Partisanship Versus Democracy: Voting in Turkey’s Competitive Authoritarian Elections
| Author | Tijen Demirel-Pegg,Aaron Dusso |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/14789299211030446 |
| Published date | 01 November 2022 |
| Date | 01 November 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299211030446
Political Studies Review
2022, Vol. 20(4) 648 –666
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/14789299211030446
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Partisanship Versus
Democracy: Voting in Turkey’s
Competitive Authoritarian
Elections
Tijen Demirel-Pegg
and Aaron Dusso
Abstract
Do voters care about anti-democratic behavior by their leaders? While political pundits and
academics often hope that they do, there has been little research that tests the effects that
specific anti-democratic actions have on voters during elections. This is because there are few
clear instances where violations of democratic norms are so visible to the average voter that one
would expect it to have an effect, above and beyond traditional predictors of the vote. However,
the recent elections in Turkey offer a unique opportunity to test the effect that nullifying an
entire election (an unequivocal violation of democratic norms) has on voters. We do exactly that
with a survey of voters following the election re-do. We find that even in such an extraordinary
circumstance, voters rely on standard voting drivers like partisanship, rather than concern for the
functioning of democracy itself. Ultimately, our findings have important implications for voting in
competitive authoritarian regimes, as they fail to show that anti-democratic behavior is punished.
Keywords
voting behavior, competitive authoritarian regimes, Turkey
Accepted: 17 June 2021
Introduction
On 23 June 2019, Istanbul voters handed Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan a
second electoral defeat in less than 3 months. This defeat came as Istanbul residents
elected the main opposition candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu, from the People’s Republic
Party (CHP) to be mayor. The incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s
Department of Political Science, Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI), Indianapolis, IN,
USA
Corresponding author:
Tijen Demirel-Pegg, Department of Political Science, Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis
(IUPUI), 425 University Blvd, Cavanaugh Hall 503D, Indianapolis, IN 46202-5143, USA.
Email: tipegg@iupui.edu
1030446PSW0010.1177/14789299211030446Political Studies ReviewDemirel-Pegg and Dusso
research-article2021
Article
Demirel-Pegg and Dusso 649
candidate Binali Yıldırım had already lost in the first set of elections on March 31. The
local elections on March 31 were a major disappointment for AKP and President
Erdoğan because of their loss of municipal governments in several major cities. Yet,
the ruling party’s electoral defeats in Istanbul, the economic powerhouse of Turkey,
and Ankara, the capital, attracted significant attention because of AKP’s hitherto long-
lasting control of them (McKernan, 2019). AKP conceded power to the newly elected
local officials in most areas, including Ankara, but not in Istanbul. AKP challenged
İmamoğlu’s narrow victory and successfully pressured Turkey’s electoral authority,
the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK), to overturn the Istanbul elections, citing the
inclusion of non-civil servants in supervisory committees at the polling booths. As a
result, on 23 June, Istanbul residents voted again and gave İmamoğlu a decisive 54%
win over Yıldırım (McKernan, 2019).
In an increasingly authoritarian context, the ballot box remains one of the last demo-
cratic mechanisms available to Turkish citizens to express their political preferences.
AKP’s repression of opposition movements, its severe limitations of freedom of the press,
and its politicization of state institutions, including the judiciary, have enabled the gov-
ernment to tighten its grip on power, particularly since 2010 (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2016).
Yet, the electoral process had remained mostly competitive, allowing Turkish citizens to
exercise their political voice with confidence. The unwillingness of President Erdoğan to
concede power in Istanbul and his concerted pressure on state institutions to nullify the
election threatened Turkish citizens’ sole remaining means for democratic participation
(Esen and Gümüşçü, 2019).
The popular narrative surrounding the second election framed İmamoğlu’s win as a
sign of Turkish citizens’ commitment to democracy (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2019;
McKernan, 2019). For example, The Economist encouraged Istanbul residents to vote
for İmamoğlu by stating that “[A]nyone in Istanbul who cares about the survival of
democracy in Turkey, including all but the most narrow-minded supporters of the rul-
ing AKP, ought to turn out in their millions to vote for the rightful mayor” (The
Economist, 2019a). On Open Democracy’s website, Kadıoğlu highlighted “[T]he
inspiring stories of elderly citizens of Istanbul who went out of their ways to
vote . . . [which] revealed how the memory of the struggle for democracy could be
instrumental in the fight for it” (Kadıoğlu, 2019). Similarly, in its coverage of the elec-
tion outcome, The New York Times quoted an analyst highlighting the vote as a sign of
democratic resilience (Gall, 2019).
However, without systematic evidence to back up these claims, these antidotes may be
more representative of journalists’ confirmation bias than a groundswell of support for
democracy itself. A glance at the electoral tabulations shows that 45% of the voters still
chose AKP’s Yıldırım, a high percentage given that AKP violated fundamental demo-
cratic norms by nullifying the first election. Polls show that only 1%–2% of the Istanbul
electorate shifted their votes from Yıldırım to İmamoğlu in the second round (Konda,
2019). Moreover, voter turnout for the second election (84.4%) was similar to the nulli-
fied election (83.8%). Thus, while the annulment did not appear to turn citizens off from
participating, it appears to have energized only a tiny segment of voters in the second
round. Ultimately, İmamoğlu’s more decisive victory in June can be explained by the
decrease in the number of invalid votes (from 3% in March to 1.7% in June), a decrease
in AKP turnout (3.7%), and a shift of 1%–2% of votes from Yıldırım to İmamoğlu (Konda,
2019: 4). These figures call into question the dominant narrative that democracy itself
was reaffirmed by the actions of the Istanbul electorate.
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