Overcoming the Conservative Disposition: Oakeshott vs. Tönnies
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00699.x |
| Published date | 01 December 2008 |
| Author | Efraim Podoksik |
| Date | 01 December 2008 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Overcoming the Conservative Disposition:
Oakeshott vs. Tönnies
Efraim Podoksik
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Widely considered a conservative British philosopher,this article presents Michael Oakeshott as, in fact,
a critic of conservatism – in particular of the German conservative tradition, represented,among other
thinkers, by Ferdinand Tönnies. This tradition was characterised by the rejection of modern individu-
alistic society considered as an embodiment of alienating purpose-oriented rationalism.At a cer tain phase
of his intellectual development Oakeshott himself came under the influence of this conservative critique,
with ideas strikingly similar to those of Tönnies. Yet, unlike Tönnies, Oakeshott later rejected the
premises of this tradition. Instead, he formulated the notion of rationalistic non-purposive association,
which allowed him to become reconciled to modern liberal society.
There was a time when British philosopher Michael Oakeshott enjoyed the
reputation of being the quintessential conservative thinker, even if somewhat
eccentric.1Moreover, according to many of his critics, he belonged to that group
of European intellectuals who challenged the very foundations of the liberal
order, launching a vehement attack against modern rationalism.2This sort of
anti-modern mood was especially widespread among Central European intellec-
tuals and was closely connected to the rise of German Romanticism. But it also
influenced a number of prominent figures in British and American culture,from
Coleridge to Eliot. This conservative tradition is usually seen as part of a wider
phenomenon known as ‘cultural pessimism’.3
The perception of Oakeshott as a disenchanted conservative critic of the modern
liberal order was, however, so one-sided that it did not stand even minimal
scrutiny the moment his thinking became a subject of serious scholarly research.
Some studies convincingly debunked the myth of Oakeshott’s conservatism (e.g.
Rayner, 1985) (unless what was meant by the word ‘conservatism’ was the
conservative variety of liberalism, associated, for example, with Tocqueville and
Acton). Many others went still further to establish a more precise definition of
Oakeshott’s ideas. It appeared quite clear that Oakeshott’s writings contained
significant liberal elements – and thus he came to be characterised by many
scholars as a kind of liberal thinker.4Yet the question still remained open, why
liberal traits coexisted (especially in his writings of the middle period) with those
anti-rationalist ideas that created his image of a ‘conservative’ in the fir st
place. Could his ‘conservative’ ideas be reinterpreted to fit the liberal paradigm
(Podoksik, 2003a, pp. 158–80)? Or were there two Oakeshotts: the earlier
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00699.x
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2008 VOL 56, 857–880
© 2008The Author.Jour nal compilation © 2008 Political StudiesAssociation
conservative and the later liberal one (Covell, 1986,p. 136)? Alternatively, should
Oakeshott be seen as a disinterested philosophical observer whose thinking defies
any reduction to such mundane political distinctions (Holliday, 1992)?
Reasons can be found to support each one of these interpretations. Yet such
answers seem to be missing something important: they do not deal sufficiently
with the question of the significance of the apparent discrepancy between
Oakeshott’s liberalism and his alleged conservative critique of modern civilisa-
tion. The purpose of the present article is to close this gap. In general, the article
accepts what has by now become a more or less common characterisation of
Oakeshott as a liberal. Yet it does not ignore the fact that, at least in his middle
period, Oakeshott sounded very close to the conservative variety of ‘cultural
pessimism’. Precisely by highlighting this ‘conservative’background of some of his
ideas, I will try to elucidate the significance of his later more explicitly liberal
position. For Oakeshott’s acceptance of liberalism should be understood, not as a
result of an inadvertent change of mood, but as a reflection on the challenges
presented by the conservative critique of modernity, the critique to which he
partly subscribed in his middle per iod, and to which he eventually found an
answe r.
Specifically, Oakeshott was preoccupied with one charge against the liberal order:
that, being based on purposive rationality,it depr ived the human character of its
authenticity. The development of his political theory should be seen, to a great
extent, as an attempt to theorise such a framework for a modern individualistic
rational society that would emancipate this society from the tyranny of purposive
mentality.
If Oakeshott is seen in this way, he may turn out to be one of the subtlest critics
of conservative cultural pessimism. For his rejection of it is a rejection from
within, a rejection by someone who understood very well its intellectual and
emotional appeal, and who nevertheless defied it. And since cultural pessimism,
while associated mainly with European conservatism of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, is a wider phenomenon,reappearing under different guises at
different times, Oakeshott’s theory shows itself to be perhaps less irrelevant to our
political experience than is usually perceived.
In order to substantiate this claim, I will analyse the evolution of Oakeshott’s
thought in the context of its relation to an important intellectual tradition by
which he was strongly influenced: the tradition of continental, and especially
German, conservatism. Specifically, I will compare Oakeshott’s ideas with those
of Ferdinand Tönnies, a prominent German social philosopher, whose work
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft has become one of the most famous texts of clas-
sical sociology. As will be shown, this text faithfully represents that conservative
style of thought to which some of Oakeshott’s writings belong and from which
he later departs. One can easily find major and minor similarities between the
two authors, similar ities which to date have escaped the attention of scholars.
858 EFRAIM PODOKSIK
© 2008The Author.Jour nal compilation © 2008 Political StudiesAssociation
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2008, 56(4)
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