Peace and Politics: The Danish Peace Movement and Its Impact on National Security Policy
| Author | Michael A. Krasner,Nikolaj Petersen |
| Published date | 01 June 1986 |
| Date | 01 June 1986 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002234338602300206 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Peace
and
Politics:
The
Danish
Peace
Movement
and
Its
Impact
on
National
Security
Policy*
MICHAEL
A.
KRASNER
&
NIKOLAJ
PETERSEN
Institute
of
Political
Science,
University
of
Aarhus
The
rise
of
the
peace
movements
in
the
West
can
be
interpreted
as a
sign
of
weakness
on
the
part
of
ex-
isting
party
systems,
and
in
particular
the
Social
Democratic
parties.
But
the
parties
still
control
the
policy-making
process,
and
if
they
want
to
make
an
impact
on
official
policy,
the
peace
movements
will
therefore
have
to
work,
directly
or
indirectly,
through
the
party
system
and
especially
through
the
Social
Democratic
parties.
The
question
is
whether
the
peace
movements
are
optimally
structured
for
influen-
cing
the
policy
process.
The
present
article
discusses
these
paradoxes
through
an
analysis
of
the
political
impact
of
the
Danish
peace
movement.
First
a
short
sketch
is
presented
of
the
century-old
relationship
between
the
movement
and
the
Danish
policy-making
establishment.
Next,
a
structural
analysis
of
the
’new’
peace
movement
discusses
its
strengths
and
weaknesses
as
well
as
its
chosen
strategies
for
in-
fluence.
Finally,
a
case
study
is
presented
of
the
political
impact
of the
peace
movement
on
the
policies
of
the
Social
Democratic
party
since
1980.
1.
Introduction
Since
the
1960s
many
social
movements
de-
voted
to
non-material
causes
have
arisen
in
the
West.
Examples
include
the
environ-
mental
movement,
the
feminist
movement,
and,
most
recently,
the
reborn
anti-nuclear
peace
movement.
Because
these
movements
develop
out-
side
the
mainstream
of
normal
political
life,
and
because
they
address
issues
not
consid-
ered
by
the
mainstream
political
parties,
their
appearance
and
persistence
have
been
widely
interpreted
as a
sign
of
the
weakness
and
even
the
failure
of
the
existing
party
sys-
tems.
With
regard
to
Western
Europe
in
particular,
observers
see
the
rise
of
the
new
social
movements
as
an
indication
of
the
failure
of
the
Social
Democrats,
who
claim
to
be
the
most
broadly
representative
and
progressive
party,
to
anticipate
and
mediate
the
results
of
social
change,
to
communicate
effectively
with
newly
active
constituencies,
and
to
perform
the
integrating
function
cen-
tral
to
party
existence.
But
if
the
parties
generally
and
especially
the
Social
Democrats
have
lost
their
ability
to
coopt
movements
for
social
change,
they
have
retained
control
of the
policy-making
process.
Hence,
a
major
paradox:
At
the
practical
level,
if
the
peace
movements
want
to
do
anything
more
than
make
a
moral
statement
they
must
somehow
find
a
way
to
work
through
the
political
parties.
In
disdain
of
these
very
parties’
stultifying
bureaucracy
and
short-sighted
policy,
the
peace
move-
ments
created
their
humane,
radical,
grass-
roots
alternative.
But
in
order
to
press
their
claims,
they
find
themselves
forced
to
deal
with
their
original
anathemas.
Compound-
ing
the
paradox,
the
movements
find
them-
selves
handicapped
by
their
own
decentral-
ized
structure
and
democratic
ethos.
At
the
analytical
level,
the
paradox
is
that
the
con-
ditions
and
motives
which
gave
rise
to
the
movements
shape
them
in
a
way
which
mo-
tivates
and
rewards
individuals’
participa-
tion,
but
limits
the
movement’s
ability
to
represent
those
individuals
effectively,
that
is,
to
gain
power.
In
Denmark,
a
further
specific
paradox
exists.
Considered
in
terms
of
numbers
and
* This
article
is
derived
from
a
study
by
the
two
au-
thors
on
1 he
Danish
Peace
Movement:
Organization,
Politics
and
Impact.
Aarhus:
Institute
of
Political
Sci-
ence,
1984
(62
pp.).
Michael
Krasner
wishes
to
thank
the
Danish
Commission
on
Disarmament
and
Se-
curity
Affairs
for
their
generous
support
of
the
re-
search
reported
here
and
to
thank
his
colleagues
and
the
staff
and
students
at
the
Institute
of
Political
Sci-
ence,
University
of
Aarhus,
for
their
kindness
to
him
and
his
family.
156
activities,
the
Danish
peace
movement
is
not
a
very
strong
one,
and
it
is
badly
split
be-
tween
rival
groups
and
organizations.
Fur-
thermore,
it
works
under
the
handicap
of
the
present
government’s
open
suspicion
of
its
policies
and
aims.
Nevertheless,
during
the
last
few
years
official
Danish
security
policy
has
probably
moved
closer
to
the
po-
sitions
of the
peace
movement
on
certain
policy
issues
than
that
of
any
other
NATO
government,
Greece
perhaps
excepted.
The
present
article
attempts
to
elucidate
these
paradoxes
by
discussing
the
relation-
ship
between
peace
movement
and
official
policy
through
an
analysis
of
the
political
impact
of
the
Danish
peace
movement,
both
historically
and
in
the
present
phase.
First,
a
short
sketch
is
presented
of
the
century-old
relationship
between
the
Danish
peace
movement
and
the
policy-making
establish-
ment.
Next,
a
structural
analysis
of the
’new’
peace
movement,
i.e.,
those
movements
which
have
sprung
up
in
the
1980s,
discusses
their
strengths
and
weaknesses
as
well
as
their
chosen
strategies
for
influence.
Finally,
in
the
second
half
of
the
article
a
case
study
is
presented
which
traces
the
actual
impact
of
the
peace
movement
upon
Danish
se-
curity
policy
in
the
1980s.
2.
The
peace
movement
in
politics
1882-
1980 :
From
opposition
to
opposition’
In
its
historical
origin,
the
Danish
peace
movement
is
an
opposition
movement,
built
around
the
objective
of
changing
radi-
cally
official
security
policy.
It
was
launched
in
1882
as
the
Society
for
the
Neutralization
of
Denmark
and
as
part
of
a
broad
demo-
cratic
opposition
to
the
reigning
Conserva-
tive
government.
Renamed
the
Danish
Peace
Society
(Dansk
Fredsforening)
in
1885,
it
remained
the
backbone
of
the
Dan-
ish
peace
movement
until
after
World
War
II
on
a
broad
and
fairly
moderate
pro-
gramme,
which
originally
centred
on
three
demands:
neutralization,
the
conclusion of
arbitration
treaties
with
like-minded
na-
tions,
and
the
peaceful
solution
of
the
Schleswig
question
in
accordance
with
the
principle
of
national
self-determination.
La-
ter
the
demand
for
international
and
na-
tional
disarmament
was
added,
and
from
about
1904
the
Society
followed
a
clearly
anti-militaristic
course.
Despite
an
impressive
public
following
in
the
1880s
and
1890s,
the
Society
made
little
impact
on
public
policy
as
long
as
the
Con-
servatives
stayed
in
power.
However,
after
1901,
when
its
allies,
the
Liberals,
took
over,
the
government
made
a
determined,
though
abortive
attempt
to
carry
out
its
main
demand
of
giving
Denmark
an
inter-
nationally
recognized
neutral
status.
But
several
arbitration
treaties
were
negotiated
at
the
time,
and
the
Society
wielded
consid-
erable
political
influence
as
an
integral
part
of
the
security
policy
establishment
from
this
period
and
until
after
World
War
II.
In
particular,
it
had
close
links
with
the
Radical
Liberals,
a
small,
but
influential
splinter
party
from
the
Liberals
which
had
anti-mili-
tarism
and
international
cooperation
as
its
major
platforms.
In
the
1930s
when
the
Radical
Leader,
Foreign
Minister
P.
Munch,
was
the
undisputed
architect
of
Danish
for-
eign
policy,
the
symbiosis
between
it
and
the
policies
recommended
by
the
Peace
Society
was
almost
perfect.
After
World
War
II
the
position
of the
Peace
Society
was
eroded
by
a
dramatic
shift
in
official
foreign
policy
away
from
neutral-
ity
and
minimum
defence
efforts.
These
pol-
icies
were
now
widely
seen
as
having
disas-
trously
failed
when
Germany
occupied
the
country
in
a
matter
of
hours
in
April
1940.
Instead
a
policy
of
alignment
in
NATO
and
a
substantial
(though
still
moderate)
de-
fence
build-up
was
initiated,
starting
in
1948-49.
Rather
than
going
into
outright
op-
position
to
the
new
foreign
policy,
the
Peace
Society
shifted
ground
and
transformed
it-
self
into
a
support
organization
for
the
United
Nations.
In
the
inter-war
years
the
Society
had
already
changed
its
name
into
the
Danish
Peace
and
League
of
Nations
So-
ciety
in
order
to
emphasize
its
support
for
universalist
cooperation;
now,
however,
the
universalist
approach
became
dominant.
In
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