Participation and Political Competition in Committee Report Allocation
| Author | Pierre Hausemer |
| Published date | 01 December 2006 |
| Date | 01 December 2006 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1465116506069441 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Participation and Political
Competition in Committee
Report Allocation
Under What Conditions Do MEPs
Represent Their Constituents?
Pierre Hausemer
London School of Economics, UK
ABSTRACT
The paper models the consequences of committee report
allocation for political representation in the European Parlia-
ment (EP). The range of legislators involved in each policy
area affects the values, interests and constituencies that the
Parliament represents. Thus, representation is defined as an
MEP’s participation in salient policy areas. The allocation of
salient reports follows inter- and intra-party group dynam-
ics. First, party groups compete for salient reports in a
context of open voting rules in committee and plenum.
Second, group coordinators distribute these reports among
their MEPs in an attempt to maximize the cohesion of the
group. The model is tested on data from the fifth European
Parliament (1999–2002). The results confirm the impact of
selective participation on political representation. The EP has
evolved into a ‘normal’ Parliament featuring coalitions and
competition along a left–right cleavage
across
party groups
and a hierarchical allocation of legislative spoils
within
parties.
505
European Union Politics
DOI: 10.1177/1465116506069441
Volume 7 (4): 505–530
Copyright© 2006
SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks CA,
New Delhi
KEY WORDS
European Parliament
legislative behaviour
party competition
report allocation
representation
Introduction
Over the past 20 years, the European Parliament (EP) has assumed increas-
ing power within the European Union’s political system. This was accom-
panied by growing interest in the ‘democratic credentials’ of the European
Union (EU) and its Parliament. Research on political representation in the EU,
however, has either taken a macro-level approach (for a discussion of this
literature see, e.g., Follesdal and Hix, 2005) or focused on the role of European
elections in selecting appropriate representatives (e.g. Van der Eijk and
Franklin, 1996; Norris and Franklin, 1997; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999).
Yet the solution to the so-called democratic deficit does not lie solely in
the institutional set-up of the European Union or the social make-up of its
Parliament. Rather, it is the legislative participation of individual MEPs that
determines whose opinions are represented. As Hall (1996) points out in his
seminal study on participation in the US Congress, purposive legislators
engage in different legislative activities and policy areas depending on the
structure of opportunities and constraints that they face. Similarly to
Congress, such ‘selective participation’ has wide-ranging consequences for
political representation in the European Parliament. The range of members
involved in legislative business, be it in committees or in the plenum, deter-
mines the values, interests and constituencies that the Parliament represents.
Consistent representational bias could undermine the legitimacy of a fledg-
ling supranational parliamentary system.
Nevertheless, little is known about the legislative participation of indi-
vidual MEPs outside roll-call voting sessions. This paper contributes to filling
this gap by developing and testing a model of political representation in the
allocation of committee reports in the European Parliament. Which MEPs
obtain the most salient committee reports? And what are the consequences
for constituency representation? The paper conceives reports as legislative
tools used by individual legislators to represent the preferences of their
national parties. The study contributes to the existing research programmes
on political representation, report allocation and the internal organization of
the European Parliament.
I first introduce a conception of political representation based on the
legislative participation of individual MEPs. I then discuss existing studies of
report allocation in the European Parliament and outline the contribution of
this paper to the research programme. My theoretical model explains the
consequences of selective participation in committee reports for political
representation and derives a set of hypotheses to be tested in the next section.
I conclude with a summary of the results and an indication of possible areas
for future research.
European Union Politics 7(4)
506
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