Parties to an alliance: Ideology and the domestic politics of international institutionalization
| Author | Aaron Rapport,Brian Rathbun |
| Published date | 01 March 2021 |
| Date | 01 March 2021 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319900916 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Parties to an alliance: Ideology
and the domestic politics
of international institutionalization
Aaron Rapport
Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge
Brian Rathbun
Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Southern California
Abstract
While much research has been done on the domestic determinants of alliance institutionalization, there has been a
neglect of the effect of domestic politics, by which we mean contestation between political actors in the same country.
We hypothesize that the ideology of the parties governing countries negotiating the terms of security relationships
will affect their preferences over the degree and kind of institutionalization seen in alliances. Drawing on previous
literature, we argue that rightist parties are more sensitive to sovereignty costs and will therefore insist on maintaining
more control over policy than their leftist counterparts. They can assert control either by imposing hierarchical forms
of institutionalization when they are a stronger party to an alliance or by avoiding institutionalization altogether if
they are the weaker party in an alliance. In contrast, we expect leftist parties to be less sensitive to sovereignty costs
and generally favorable to more voice-driven, egalitarian institutions that have institutionalized mechanisms for
consensus-building, regardless of their country’s relative power position. Combining the ATOP dataset on alliance
design with the Parties Manifesto Project, we find broad support for our hypotheses. Our findings indicate that
scholars should pay more attention to the internal ideological contestation within countries, making room for
domestic political factors that go beyond regime type.
Keywords
alliances, democracies, institutions, political ideology, trust
Introduction
When forming alliances, states are faced with a difficult
trade-off between effe ctiveness and sovereignty. More
effective alliances are likely those that are less anarchic,
meaning they restrict the autonomy of the parties to the
arrangement and hinder unilateral actions. Among other
things, institutionalized alliances do more to facilitate the
careful coordination of policy (Wallander & Keohane,
2002), integrate armed forces so that they can act more
cohesively in combat (Weitsman, 2013), and more cred-
ibly bind state parties to their commitments so as to
facilitate deterrence (Morrow, 2000; Leeds, 2003).
These advantages, however, come with ‘sovereignty
costs’. Even scholars who contend that alliances can be
‘liberating’ acknowledge that alliance agreements often
constrain some forms of behavior, a price states pay to
take advantage of the opportunities alliances afford them
to pursue valued foreign policy objectives (Palmer &
Morgan, 2006: 41). A number of factors likely affect
calculations concerning these trade-offs. Stronger states
might be less concerned with military effectiveness and
more with avoiding entrapment by smaller allies. Smaller
states, in contrast, might prefer institutionalization so as
to avoid abandonment.
Corresponding author:
brathbun@usc.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2021, Vol. 58(2) 279–293
ªThe Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343319900916
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