Ontology and political theory: A critical encounter between Rawls and Foucault
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885116659633 |
| Date | 01 April 2019 |
| Author | Irena Rosenthal |
| Published date | 01 April 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of Political Theory
2019, Vol. 18(2) 238–258
!The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885116659633
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Article
Ontology and political
theory: A critical encounter
between Rawls and Foucault
Irena Rosenthal
Department of Legal Theory/PPLE, Faculty of Law, University of
Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Abstract
Contemporary political thought is deeply divided about the role of ontology in political
thinking. Famously, political liberal John Rawls has argued that ontological claims are
best to be avoided in political thought. In recent years, however, a number of theorists
have claimed that ontology is essential to political philosophy. According to the
contributors to this ‘ontological turn’, ontological investigations may foster the politi-
cisation of hegemonic political theories and can highlight new possibilities for political
life. This essay aims to contribute to the debate about ontology in political philosophy
by arguing that a compelling case for ontology can also be made in light of Rawls’
political liberalism itself, in particular, by taking seriously Rawls’ commitment to the
politicisation of justice and the task of orientation of political philosophy. To make this
case, the paper brings Rawls’ perspective in conversation with the critical methodology
and the ontology of agonism and reflections on parrhesia or frank truth-telling of Michel
Foucault.
Keywords
Ontology, Rawls, Foucault, respect, parrhesia, power
Introduction
Contemporary political thought is deeply divided about the role of ontology in
political thinking. Famously, political liberal John Rawls (1996, 2001) argued that
ontological claims, that is, presuppositions about the constitution of agents and the
social world, need to be avoided in political thought. Given the ineradicable dis-
agreement about ontology in contemporary democracies, the principles of justice
governing societies should not appeal to ontological claims. In recent years,
Corresponding author:
Irena Rosenthal, University of Amsterdam, Postbox 1030, Legal Theory/Room B 109, Amsterdam, 1000 BA,
the Netherlands.
Email: i.rosenthal@uva.nl
however, various theorists (e.g. Marchart, 2007; White, 2000) have argued that
political thinkers should also critically investigate the ontological commitments
of political thought. The purpose of the ‘ontological turn’ is not to separate pol-
itical thinking from ontological controversies altogether, but, rather, to develop
alternative ontologies to more conventional political ontologies.
Although Rawls is the most prominent contender of the ontological turn, none
of the thinkers who have contributed to this current have, as far as I can see,
investigated the plausibility of Rawls’ strategy of avoiding ontology in light of
Rawls’ own commitments.
1
This is unfortunate, because if there are good
Rawlsian arguments for investigating ontology the case for engaging with ontology
could become more persuasive for Rawlsian political theorists or, for that matter,
make it harder for them to dismiss the plea to include ontology in political thought.
This essay thus seeks to advance the debate about ontology and political thought
by showing that a compelling case for ontology can also be made in light of Rawls’
political liberalism itself. I begin with a short reconstruction of Rawls’ arguments
for the strategy of avoidance. Rather than focusing exclusively on political liber-
alism’s well-known ambition to forge a consensus, I highlight Rawls’ aspiration for
what I call ‘the politicisation of justice’ – the commitment to an ongoing critique of
hegemonic theories of justice, including political liberalism – so that the limitations
of these theories can be brought into view. I also draw attention to Rawls’ sugges-
tion that political philosophy has a role in ‘orientation’, that is, the illumination of
various ways to understand our status as citizens and the ends of our political
institutions. My contention is that these underappreciated political liberal commit-
ments to the politicisation of justice and orientation call for a critical affirmation
rather than the avoidance of ontology. The remainder of the article substantiates
this wager by placing Rawls in conversation with a philosopher who has been an
important source of inspiration for the ontological turn: Michel Foucault.
Although Foucault’s perspective is in many respects radically opposed to that of
Rawls, there is an important point of convergence between Rawls and Foucault:
both thinkers plea for an ongoing critique of political philosophy. However, unlike
Rawls, Foucault argues that the politicisation of justice should also attend to
ontology. I will show how Foucault’s critical attention to ontology contributes
to the politicisation of Rawls’ conception of justice. More specifically, Foucault’s
critique reveals that Rawls’ conception is informed by a partisan ontology that
obscures the constitutive role of productive power relations in the formation of
democratic regimes. Juxtaposing Rawls with Foucault will also reveal the orienting
potential of ontology. Foucault’s ontology of agonism and the practice of parrhesia
prefigured by this ontology shed light on how critique and contestation can be
cultivated in contemporary democratic regimes.
Rawls’ arguments for a ‘freestanding’ conception of justice
Rawls’ argument for separating ontology and political thought is elaborated most
extensively in Political Liberalism and subsequent articles (1996, 1999b, 2001). Yet,
the strategy of avoiding ontology is not new to Political Liberalism, but reworks
Rosenthal 239
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