Pax Americana in the Gulf: Old Reflexes and Assumptions Revisited
| Author | John Sigler |
| Published date | 01 June 1994 |
| Date | 01 June 1994 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002070209404900205 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
JOHN
SIGLER
Pax
Americana
in the
Gulf:
old
reflexes
and
assumptions
revisited
In
a
briefing
on
the
new
posture
of
United
States
defence
forces
at the
end
of
1993,
Larry
Smith,
the
special
counsel
to
the
secretary
of
defense, told
the
press
that
the
situation
was
like
1946
or
1947,
when
the
world
had
dramatically
changed
but
the
'old
reflexes
and
assumptions'
continued
to
operate.' The
litany
of
change
with
the
end
of
the
Cold
War
is
a
familiar
one.
The director
of
the
Central Intelligence
Agency
(CIA),
James
Woolsey,
spoke
colourfully
of
having
'slain
a
large
dragon'
but
living
now 'in
a
jungle
filled
with
a
bewildering
variety
of
poi-
sonous
snakes'
which
he
listed
as
the
proliferation
of
weapons
of
mass
destruction
and
ballistic
missiles,
'ethnic and
regional
hatreds
that
can metastasize across
large
portions
of
the globe,'
the
international
narcotics
trade,
terrorism,
the
West's
depend-
ence on
Middle
East
oil,
and
new
economic
and
environmental
challenges.2
Having invested
so
heavily in
a
vast
military-indus-
trial
complex
during
the
Cold
War,
the
United
States
govern-
ment,
society,
and
culture
may
indeed
be
locked
into
old
reflexes
and
assumptions
as
they try
to
cope
with
the
new
agenda,
much
of
which
has
been
redefined
as
a
'security'
issue
Professor
of
Political
Science
and
International
Affairs,
Carleton
University,
Ottawa.
i
United
States,
Department of
Defense,
'Special
briefing
on
Review
of
1993
Defense
Department
activities,'
Washington,
14
December
1993;
text
in
Legis-
lative
Report
to
the
1o3
rd
Congress,
17
December
1993,
transcript
1021242.
2
United
States
Information
Agency,
testimony
of
James
Woolsey
to the
Senate
Select
Committee
on
Intelligence,
Washington,
2
February
1993,
EUR
report
2o8.
International
Journal
XLIX
SPRING
1994
278
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
-
environmental
security,
economic
security,
regional
security.
With
issues
defined
in
this
way,
however,
the
specialists
in
mili-
tary
security
can
be
expected
to
continue
to
find
military
answers
to
the
new
problems.3
American
think-tanks,
which
might
be
expected
to
take
the
lead
in
new
thinking
on
the
new
agenda,
have
been
plagued
with
the
same
problem,
and
we
have
even
seen
diplomacy
revived
once
again
as
'coercive
diplo-
macy.'4
In
all
this,
the
Gulf
War
of
1991,
the
most
important
United
States
military
engagement
since
the
defeat
in
Vietnam,
has
played
a
critical
role.
The
fear
is
that
the
lesson
of
Vietnam
on
the
dangers
of
incremental
military escalation
in
Third
World
conflicts
could
be
overturned
in
favour
of
the
policy
of
massive,
intense,
and
overwhelming
military
victory against
Third
World
foes.
While
the
triumphalism
which
accompanied
the
demonstra-
tions
of
United
States
military
technology
during
the
media
phase
of
the
war
quickly
passed,
many
in
the
policy
community
have
emphasized
how
little
long-term
political
damage
was
inflicted on
the
United
States
-
contrary
to
the
predictions
of
a
large
number
of
area
experts
in
the
build-up
to
the
war.
5
While
there
were
widespread
demonstrations
against the
United
States
in
some
Arab
countries
during
the
war,
none
of
the govern-
ments
which
supported
the
coalition
was
overthrown.
Indeed,
the
Arab
world,
long
divided
during
the
Cold
War
between
American
and
Soviet
friends
and
foes,
was
now even
more
deeply
redivided
between
those
who
supported
the
coalition
against
Saddam
Hussein
and
those
who
did
not.
The
previous
division
between
the
oil-rich
Gulf
sheikhdoms
and
much
of
the
3
Simon
Dalby,
'Security,
modernity,
ecology:
the
dilemmas
of post-Cold
War
security
discourse,'
Alternatives
17(winter
1992),
95-134,
and
David
Campbell,
Writing
Security:
United
States
Foreign
Policy
and
the
Politics
of
Identity
(Minneapo-
lis:
University
of
Minnesota
Press
1992).
4
Alexander
George,
Forceful
Persuasion:
Coercive
Diplomacy
as
an
Alternative
to
War
(Washington:
United
States
Institute
of
Peace
1992).
5
See
Norvell
B.
DeAtkine,
'The
Middle
East
scholars
and
the
Gulf
War,'
Para-
meters
23(summer
1993),
53-63.
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