Orchestrating the Response: Somali Piracy and Ontological Complexity
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2012.00194.x |
| Author | Christian Bueger |
| Date | 01 February 2013 |
| Published date | 01 February 2013 |
Orchestrating the Response: Somali
Piracy and Ontological Complexity
Christian Bueger
Cardiff University
Abstract
Contemporary piracy is a complex and intricate problem. This article discusses different sources of complexity of the
problem and suggests paying attention to ontological complexity. To unravel ontological complexity one has to ask
the very fundamental question: Why is piracy actually considered to be problematic? Addressing this question leads to
a set of different paradigms of piracy which underpin counter-piracy policy. Each of these paradigms works with
different presumptions, foregrounds different dimensions and suggests other types of measures. Five paradigms of
counter-piracy are outlined: Firstly, a security paradigm, which stresses that piracy is a threat; secondly, a legal
paradigm, within which piracy is a crime; thirdly, an economic paradigm within which piracy is a business model;
fourthly, a development paradigm that interprets piracy as a problem of structural root causes; and fifthly a
humanitarian paradigm in which piracy is the source of suffering for individuals. These paradigms produce a range of
tensions between each other. The article concludes in stressing the importance of paying attention to this complexity
to increase reflexivity in drafting counter-piracy policies.
Policy Implications
•Contemporary piracy is not only one problem, but different ones. There are competing paradigms of piracy.
•At least five paradigms of piracy exist: piracy as threat, as a crime, as a business model, as a problem of root
causes, or as a humanitarian problem leads to contradicting policy objectives.
•Paradigms produce tensions and contradictions which are not easily reconciled.
•Complexity should not be reduced. Policy responses should be orchestrated, that is not streamlining according to
a single logic, but playing with several logics, introducing breaks and silences as well using contradictions and
tensions productively.
The complexity of piracy
Contemporary maritime piracy is widely acknowledged
to be a complex problem. Counter-piracy specialists fre-
quently highlight the complexity of the problem. As for
instance, Donna Hopkins (2011), counter-piracy advisor
of the US State Department put it ‘within 20 years work-
ing in foreign affairs I found never another issue as com-
plex as piracy.’ Yet, what does actually constitute this
complexity?
A first dimension of the complexity of piracy lies in
the fact that piracy incidents involve actors and citizens
from different nation states. This is firstly given by the
globalized nature of today’s shipping industry. Any aver-
age cargo or bulk shipping tour today involves different
nationals. The ship owners, the ship managers, cargo
owners, classification societies, insurance providers,
manning agencies, masters and crew members, each
actor having a different role in shipping and managing a
piracy incident, comes from different places of the pla-
net and are subjects of different national laws. Secondly,
not only shipping is multinational, but the institutional
response to piracy is, too. Over 30 nation states take an
active role in counter-piracy by contributing naval forces
to address piracy in the western Indian Ocean. Much
effort has been made to coordinate the response by
governance mechanisms, such as the United Nations
Contact Group (see Guilfoyle in this issue) or through
technical mechanisms such as the Shared Awareness and
De-confliction mechanism (SHADE) by which the navy
patrols in the Gulf of Aden are coordinated. Yet, navies
continue to operate with different rules of engagement,
different national counter-piracy laws induce different
practices of evidence collection, handling piracy suspects
Global Policy Volume 4 . Issue 1 . February 2013
ª2013 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2013) 4:1 doi: 10.1111/j.1758-5899.2012.00194.x
Special Section Article
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