Peace for our time? Examining the effect of power-sharing on postwar rebellions
| Published date | 01 September 2020 |
| Date | 01 September 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343319883676 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Regular Articles
Peace for our time? Examining the effect
of power-sharing on postwar rebellions
Martin Ottmann
International Development Department, University of Birmingham
Abstract
Does power-sharing promote peace? Relying on credible commitment theory, past research has predominantly
focused on one aspect of this question – namely, whether power-sharing prevents the recurrence of battle violence
between agreement signatories. However, this disregards a phenomenon that plagues postwar countries across the
globe: battle violence perpetrated by armed groups outside of the negotiated settlement against the postwar order.
To explain this violence, I argue that we have to focus on how power-sharing redistributes power and access to
resources across elites in a postwar country. By determining who gets what, when, and how, power-sharing
determines the state’s counterinsurgency capabilities and thus shapes incentives and constrains for extra-
agreement battle violence. Personalized power-sharing, for instance, gives elites privileged access to state resources,
facilitates effective counterinsurgency strategies, and thus decreases extra-agreement violence. In contrast, struc-
tural power-sharing limits elites’ access to resources and their ability to prevent armed challenges resulting in
higher levels of violence. To empirically test these propositions, I combine data from the Power-Sharing Event
Dataset (PSED) with the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) for peace agreements in Africa and Asia
signed between 1989 and 2006. I analyze these data using count models, matching procedures, and correlated
random effects models. The empirical results support my expectation that personalized power-sharing is associated
with fewer extra-agreement battle-deaths while structural arrangements facilitate postwar rebellions. This study
contributes to an improved understanding of power-sharing as a conflict resolution tool and highlights its
divergent effects on actors inside and outside of peace agreements.
Keywords
civil war, extra-agreement battle violence, postwar peace, power-sharing
Introduction
On 9 January 2005, one of Africa’s longest running civil
wars was concluded with the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) between the Sudanese government
and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Its
central element was a power-sharing deal involving a
transitional government and territorial autonomy. It was
another instance of what scholars and practitioners alike
regard as an effective way to resolve civil wars: the exten-
sive sharing of power between former combatants on as
many dimensions of power as possible. But peace in
Sudan was short-lived. In 2005, the Khartoum regime
escalated its counterinsurgency campaign in Darfur. In
South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, continued fighting
between government forces and former SPLA allies also
reached new heights. Finally, simmering tensions
between the Government of South Sudan and regional
militias escalated into armed violence resulting in a
bloody civil war just a few years after South Sudan gained
its independence.
Sudan is not the only country in which a power-
sharing arrangement was followed by a series of postwar
rebellions and their violent suppression. Similar develop-
ments also took place in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, the Philippines, and Tajikistan. Thus, the cen-
tral question of the power-sharing research program
Corresponding author:
m.ottmann@bham.ac.uk
Journal of Peace Research
2020, Vol. 57(5) 617–631
ªThe Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343319883676
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