On the Notion of Rule
| DOI | 10.1177/019251218700800206 |
| Date | 01 April 1987 |
| Published date | 01 April 1987 |
| Author | Joseph Losco |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
155-
On
the
Notion
of
Rule:
A
Construct
for
Integrating
the
Behavioral
and
Life
Sciences
1
JOSEPH LOSCO
ABSTRACT.
This
paper
explores
the
utility
of
the
construct
of rule
as
a
means
for
integrating
insights
from
the
behavioral
and
life
sciences.
It
is
suggested
that
biological
"rules"
hypothesized
by
evolutionary
biology
and
mediated
proximately
by
empathy
constitute
a
kind
of
basic
grammar
around
which
human
social
action
is
built.
Over
the
past
decade,
evolutionary
biology
has
boldly
advocated
its
utility
in
elucidating
issues
in
the
social
and
behavioral
sciences.
Recent
papers
and
articles
(e.g.
Losco
and
Baird,
1982;
Peterson
et
al.,
1983)
have
chronicled
the
impressive
impact
of
evolutionary
approaches
in
the
field
of
political
science.
Yet,
while
evolutionary
biology
may
provide
a
key
for
increasing
our
awareness
of
the
biological
roots
of
behavior,
alone
it
is
clearly
inadequate
to
the
task
of
supplying
a
complete
picture
of
human
activity
(see
Losco,
1981).
Ultimately,
a
complete
account
of
social
and
political
conduct
requires
the
connection
of various
levels
of
analysis;
we
must,
as
Hines
has
suggested,
determine
how
to
&dquo;get
from
sociobiology
to
psychology
to
meaningful
political
action&dquo;
( 1982:
12).
In
this
article,
I
explore
the
concept
of
rule
as
a
potential
vehicle
for
facilitating
the
integration
of
insights
from
the
life
and
behavioral
sciences,
an
integration
which
I
believe
to
be both
necessary
and
possible
in
forging
a
workable
theory
of
human
action.2
2
The
Concept
of
Rule
Connecting
human
action
with
rule
formulation
and
rule
following
is
not
novel
either
in
epistemological
or
behavioral
studies.
For
many
thinkers,
however,
the
rules
of
human
conduct
are
considered
strictly
social
in
origin.
For
Wittgenstein,
Winch,
and
Peters,
the
force
of
the
statement
that
humans
are
&dquo;rule-following
animals&dquo;
comes
precisely
from
the
recognition
that
behavior
and
the
rules
from
which
it
issues
are
social
products.
However,
it
can
be
argued
that
the
rule-following
proposition
formulated
in
purely
societal
terms
is
far
too
restrictive
in
providing
a
framework
for
the
analysis
of
human
conduct.
While
it
provides
a
context
for
understanding
behavior,
it
tells
us
little
about
the
ends
humans
pursue
by
virtue
of which
social
rules
are
designed,
and
it
ignores
the
arena
of
causal
explanation,
citing
the
existence_ of
rules
rather
than
detailing
why
such
rules
are
followed,
ignored,
or
disobeyed.
To continue reading
Request your trial