Party Manifestos, Opposition and Media as Determinants of the Cabinet Agenda
| Published date | 01 February 2020 |
| Author | Ana Maria Belchior,Enrico Borghetto |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321718820738 |
| Date | 01 February 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321718820738
Political Studies
2020, Vol. 68(1) 37 –53
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321718820738
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Party Manifestos, Opposition
and Media as Determinants
of the Cabinet Agenda
Enrico Borghetto1
and Ana Maria Belchior2
Abstract
Cabinets are the engine of policy change in parliamentary systems. Yet, we still know little about
how cabinets micro-manage the content of their multifaceted agenda during their term in office.
Drawing on the party and agenda-setting literature, this article addresses this gap by focusing on
three main determinants of cabinet priorities: issue priorities in the electoral platforms of majority
and opposition parties, and new and unforeseen problems as conveyed by the media. Our analysis
reveals that (1) majority platforms have a stronger impact on the cabinet agenda than those of
opposition parties, but this effect decreases as the legislative term progresses; (2) cabinet agendas
do take into consideration opposition electoral priorities but only when the latter are expressed
by mainstream competitors or when the media focus on them and (3) an externally imposed
adjustment programme can also create the conditions for strengthening the congruence between
electoral and cabinet agendas.
Keywords
party manifestos, media, cabinet agenda, agenda-setting, opposition, Portugal
Accepted: 2 December 2018
Understanding the dynamics of governments’ issue prioritisation is central to the study of
democratic political systems. Cabinet attention is crucial to the attainment of policy
change, particularly in parliamentary systems. As a result, the burgeoning literature on
policy agendas (Baumgartner et al., 2011; Green-Pedersen and Walgrave, 2014) has given
pride of place to the study of cabinets’ policy priorities. While some works addressed this
topic by analysing budget spending (e.g. Baumgartner et al., 2009b; Blais et al., 1993;
Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008; Kang and Powell, 2010; Russo and Verzichelli, 2016),
other more recent research studied the policy content of the Prime Minister or the Queen’s
1Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, Lisboa, Portugal
2ISCTE-IUL, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, and CIES-IUL, Lisboa, Portugal
Corresponding author:
Enrico Borghetto, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, 1069-061
Lisboa, Portugal.
Email: enrico.borghetto@fcsh.unl.pt
820738PSX0010.1177/0032321718820738Political StudiesBorghetto and Belchior
research-article2019
Article
38 Political Studies 68(1)
speeches (e.g. Borghetto et al., 2017; Breeman et al., 2009; Jennings and John, 2009;
Jennings et al., 2011; Mortensen et al., 2011). These speeches are often referred to as
‘symbolic agendas’ because they do not have immediate policy consequences but are
used by cabinets at the start of either their mandate or the legislative year to make an
official and public commitment to a range of policy goals.
Only a few studies have looked at ‘substantive’ agendas (Baumgartner et al., 2009a;
Walgrave et al., 2008), namely the myriad of tangible but, at times, less visible policy
decisions taken on a regular basis by the cabinet.1 The difference with the above-
mentioned approaches lies in the capacity to track agenda change over time with greater
precision as cabinets normally convene on a weekly basis;2 moreover, a wider spectrum
of decisions is taken into consideration.3 Since cabinets in modern democracies are simul-
taneously the main legislative agenda-setters and the heads of the administrative appara-
tus, they make decisions on bills to submit to parliament or ministerial decrees, sign
international treaties, appoint high order civil servants or manage administrative units.
Together, these acts constitute the backbone of a country’s legislative and administrative
policymaking and, this article argues, a useful level of analysis in order to shed light on
how cabinets set their policy priorities. Neither public spending nor Prime Minister
speeches can capture this complex range of decisions.
Inspired by the party and agenda-setting literature (e.g. Froio et al., 2017; Green-
Pedersen and Walgrave, 2014), this article sets out to develop an explanatory attention-
based model of cabinet agenda-setting revolving around three main determinants: the
electoral agenda of its supporting party/coalition, issues in the opposition platform and
new and unforeseen problems as conveyed by the media.
Parties’ electoral mandates are recognised as being at the core of democratic represen-
tation. Cabinets must deliver on the policy commitments made to their voters during the
electoral campaign if they want to avoid being punished at the next election (Mansbridge,
2003; Thomson and Brandenburg, 2018). Thus, elections represent the core mechanism
allowing the translation of citizens’ preferences into political decisions. Electoral com-
mitments are normally summarised in party platforms, which are the parties’ primary
instrument to communicate their political goals to the public and the basis upon which
voters hold them accountable for policy decisions (Bara, 2005; Schedler, 1998). Party
electoral priorities are, therefore, an important determinant of which kind of issues will
make it into the cabinet agenda.4
On the other hand, while cabinets do their best to stick to their electoral mandate, they
also try to dodge or neutralise their political opponents’ present and future attacks (Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010; Seeberg, 2013) by addressing issues they raise. Since oppo-
sition parties were elected based on an electoral agenda, it is fair to assume that, to respond
to their voters’ expectations, they will tend to wage opposition in parliament in areas empha-
sised in their electoral platforms (Louwerse, 2011). As a result, a part of the electoral agen-
das of opposition parties may find its way into cabinet decision-making, albeit indirectly.
Whereas the party literature focuses on electoral priorities as the compass orienting
cabinet policy direction, the agenda-setting literature has traditionally drawn attention on
the constant flow of new and unforeseen problems (or ‘incoming information’) calling for
cabinet intervention during the mandate (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). In other words,
cabinets’ decision-making must reconcile the fulfilment of promises made to voters in
elections (the ‘promissory agenda’, according to Mansbridge, 2003), with the response to
emerging public concerns and policy problems during the legislature (the ‘anticipatory
agenda’, see Froio et al., 2017 for an application of this framework to the analysis of
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