Parliamentary rules, party norms, and legislative speech
| Author | Eduardo Alemán,Juan Pablo Micozzi |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120985508 |
| Published date | 01 November 2022 |
| Date | 01 November 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120985508
International Political Science Review
2022, Vol. 43(5) 713 –729
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512120985508
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Parliamentary rules, party norms,
and legislative speech
Eduardo Alemán
University of Houston, USA
Juan Pablo Micozzi
ITAM, Mexico
Abstract
This article examines speech participation under different parliamentary rules: open forums dedicated to
bill debates, and closed forums reserved for non-lawmaking speeches. It discusses how electoral incentives
influence speechmaking by promoting divergent party norms within those forums. Our empirical analysis
focuses on the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. The findings lend support to the view that, in forums dedicated
to non-lawmaking speeches, participation is greater among more institutionally disadvantaged members
(backbenchers, women, and members from more distant districts), while in those that are dedicated to
lawmaking debates, participation is greater among more senior members and members of the opposition.
Keywords
Legislative speech, electoral incentives, legislative behavior, party norms
Introduction
On August 4, 2009, Carolina Goic, a legislator from the Christian Democratic Party, stood up on
the floor of the Chilean Chamber of Deputies and delivered a speech calling attention to the envi-
ronmental damage caused by salmon farming and aquaculture in the Magallanes region, where her
electoral district was located. She asked her fellow legislators to take action to protect the biodiver-
sity of the region and enact appropriate regulations. She was immediately followed by another
legislator, Jorge Sabag, who demanded that the Ministry of Public Works upgrade a rundown
bridge in the town of San Carlos, within his district, so its inhabitants, partially isolated due to the
construction of a new highway, could make their way into and out of the town. These speeches, as
well as many others that are regularly delivered at the end of sessions, called attention to local
Corresponding author:
Eduardo Alemán, Department of Political Science, University of Houston, 3551 Cullen Boulevard, Philip Guthrie
Hoffman Hall, Houston, TX 77204, USA.
Email: ealeman2@uh.edu
985508IPS0010.1177/0192512120985508International Political Science ReviewAlemán and Micozzi
research-article2021
Article
714 International Political Science Review 43(5)
problems and showed deputies standing up for their constituents. Of course, these are not the only
types of speeches legislators deliver in the chamber; earlier in the day, deputies debated a major bill
focused on cracking down on money laundering.
Bill debates and individual speeches are essential tools used by legislators to exercise their roles
as representatives. Speechmaking, however, has not been scrutinized as often as other legislative
activities, such as roll call votes, bill initiation, and cosponsoring, particularly in presidential coun-
tries. Examining legislative speech participation can illuminate not only unexplored patterns of
representation but also more specific behaviors derived from electoral incentives and legislators’
demands for position-taking.
In this article, we examine congressional speeches delivered on the floor of the Chilean Chamber
of Deputies. Our contribution to the literature on legislative speechmaking is two-fold. First, we
shed light on legislative speeches during different stages of the chamber’s daily session, some that
give leaders control over who may talk and others during which no formal screening is possible.
Second, we examine differences between bill debates and non-lawmaking speeches, which are
usually examined separately. We find that institutional rules and endogenously determined party
norms result in substantial differences in speech participation. During party-controlled settings
dedicated to non-lawmaking speeches, participation is greater among more institutionally disad-
vantaged members, while participation in lawmaking debates occurs more frequently among more
senior legislators and members of the opposition.
The remainder of this article is organized into four parts and a brief conclusion. The next section
discusses the differences between open and closed speech rules. Then we examine legislators’
electoral incentives and institutional rules and derive a series of expectations about legislative
speeches in the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. This is followed by a description of the data we col-
lected, the variables used in the empirical analysis, and the statistical models employed. We then
outline the result of our analysis, followed by a brief conclusion.
Speech participation
Legislators use speeches to convey messages to constituents, interest groups, other politicians, and
the general public. They are tools that representatives can employ to advocate for particular poli-
cies, advertise their positions, signal their efforts, and differentiate themselves from their oppo-
nents (Kellerman, 2012; Maltzman and Sigelman, 1996; Martin and Vanberg, 2008). Both
individual legislators and party leaders value the opportunities offered by forums dedicated to
debating bills and delivering speeches. The media often reports on the various oral statements
made by legislators on the parliamentary floor, and debates are sometimes televised. However,
participation in these forums is not equal. As is often noted, in legislatures, time is a scarce resource,
which results in norms and regulations that constrain speaking time.
Internal rules of procedure may give party leaders the right to control access to the parliamen-
tary floor. This is the case in the German Bundestag, for example, in which party leaders exert
considerable control, screening members and often denying speaking time to party rebels. In other
contexts, internal rules of procedure create specific forums wherein party leaders lack the formal
authority to block legislators from participating in debates. Proksch and Slapin (2012) explained
these differences by theorizing that electoral incentives are paramount in determining the organiza-
tion of legislative speech; decisions regarding who may speak reflect parties’ strategic calculations
over the value of presenting a cohesive party message. In scenarios where electoral incentives
emphasize the role of parties over individuals, parties strive to control legislative speech. But in
settings where the individual reputations of candidates are particularly salient, parties impose
fewer constraints on legislators’ speech participation (Proksch and Slapin, 2012).
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