Penal populism: Negotiating the feminist agenda. Evidence from Spain and Poland
| DOI | 10.1177/1477370819882912 |
| Published date | 01 November 2021 |
| Date | 01 November 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370819882912
European Journal of Criminology
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1477370819882912
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Penal populism: Negotiating
the feminist agenda. Evidence
from Spain and Poland
Magdalena Grzyb
Jagiellonian University, Poland
Abstract
It is interesting to observe how penal populism intersects with feminism when it comes to
gender-based violence, as regards both anti-rape and domestic abuse reforms. There is a vast
scholarship (Bumiller, 2008; Gottschalk, 2006; Gruber, 2007) in the US explaining how feminist
activism turned to state power to demand more protection and more criminalization, and little
focus on the European context.
This article aims to analyse the development of what might be called feminist penal populist
discourse in Spain and Poland. Whereas penal populist discourse has been conspicuous in Spain,
and the authorities there ally themselves with domestic feminist groups and scholars to combat
gender-based violence, Poland has never embraced the feminist agenda, despite the widespread
influence and effectiveness of penal populism in that country. The article attempts to answer
the general question: Why are feminist demands likely to be addressed in some countries
where penal populism discourse has emerged in the political and public sphere, but not in
others? The analysis demonstrates that the proclivity for penal populism and selection of topics
are strongly related not only to some structural factors or political culture, but also to the
historical and social context of each country. In Spain, the feminist movement was incorporated
and politicized by left-wing parties into mainstream politics, whereas in Poland there was no
grass-roots movement for women’s liberation for a long time, and the emancipatory politics
during the communist era was superficial.
Keywords
Penal populism, Poland, punitive populism, Spain, violence against women
Introduction
The growth of comparative penology in the last decade has enriched the analysis
of penal developments in countries that have been ignored by the dominance of
Corresponding author:
Magdalena Grzyb, Criminology Department, Jagiellonian University, ul. Olszewskiego 2, Kraków, 30-107,
Poland.
Email: m.grzyb@uj.edu.pl
882912EUC0010.1177/1477370819882912European Journal of CriminologyGrzyb
research-article2019
Article
2021, Vol. 18(6) 836–854
Anglo-American scholarship, for example Central European countries (Haney, 2016).
This article aims to analyse the development of what might be called feminist penal
populist discourse in Spain and Poland. Penal populism, as explained by John Pratt
(2007), describes the emergence of a new structure of penal power, the changing nature
of crime control and the means of law-making in the field of criminal justice. The rise
of penal populism is related to the way in which criminal justice elites steadily lost
legitimacy in the post-1970s period: in the realignment of power relations that ensued,
penal populism was able to become influential (Pratt, 2007: 365). Penal populism as a
new trend of criminal policy-making is consistent with the considerations of three
highly influential texts that have emerged within contemporary social theory to inter-
pret the late 20th-century ‘punitive turn’ in US and Western European politics: David
Garland’s The Culture of Control (2001), Loïc Wacquant’s Punishing the Poor (2009)
and Jonathan Simon’s Governing Through Crime (2007). Penal populism contributes
to a description of the evolution of contemporary modes of punishment and its rela-
tions to more general tendencies of late-modernity/neoliberal culture and political
economy and shifts in state governance.
Although Pratt did not explicitly define penal populism, he provided three ways in
which it is usually understood. First, it can be associated with political opportunism, that
is, a means of gaining electoral support by raising the topic of punishment and promising
to increase it (Pratt, 2007: 3). This can be done by intentionally playing on the social
fears related to crime and the negative attitudes towards offenders in line with public
opinion (Roberts et al., 2003: 3). Second, penal populism refers to a change of commu-
nication forms and channels between politicians and the public in matters of crime, secu-
rity, and law and order. In other words, it is a way of mobilizing the citizenry, which now
has more punitive attitudes and which demands more influence over the penal policy-
making process. In so doing, it calls the previous legitimacy of the elites to govern on
behalf of society into question and triggers the emergence of a demand on the part of the
citizenry for direct input into the policy-making process (Pratt, 2007: 36). Third (Pratt,
2007: 38), this is a general trait of a recent tendency in the field of criminal policy aimed
at increasing repression and satisfying the popular expectations of justice and the vic-
tim’s right to retribution.
This form of populism is seen as intrinsic to democratic structures and institutions. It
does not seek to challenge democratic government itself, but rather, is used within its
structures by mainstream politicians to win public support. Crime has become a red her-
ring that thus allows them to hide the decline of state power in relation to globalization
and its effects, by declaring wars on crime (Pratt, 2007). Demand for penal populist
discourse is a consequence of vague common social anxieties and insecurities (Pratt,
2007: 55). In addition, however, Michalina Szafrańska (2015: 39) defines penal pop-
ulism in a more complex way, as a political strategy oriented towards penal repression,
and that relies on commonly shared attitudes and beliefs – explicitly or implicitly –
towards crime and criminal policy, and accordingly proposes legal, political and mana-
gerial solutions. The real effectiveness of criminal policy rationales is ignored. Popular
beliefs and attitudes are sufficient justification for the solutions adopted and, at the same
time, constitute self-evidence of their legitimacy. The tactic is characterized by the par-
ticular communication style (simple, direct, emotional, symbolic), the limited role of
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