the marriage to be for life and that neither party
should take other partners during the subsistence of the marriage.
The respondent husband came to England in
1950
and the wife
joined him there in
1953.
The parties evidently had no doubt
about the validity of their marriage in Nigeria, but apparently the
wife found that
it
would be desirable for her to have a marriage
certificate to produce in England. Accordingly the parties (neither
of whom had taken another spouse since the Nigerian marriage)
went through
a
second ceremony of marriage at the St. Pancras
register office. The report does not state how the parties described
their status to the registrar. In the events which happened, the
wife in
1959
sought
a
decree of divorce on the ground of her hus-
band’s cruelty. The suit was not defended and the Queen’s Proctor
did not appear. The court assumed jurisdiction under section
18
(1)
(b)
of the Matrimonial Causes Act,
1950,
the conditions thereby
laid down being fulfilled. The wife was thrown back on this alterna-
tive claim to the court’s jurisdiction because
of
the judge’s finding
that the husband had never lost his domicile of origin in Nigeria.
Having found in the wife’s favour on the issue of cruelty,
Wrangham
J.
rhetorically asked:
The only question is, which
marriage is it that has to
be
dissolved?
It
is
not made abso-
lutely clear in the report what cases counsel
for
the wife cited to
his lordship
or
what cases his lordship considered in the course of
his judgment.
It
is, however, clear that the learned judge observed
that recent cases showed that a court dissolving a marriage must
1
[1960]
1
W.L.R.
183; El9601
1
All
E.R.
253.
2
[1955]
P.
272
(C.A.).
3
[1960]
1 All
E.R.
at
p.
255.

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