One Voice More on Berlin's Doctrine of Liberty
| Author | Beata Polanowska-Sygulska |
| Published date | 01 March 1989 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1989.tb00270.x |
| Date | 01 March 1989 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Political Studies
(1989),
XXXVII,
123-127
One Voice More on Berlin’s Doctrine
of
Liberty
BEATA POLANOWSKA-~YGULSKA*
Jagiellonian University
Sir Isaiah Berlin’s famous essay on political freedom, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’,’
was described by Professor Marshall Cohen as ‘academic, inflated and obscure’.2 It is
perhaps an indication of the value of the essay that it should produce such a violent
reaction. However, this characterization
of
the essay has relevance to the problem
of
political liberty itself for there is no doubt that the concept is of its nature
obscure. Nevertheless, though philosophically
so
vague, the burning issue of liberty
cannot be treated as merely academic in the contemporary world. Let this serve
as justification
for
my adding one more voice to a long and complex discussion.
I
Participants in the debate have recognized different threads
of
Berlin’s essay as
the most significant ones. Many have concentrated on his conception of negative
freedom, some criticizing its narrowness and tracing its links with classical
liberali~m.~ It seems to me, however, that the main value and originality of
Berlin’s approach lies not
so
much in his discussion
of
negative liberty but in his
perceptive critique
of
the positive concept. The proportions
of
the essay devoted
to the two aspects in a way confirm this impression. Berlin devotes nine pages to
understanding
of
the negative concept, whereas his critique of the positive
concept occupies
24
pages. Some commentators have discussed both threads of
Berlin’s essay. Nevertheless, what most of them have concentrated upon has been
the distinction between the two concepts, not the critique of the positive
*
For clarification on some points
of
his doctrine, for valuable suggestions and encouragement, I
owe a great debt to Sir Isaiah Berlin. For my argument and interpretations
I
alone bear responsibility. I
am also grateful to John
N.
Gray for his advice and to Kenneth Fincham for his help with my English.
I. Berlin, ‘Two concepts of liberty’, in
Four Essays
on
Liberty,
(Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1975,
pp.
118-72.
*
M. Cohen, ‘Berlin and the liberal tradition’,
The Philosophical Quarterly,
10
(1980).
p.
216.
See
A.
S.
Kaufman, ‘Professor Berlin on negative freedom’,
Mind,
71 (1962), 241-3;
Cohen,
‘Berlin and the liberal tradition’, pp.
216-27,
H.
Steiner, ‘Individual liberty’,
Proceedings
of
the
Aristotelian Society,
75 (197475), 334;
J.
N.
Gray, ‘On negative and positive liberty’,
Political
Studies,
28 (l980), 523-4.
For discussion
on
the disadvantages of the rigid negative approach,
see
also
A.
Ryan, ‘Freedom’,
Philosophy,
40 (1965),
108-1
I.
*
See,
Gray, ‘On negative and positive liberty’, pp.
51Ck-13;
J. Gray, ‘Introduction’, in
Z.
Pelczynski and J. Gray (eds),
Conceptions
ofLi6erty
in
Political Philosophy
(London, Athlone
Press,
1984),
pp.
44;
H.
J. McCloskey, ‘A critique
of
the ideals of liberty’,
Mind,
74 (1965), 4834;
L.
J.
Macfarlane, ‘On two concepts
of
liberty’,
Political Studies,
14:l (1966), 77-81;
D.
Nicholls,
‘Positive liberty’,
American PoliticalScience
Review,
56 (1962),
11415,
footnote
8.
For
an objection
on the ground of the incompleteness
of
the two concepts of liberty
see
also
S.
I. Benn, ‘Freedom and
persuasion’,
The Australasian Journal
of
Philosophy,
45 (1967), 260-2.
0032-321 7/89/01/0123-5/$03.00
0
1989
Political Studies
To continue reading
Request your trial