On ‘The Right to Associate’ and the Effectiveness of Voluntary Associations
| Published date | 01 April 1981 |
| Author | Andrew Reeve |
| Date | 01 April 1981 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9256.1981.tb00042.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
12
Adrian
E
2
Zis
than before (e.g. barter transactions) is the difference
between voluntary and coerced relations. (Heath, 1976, p 19-20).
--
PrIany market transactions read as voluntary may, on investigations transpire
to
be coerced, For example, Radio Luxembourg has recently been advertising
a
$5
package including tape-recorded advice and examples of letters of application
designed to improve purchasers' chances of success at job interviews, Assuming
the effectiveness of the product and no significant multiplier effect stemming
from the financial success of the venture on the part of the entrepreneurs, one's
job chances are adversely affected simply by doing nothing. Either one joins
in and sends off
€5
or one gets lefT-behind. Either way there is no aggregate
benefit in such an exchange and consumption of the product, although recorded
in the National Accounts as final, is what Hirsch rightly deems defensive. It
leads to no net benefit in welfare and indeed adversely affects it if one has
to run
to
stay where one is in the job queue.
It
is this argument which Hirsch
is
implicitly applying
to
the race for educational qualifications. However,
the fact that competition for these
goods
is coerced in the specific sense
outlined above does not take us very far down the road to explaining why, if
it
is not that they are positional goods, these goods should be the ones for
which competition is
so
structured. Nor does it tell us why, if indeed
it
is
the case, goods distributed in such a way should be of increasing importance.
It
is,
however, obvious that such goods fulfill two conditions: first, they are
distributed through a mechanism of individualistic competition and secondly,
competition for them is channelled through an intermediate good (e.g. education).
Hirsch's contention was that there are certain goods
-
positional goods
-
which,
however distributed, will lead to a paradox of affluence
as
demand for them
increases.
It
is the contention of this paper that there are certain methods
of distribution, which, whatever the goods under consideration, will lead
to
the phenomenon Hirsch associates with affluence. The difference between
coerced and positional competition is that the former is
a
descriptive one whilst
the latter aspires to be explanatory.
It
is beyond the scope of this paper
to
develop a typology
of
circumstances in which coerced competition arises,. but it
is
important to note that unless one can show a causal link between economic
gyowth and the prevalence of the method of exchange then the 'paradox
of
affluence'
is only contingently related to affluence itself.
References
Heath,
A
(1976), Rational Choice and Social Exchange, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Hirsch,
F
(1977), Social Limits
to
Growth, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
........................
Qri
'THE
RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE'
AND
THE
EF~ECTIVE~~ESS OF
V~LUNTARY
ANDREW REEVE
This note is prompted by the observation of the European Commission on Human
Rights that closed shops violate the right to associate. This view derives
from the assertion that a right toassociate includes the right not
to,
associate,
and from the judgement that the latter is violated by an organisation which is
inclusive, bringing in those who have no wish to join.
On that
view,
the right not
to
associate is apparently violated by the inclusion
of an unwilling individual, whether by making him join or by keeping him in.
Analogously, the exclusion of an individual who wishes to join and the ejection
of
an
existing associate who does not wish to leave would seem to violate the
right to associate. Clearly, no voluntary association could respect all
these rights: the individual would be entitled
to
join at will, being neither
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