Outside of a Small Circle of Friends: States, Genocide, Mass Killing and The Role of Bystanders
| Published date | 01 June 1987 |
| Date | 01 June 1987 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002234338702400205 |
| Author | Michael Stohl |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Outside
of
a
Small
Circle
of
Friends:
States,
Genocide,
Mass
Killing
and
The
Role
of
Bystanders*
MICHAEL
STOHL
Department
of
Political
Science,
Purdue
University
The
paper
begins
with
a
brief
discussion
of
the
conditions
under
which
genocide
and
other
instances
of
mass
killing
occur
and
discusses
recent
levels
of
reporting
of
such
instances.
The
core
of
the
paper
is
an
examination
of
the
circumstances
and
structural
conditions
which
have
allowed
these
crimes
against
humanity
to
go
relatively
undernoticed
and
unchallenged.
Three
interrelated
questions
concerning
the
assumptions
which
are
built
into
the
current
state
system
and
the
state
as
an
institution
guide
the
analysis
of
how
states
have
arrived
at
a
position
in
which
mass
killing
by
states
and
their
agents
is
somehow
’accepted’
and
whereby
there
is
little
expectation
that
other
states
in
the
system
will
intervene
on
behalf
of
those
in
danger.
To
explore
the
lack
of
response
further,
the
literature
of
’bystander
apathy’
is
introduced
and
the
classic
formulation
of Latane
&
Darley
1969
is
employed
to
structure
an
exammation
of
bystander
non-involvement
in
the
international
system
of
states.
Eleven
confounding
factors
present
in
the
international
system
are
suggested.
The
paper
concludes
with
some
suggestions
for
moving
beyond
non-involvement
to
move
beyond
the
’small
circle
of
friends’
who
need
to
become
involved
if
future
mass
killings
are
to
be
prevented.
ISSN
0022-3433
Journal
of
Peace
Research,
vol.
24,
no.
2,
1987
Like
a
repetition
m
miniature
of
the
Germany
of
1945,
Argentina
in
1984
is
trymg
to
know
and
under-
stand.
In
this
painful effort,
the
same
questions
surface.
How
was
it
possible
that
children
were
tortured
in
front
of
their
mothers?
How
was
it
pos-
sible
that
women
were
raped
m
front
of
their
hus-
bands ?
Why
were
there
soldiers
m
Argentina
who
kicked
pregnant
women
to
death?
Why
were
young
children
murdered
or
handed
over
to
stage
famihes?
Why
were
people
drugged
and thrown from
air-
planes
mto
the
ocean,
or
martyrized
bodies
in
con-
tamers
thrown
from
boats
into
the
water?
Jacobo
Timerman
(1984)
1.
Introduction
When
we
read
yet
another
account
of
the
atrocities
that
we
now
are
fully
aware
that
mankind
is
capable
of
performing,
we
do
indeed
find
ourselves
repeating
the
questions
posed
by
Timerman
and
despair
at
our
*
This
is
a
revised
version
of
a
paper
presented
to
the
Annual
Meeting
of
the
American
Political
Science
Association,
Washington,
D.C.,
August
29-September
1,
1984
and
at
the
Eleventh
General
Congress
of
the
International
Peace
Research
Association,
University
of
Sussex,
Brighton,
April
11-19,
1986.
I
would
like
to
acknowledge
the
assistance
of
Michael
Draper
and
Gilbert
Arroyo
in
the
collection
of
the
information
for
the
Table
and
the
helpful
comments
of
Richard
Falk,
Peter
Flemming,
Cynthia
Stohl
and
Nils
Petter
Gle-
ditsch
in
the
preparation
of
this
paper
for
pubhcation.
inability
to
comprehend,
intervene
or
pre-
vent
their
occurrence.
We
who
study
these
atrocities,
these
continuing
tragedies
of
man’s
all
too
frequent
and
familiar
inhu-
manity
towards
his
fellow
man,
may
easily
be
overcome
with
depression
and
pessimism
about
the
human
future.
How
could
it
have
happened
and
happened
yet
again?
My
purposes
in
this
paper
are
to
briefly
introduce
some
of
the
conditions
under
which
genocide
and
other
large
scale
instan-
ces
of
state
violence
and
state
terrorism
occur
and,
most
importantly
for
this
paper,
to
explore
why
they
are
so
rarely
halted
by
external
observers.
I
will
of
necessity
begin
with
a
discussion
of
some
of
the
factors
which
contribute
to
the
actual
occurrence
of
geno-
cide
and
mass
murder.
These
factors,
of
course,
have
been
covered
in
much
depth
elsewhere
(see,
for
example,
Hilberg
1967;
Fein
1979;
Arendt
1966;
Dawidowicz
1975).
I,
on
the
other
hand,
will
focus
most
of
my
attention
on
the
important
interrelated
questions
of
how
observers
outside
the
threatened
area
allow
or
fail
to
prevent
instances
of
genocide
and
mass
violence,
and
how
we
may
encourage
these
bystanders
to
involve
themselves
in
these
tragedies
as
they
unfold.
152
I
should
also
state
at
the
outset
that
I
am
aware
of
the
definitional
difference
and
importance
of
the
distinction
between
geno-
cide
and
other
instances
of
large
scale
mur-
der
by
agents
of
the
state,
where
the
former
generally
includes
the
requirement
that
such
murder
be
’centrally
planned
and
purposeful
and
that
its
intent
is
total’
(Fein
1979,
p.
7).
One
may
argue
that
genocide
would
be
easier
to
monitor
and
perhaps
prevent
because
the
planning
and
purposefulness
of
its
preparation
would
yield
more
time
in
which
to
prepare
a
response
than
the
appar-
ently
unpredictable
mass
murder.
While
this
might
or
perhaps
even
’should’
be
true,
the
story
of
the
twentieth
century
genocidal
actions
does
not
give
much
empirical
support
to
the
assumption.
Mankind
has
been,
at
best,
slow
to
respond
to
genocide
and
has
ignored
many
of
its
cases
and
those
of
large
scale
mass
murder.
Table
I
provides
graphic
evidence
of
this
lack
of
interest
by
indicating
the
kind
of
coverage
that
the
New
York
Times,
often
referred
to
as
’the
newspaper
of
record’
has
provided
for
such
instances
in
the
past
two
decades.
Many
of
the
cases
are
clearly
underreported
and
those
cases
that
have
received
greater
coverage
have
gen-
erally
occurred
in
countries
in
which
there
has
been
a
previous
US
national
security
concern
or
large
scale
presence.
But
even
in
these
cases
it
is
clear
that
the
concern
has
been
more
clearly
related
to
national
security
rather
than
human
concerns.
Note
the
dif-
ference
in
coverage
in
Cambodia
following
the
US
withdrawal
from
Vietnam
and
Cam-
bodia
in
1975.
As
A.
J.
Sherman
(1985,
p.
1)
reminds
us,
we
cannot
understand
why
the
cries
for
help
had
so
little
resonance
in
a
world
that
subscribed
in
large
part
to
decencies
commonly
assumed
for
centuries.
While
the
murderers
systematically
went
about
their
vast
enterprise,
undeflected
by
logistical
problems
or
even
imminent
military
defeat,
where
were
we?
Therefore
for
the
purposes
of
this
under-
taking
I
will
not
enter
into
a
definitional
debate
on
genocide
and
mass
murder.
It
is
unimportant
for
my
purposes
if
the
Indo-
nesians
are/were
guilty
of
genocide
or
mass
murder
in
Timor
or
if
the
United
States
is/was
guilty
of
genocide
in
Vietnam.
I
am
interested
in
why
we
as
an
international
com-
munity
have,
for
the
most
part,
ignored
these
tragedies
and
why
we
are
likely
to
continue
to
ignore
future
tragedies.
Three
interrelated
observational
ques-
tions
structure
the
discussion
that
follows:
1.
Why
is
it
that:
The
men
who
act
for
us
and
in
our
name
are
often
killers,
or
seem
to
become
killers
too
quickly
and
too
easily
(Walzer
1974,
p.
66).
2.
How
has
it
come
to
pass
that
sovereignty
includes
the
right
to
commit
genocide
against
peoples
under
the
sovereign
state’s
rules
and
thus:
One
has
to
ask
whether
the
slaughter
of
millions
in
Bangladesh,
Biafra,
the
Sudan
and
now
Eritrea
can
possibly
be
justified
by
the
interests
of
the
Territorial
State
in
the
relatively
unrestrained
exercise
of
its
internal
sovereignty
and
in
the
preservation
of
the
domains
it
has
conquered
or
inherited?
(Kuper
1981,
p.
183).
3.
If
we
apply
Timerman
to
a
setting
wider
than
the
internal
conditions
of
Germany
or
Argentina
we
may
echo
his
voice:
Those
who
now
learn
of
these
events
ask
themselves
why
those
who
knew
did
not
speak;
they
affirm
that
silence
became
complicity;
they
suspect
that
silence
is
as
awful
as
the
discoveries
about
those
dreadful
years
that
come
to
light
day
after
day.
(Timerman
1984,
p.
39).
These
observations
lead
us
to
an
exam-
ination
of
the
predispositions
to
mass
viol-
ence
and
the
role
of
bystanders
in
these
events.
2.
Predispositions
2.1
Internal
Conditions
As
I
indicated
above,
it
is
not
my
intention
to
rehearse
the
causes
of
genocide.
However,
it
is
useful
to
provide
a
context
within
which
much
of
our
discussion
will
take
place
by
considering
some
of
the
predispositions
which
have been
identified
with
the
occur-
rence
of
genocide.
Herbert
Kelman
(1973)
discusses
three
factors,
authorization,
rou-
tinization
and
dehumanization
which
reduce
the
strength
of
restraining
forces
against
viol-
ence.
These
first
two
factors
serve
to
reduce
individual
responsibility
for
actions
taken
against
targets,
while
the
latter
disinhibiting
factor
places
the
target
outside
the
pro-
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