On the Surprising Implications of Coercion Theory
| Author | Miriam Ronzoni |
| Published date | 01 August 2022 |
| Date | 01 August 2022 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0032321720985720 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321720985720
Political Studies
2022, Vol. 70(3) 739 –756
© The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0032321720985720
journals.sagepub.com/home/psx
On the Surprising Implications
of Coercion Theory
Miriam Ronzoni
Abstract
According to much of self-labelled coercion theory, the state is both the ground of egalitarian
demands of distributive justice, and the (sole) domain to which such demands apply, in virtue
of its exercise of coercive power which only distributive equality can justify. This article argues
that, when properly unpacked in its theoretical commitments, coercion theory has surprising
implications both within and beyond borders. Within borders, coercion is either *fully* justified by
its necessity for autonomy; or it is not, in which case egalitarian distributions cannot do the trick,
either – although *political* equality might. Beyond borders, the view turns out to have significantly
demanding global implications, contrary to how it is often presented. It indeed differs from global
egalitarianism simpliciter, but it gives rise to an interesting, complex set of cross-border obligations
which reach far beyond the ‘global sufficiency, domestic equality’ picture. This surprising account of
the implications of coercion theory rests on a crucial insight: when closely examined, the view turns
out to be grounded in a natural duty of justice account of political obligation.
Keywords
coercion, global justice, natural duty of justice, Michael Blake, democracy
Accepted: 10 December 2020
Introduction
According to most proponents of ‘coercion theory’ (Blake, 2011), the coercive apparatus
of the state is both the ground of egalitarian demands of distributive justice and the
domain to which such demands apply (Blake, 2001, 2011, 2013, 2016; Miller, 1998;
Nagel, 2005). Liberal justice, so the argument goes, prescribes indeed the global protec-
tion of the preconditions for freedom or autonomy (Blake, 2001; Valentini, 2011). This,
however, requires no egalitarian distribution per se. The demand for comparative entitle-
ments only arises because state coercion is apparently at odds with autonomy or freedom,
but also necessary for it; special conditions must, therefore, apply to its exercise. Michael
Blake (2001, 2011) makes this argument in its starkest form, by arguing that, whereas the
conditions to secure autonomy, which are due to all moral agents, only require suffi-
ciency, state coercion triggers equality among those subject to it.
Political Theory, The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
Corresponding author:
Miriam Ronzoni, Political Theory, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK.
Email: miriam.ronzoni@manchester.ac.uk
985720PSX0010.1177/0032321720985720Political StudiesRonzoni
research-article2021
Article
740 Political Studies 70(3)
This article disputes such straightforward ‘global sufficiency, domestic (distribu-
tive) equality’ narrative, by arguing that coercion theory, when unpacked in its theo-
retical commitments, has surprising implications both within and beyond borders.
Within borders, there is no straightforward connection between coercion and egalitar-
ian distributions. Coercion is either fully justified by its necessity to secure autonomy,
in which case no further conditions are required; or it is not, in which case distributive
equality does not seem able to do the trick, either – although political equality might.
Beyond borders, even if we were to accept the domestic egalitarian implications of the
view, the global implications would be much more demanding than it is normally
assumed – and for different reasons than those raised by its cosmopolitan critics (e.g.
Caney, 2008). It indeed differs from global egalitarianism simpliciter, but it gives rise
to an interesting, complex set of cross-border obligations which reach far beyond
global sufficiency.1 First, equality as such is not a requirement of global justice, but
the imperative that each state be internally egalitarian is; hence, I owe to those who
are not my compatriots that they be able to live under their own egalitarian institu-
tions. Second, it is plausible to claim that our world needs additional and different
coercive institutions compared with existing ones – not only coercion exercised by
states, but also some coercion of states and of transnational non-state actors. New,
supranational coercive institutions, however, also mean new egalitarian demands.
Third, several critics have pointed out that there already is a great deal of coercion
beyond the state. Blake has partly acknowledged this, and has also claimed that most
forms of global coercion are not necessary for autonomy, and must therefore simply be
eliminated. I suggest, however, that the elimination of unnecessary global coercion
sometimes requires coercive means – which in turn, again, trigger new egalitarian
demands. These implications, I finally argue, remain far reaching even if I am correct
in maintaining, in the first part of the article, that there is no straightforward connec-
tion between state coercion and distributive equality.
This revised account of coercion theory rests on a crucial insight: when closely exam-
ined, the view turns out to be grounded in a natural duty of justice account of political
obligation. Coercion theory is often presented as an attempt to justify state coercion as
something contingent, if unlikely to disappear. At closer scrutiny, however, its commit-
ment to state coercion turns out to be much more fundamental: we must have coercive
institutions to honour demands of justice which hold regardless of their existence (for
coercion is necessary for autonomy). However, while a natural duty of justice view can
justify differential requirements, it is incompatible with a simple ‘global sufficiency,
domestic (distributive) equality’ story.
The article unfolds as follows. The ‘Political Obligation, Coercion Theory and the
Natural Duty of Justice’ section argues that coercion theory must be understood as being
committed to a natural duty of justice account. The ‘What Does It Take to Justify
Coercion?’ section argues that it cannot ground domestic distributive equality in any fun-
damental, non-instrumental way; state coercion is either fully justified by its necessity for
autonomy (with no need for further requirements); or offers, if at all, a better justification
for political, rather than distributive, equality. ‘The Global Demandingness of Coercion
Theory’ section shows how, if coercion theory is grounded in the natural duty of justice,
and whatever its right conception of domestic justice, its statism must be relaxed in along
the three lines mentioned above. The ‘Conclusion’ section concludes by briefly pointing
out the implications of the argument if both ‘What Does It Take to Justify Coercion?’ and
‘The Global Demandingness of Coercion Theory’ sections are correct.
To continue reading
Request your trial