Performance‐related pay and trade union membership
| Date | 01 October 1997 |
| Pages | 430-442 |
| Published date | 01 October 1997 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/01425459710186313 |
| Author | Edmund Heery |
| Subject Matter | HR & organizational behaviour |
Employee
Relations
19,5
430
Performance-related pay and
trade union membership
Edmund Heery
Cardiff Business School, University of Wales, Cardiff, Wales
Introduction
A previous article in this journal (Employee Relations, Vol. 19 No. 3) presented
an analysis of the impact of individual performance-related pay (IPRP) on the
relationship between trade unions and employers (Heery, 1997). In this article a
complementary analysis is offered which reviews the impact of IPRP on the
relationship between unions and their members. Whereas the first article was
concerned with the question of derecognition, therefore, this article is concerned
with the question of disorganization and the extent to which a payment system
targeted at individuals detaches workers from trade union membership.
That new management techniques, like IPRP, can disorganize unions is
frequently asserted (see Guest, 1989; Hyman, 1992; Kessler and Purcell, 1995). It
is important to recognize, however, that they might produce this effect in a
number of different ways. First, they might succeed in generating a new level of
organizational commitment, such that employees come to identify more closely
with management than they do with trade unions. Second, to the extent that
new techniques successfully address the needs and aspirations of employees,
they will diminish grievances at work and hence the raw material of discontent
which unions need if they are to thrive. Third, techniques may fragment
employee interests, so a perception of shared interests and the need for
solidarity through the vehicle of a trade union fades.
Although each of these effects is possible, and has been adduced to explain
union decline, contrary claims exist and it is not at all certain that new
management techniques invariably corrode union organization (Snape et al.,
1993). Moreover, the deployment of techniques may provide unions with fresh
opportunities to organize and represent employees. Opportunities of this kind
are particularly likely to arise where techniques diminish, rather than
strengthen, workers’ organizational commitment or generate grievances among
employees. According to some (Fairbrother, 1990; 1994), new management
methods are helping to generate “union renewal” as employees react against a
more exacting managerial regime with support for militant workplace trade
unionism.
The purpose of this article is to consider which of these broad hypotheses is
correct for the specific case of IPRP. It aims to establish whether the spread of
this technique is serving to disorganize unions or is stimulating a new demand
for union protection. In addition, a further aim is to establish the circumstances
where IPRP is likely to produce a disorganizing effect. It can be hypothesized
that certain types of trade union will be more prone to the disorganizing effects
Employee Relations,
Vol. 19 No. 5, 1997, pp. 430-442.
© MCB University Press, 0142-5455
Received January 1997
Accepted July 1997
To continue reading
Request your trial