Overcoming the NPT’s “institutional deficit”: A Canadian saga
| DOI | 10.1177/0020702020915634 |
| Date | 01 March 2020 |
| Published date | 01 March 2020 |
| Author | Paul Meyer |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essay |
Scholarly Essay
Overcoming the NPT’s
“institutional deficit”:
A Canadian saga
Paul Meyer
Simon Fraser University, School for International Studies,
Vancouver, Canada
Abstract
Ever since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended in 1995,
Canada has promoted the concept of “permanence with accountability.” Canada led
on an ambitious initiative to enhance accountability via a reform package to overcome
the NPT’s “institutional deficit.” Launched prior to the failed 2005 Review Conference,
the effort was sustained for a decade. The priority goals were to establish annual
meetings of states parties; to create a standing body of past, present, and future
chairs; and to provide for the convening of extraordinary meetings. These ideas
attracted support, but also opposition, from quarters less interested in having more
effective tools of accountability put into place. The history of this initiative sheds light
on the dynamics of multilateral diplomacy in the nuclear realm and on weaknesses in
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty process that continue to threaten the authority
of the treaty.
Keywords
Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, Canadian foreign policy, disarmament diplomacy
Corresponding author:
Paul Meyer, Simon Fraser University, School for International Studies, 7200-515 West Hastings Street,
Vancouver, British Columbia, V6B 5K3, Canada.
Email: pmeyer@sfu.ca
International Journal
2020, Vol. 75(1) 49–64
!The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0020702020915634
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Introduction
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970
and currently has 190 states parties, is often hailed as the cornerstone of the global
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Its tripartite central bargain—
that non-nuclear weapon states foreswear ever developing or acquiring nuclear
weapons, that nuclear weapon states commit to nuclear disarmament, and that
all states support the peaceful use of nuclear energy—has underpinned the inter-
national security landscape for almost 50 years. Although debate over its effec-
tiveness has increased in recent years, the NPT remains the key treaty defining the
global nuclear regime.
1
Yet for all its importance to the global nuclear order, the NPT is something of a
“poor cousin” among international treaties. Unlike most contemporary multilat-
eral agreements, the NPT has no executive council or standing bureau for ongoing
oversight of treaty implementation, no annual Conference of States Parties, no
provision for convening emergency meetings, and no secretariat or dedicated
implementing organization for the treaty as a whole (the International Atomic
Energy Agency’s role is limited to only certain non-proliferation provisions).
States parties to the NPT can only fully exercise their decision-making power at
the once-in-5 years Review Conferences. These limitations of the NPT have been
described as an “institutional deficit,” and have prompted efforts over the years to
overcome this gap via various reform proposals.
Among originators of reform proposals, Canada has figured prominently,
reflecting the high value it has placed on the NPT-centred nuclear regime. This
article describes the chief elements of these reform initiatives and analyses the
diplomatic context in which they have been promoted, albeit with little success
to date in winning acceptance by the NPT membership as a whole. In brief, inno-
vative ideas for refashioning NPT procedures to enhance accountability ran foul of
nuclear weapon states’ (and certain other parties’) preference for maintaining the
status quo. The article will conclude with reflections on the future prospects for
institutional reform of the NPT as a significant, if neglected, aspect of the myriad
challenges this core multilateral treaty currently faces.
1. Illustrative of recent and more critical commentary on the NPT are: Rebecca Johnson, “Rethinking
the NPT’s role in security: 2010 and beyond,” International Affairs 86, no. 2 (2010): 429–445;
Jonathan D. Bergner, “Going nuclear: Does the Non-Proliferation Treaty matter?” Comparative
Strategy 31, no. 1 (2012): 84–102; Paul Meyer, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Fin de
r
egime?,” Arms Control Today 47, no. 3 (2017): 16–22; Harald Mu
¨ller, “The Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty in jeopardy? Internal divisions and the impact of world politics,” The
International Spectator 52, no. 1 (2017): 12–27; Nick Ritchie, “A hegemonic nuclear order:
Understanding the ban treaty and the power politics of nuclear weapons,” Contemporary
Security Policy 40, no. 4 (2019): 409–434; Thomas Doyle, “A moral argument for the mass defection
of non-nuclear-weapon states from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime,” Global
Governance 23, no. 1 (2017): 15–26; Ramesh Thakur, “A bifurcated global nuclear order: Thou
may vs. thou shall not possess or use nuclear weapons,” in Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo, ed., The
Global Community: Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2018).
50 International Journal 75(1)
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