Patterned pogroms: Patronage networks as infrastructure for electoral violence in India and Indonesia
| Author | Ward Berenschot |
| Published date | 01 January 2020 |
| Date | 01 January 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343319889678 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Patterned pogroms: Patronage networks
as infrastructure for electoral violence
in India and Indonesia
Ward Berenschot
Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies
Abstract
The regular occurrence of election-related violence between ethnic or religious communities has generated a bur-
geoning literature on ‘the dark side’ of democracy. This literature provides convincing accounts of how political
competition incentivizes politicians to foment violence. Yet such elite-oriented approaches are less convincing in
explaining why and how political elites succeed in mobilizing people who do not share their concern for electoral
benefits. This article addresses this challenge by relating the capacity of politicians to foment violence to the everyday
functioning of patronage networks. Using ethnographic fieldwork to compare violent and nonviolent areas during
Hindu–Muslim violence in Gujarat (2002) and Christian–Muslim violence in North Maluku (1999–2000), I find
that the informal networks through which citizens gain access to state benefits (‘patronage networks’) shape patterns
of election-related violence between religious communities. Politicians succeeded in fomenting violence in areas
where citizens depended strongly on ethnicized patronage networks, while violence was averted in areas where state–
citizen interaction was organized through networks that bridge religious divides. Interpreting this finding, I argue
that patronage networks generate both infrastructure and incentives to organize violence. They provide the infra-
structure for violence because their everyday functioning generates interdependencies between politicians and local
followers that facilitate the instigation and organization of violence. Patronage networks also generate incentives for
violence because when prevailing patronage networks bridge social divides, politicians relying on these networks have
an interest in preventing communal violence. When socio-economic changes cause patronage networks to become
organized along religious divides, as occurred in the violent areas in Gujarat and North Maluku, divisive political
discourse is more likely to resonate and political actors are more likely to benefit electorally from communal violence.
In this manner this article provides a novel explanation for both subnational variation in patterns of violence and the
hardening of social divisions.
Keywords
clientelism, electoral violence, ethnicity, India, Indonesia, informal institutions
Introduction
Prompted by the regular observations of politicians
playing a prominent role in organizing and instigating
violence between ethnic or religious groups (e.g. Horo-
witz, 2002; Valentino, 2005), a largely comparative body
of literature has emerged that argues that democracy has
a ‘dark side’ (Mann, 2004) as it leads ‘from voting to
violence’ (Snyder, 2000). Such observations have led to a
growing literature on electoral violence, that is, violence
carried out for the purpose of influencing the process or
outcomes of elections (Ho
¨glund, 2009; So
¨derberg
Kovacs & Bjarnesen, 2018). Most explanations for this
phenomenon focus on the electoral benefits that violence
offers to politicians. In this vein scholars have argued that
politicians foment such violence around election times in
order to solidify communal identities and polarize the
electorate on a targeted social division (Brass, 2003;
Corresponding author:
berenschot@kitlv.nl
Journal of Peace Research
2020, Vol. 57(1) 171–184
ªThe Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343319889678
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