Opportunistic behavior in the principal–agent model of policing
| Published date | 01 June 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1461355718763453 |
| Date | 01 June 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Opportunistic behavior in the principal–
agent model of policing: The case of a
convicted field officer in Norway
Petter Gottschalk
BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo, Norway
Abstract
Whereas the criminal justice system is designed to determine whether a police officer as an offender is guilty or innocent,
the principal–agent model of policing can provide insights into police officer behavior in law enforcement. Agency theory
suggests that the chief as a principal and the field officer as an agent may have different preferences, varying knowledge, and
opposite risk willingness when it comes to policing. For example, goals may justify means. In this article, the case of a
convicted police officer in Norway is discussed based on principal–agent theory.
Keywords
Agency theory, principal–agent model, police officer, goal orientation, police criminality
Submitted 10 Oct 2017, Revise received 02 Jan 2018, accepted 13 Jan 2018
Introduction
The police are agents of the government, whereas field
officers are agents of police chiefs (Mitnick, 1975). A rela-
tionship of agency implies that an agent is acting on behalf
of a principal (Bosse and Phillips, 2016; Jensen and Meck-
ling, 1976). This relationship can be challenging when a
police officer is tasked with special assignments such as
dialogue with criminal biker gangs, drug dealers and infor-
mants in the shadow economy (Leinfelt and Rostami, 2012;
Politiet, 2012). The rule of the game can be very different
in undercover operations and in dealing with transnational
organized crime (Gottschalk and Markovic, 2016). A
recently convicted field officer in Norway illustrates dilem-
mas found in the principal–agent model of policing (Oslo
tingrett, 2017), where the issue is police deviance and crim-
inality (Davidson and Gottschalk, 2014). Explicitly, if we
apply principal–agent theory to undercover policing, it pro-
vides a framework to gain insights into why police might
break the law.
The conviction after a 4-month trial was appealed from
Oslo District Court in 2017. Borgarting Court of Appeal in
Oslo is expected to have its hearing in 2019. In the mean-
time, the verdict of 21 years’ imprisonment for the police
officer is an interesting case for a study of the principal–
agent model of policing as presented in this article.
Convicted police undercover officer
A senior police officer in Norway was sentenced to the
maximum of 21 years in prison in September 2017. He was
convicted for aiding a drug smuggler for many years and
taking bribes from the smuggler. The case captivated a
nation accustomed to clean law enforcement. The field
officer, Eirik Jensen, was once in charge of combating
Oslo’s criminal gangs including the Hells Angels and other
biker gangs. He denied the accusations against him, and his
lawyer said he would appeal the serious verdict from Oslo
District Court (Sætran et al., 2017).
During the 4-month trial in spring 2017, prosecutors
accused Jensen of aiding a smuggling ring for more than
a decade by providing information on police and customs
Corresponding author:
Petter Gottschalk, BI Norwegian Business School, Nydalsveien 37, 0484
Oslo, Norway.
Email: petter.gottschalk@bi.no
International Journalof
Police Science & Management
2018, Vol. 20(2) 109–115
ªThe Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/1461355718763453
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