One Europe, One Vote?
| Date | 01 June 2004 |
| Author | Jeffry A. Frieden |
| Published date | 01 June 2004 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1465116504042441 |
| Subject Matter | Journal Article |
One Europe, One Vote?
The Political Economy of European
Union Representation in International
Organizations
Jeffry A. Frieden
Harvard University, USA
ABSTRACT
Many Europeans support common European Union (EU)
representation in international institutions. But such a
pooling of international political influence raises complex
and controversial issues. A common European foreign
policy position implies compromise among EU members.
The pooling of international representation thus requires, as
with many internal EU policies, that member states weigh
the potential benefits of a common policy against the poten-
tial costs of a policy not to their liking. There can be a trade-
off between the advantages of scale and the disadvantages
of overriding heterogeneous preferences. Simple spatial
models help to make this point, to clarify the circumstances
in which a common European international representation
is most likely, and to explain who is most likely to support
or oppose a pooling of European foreign policies.
261
European Union Politics
DOI: 10.1177/1465116504042441
Volume 5 (2): 261–276
Copyright© 2004
SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks CA,
New Delhi
KEY WORDS
European Union
international institutions
international
organizations
spatial models
05 042441 (to/d) 15/4/04 12:28 pm Page 261
Introduction
Since the Treaty of Rome, many proponents of European integration have
hoped that a single Europe would speak with more authority – and more influ-
ence – in the international arena. This was certainly true in the 1950s and 1960s,
as a reconstructed Europe attempted to affect international politics in a world
of superpowers to which it was subordinate. It has been given added urgency,
in the minds of many, with the rise since the Cold War of a world dominated
by a single superpower, the United States. Whether to temper or to counter
American demands, recent European experience has heightened the view that
one Europe would be more influential if it had one foreign policy voice.
This calculation has been especially widespread in discussions of
Europe’s international economic relations. A common European represen-
tation in the International Monetary Fund/World Bank system would have
more votes than the United States – and thus a veto. At the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements, the Group of 8, the World Trade Organization, and other
international economic institutions, there is a pervasive view that a pooled
European presence would increase Europe’s influence. This is particularly
clear in international monetary affairs, where there already is a common
European institution, the European Central Bank, which is the natural
representative of the euro zone.1
But a common European international representation is more compli-
cated than may appear at first glance. A collective European voice presumes
a collectively agreed upon policy and bargaining position, which means that
it requires compromise among European Union (EU) members. In this sense,
adopting a common international EU policy is analogous to adopting a
common internal EU policy: it requires that member states weigh the poten-
tial benefits of a common policy against the potential costs of a policy that is
not to their liking. And just as with other EU policies – such as the general
focus on subsidiarity – there is a clear trade-off between the advantages of
scale and the disadvantages of overriding heterogeneous preferences.
To better understand the impact, and the likelihood, of shared EU
representation in international institutions, I make use of simple tools of
spatial analysis. This allows me to present some of the political constraints
that the European Union, its member states, and groups within the member
states face in considering whether in fact it is desirable and feasible to unify
Europe’s international presence. My goal is not a welfare analysis – for this
is in effect impossible without a clear baseline – but rather an understanding
of the choices faced by Europeans as they consider their international role.
We can think about the issue in a more positive mode by asking what
factors make it more or less likely that the EU will pool its presence in
European Union Politics 5(2)
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