Performing the enemy? No-risk logic and the assessment of prisoners in “radicalization assessment units” in French prisons
| DOI | 10.1177/1462474520952147 |
| Date | 01 April 2021 |
| Published date | 01 April 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Performing the enemy?
No-risk logic and the
assessment of prisoners
in “radicalization
assessment units”
in French prisons
Gilles Chantraine and
David Scheer
Universit
e de Lille, France
Abstract
This article is based on a sociological research, combining qualitative inter views and
ethnographic observations, undertaken in “radicalization assessment units” (RAU) in
French prisons. The RAUs are units that hold, for a fixed period of time, a dozen
prisoners described as “Islamic terrorists” or “suspected radicalization” so that a multi-
disciplinary team can evaluate their degree of radicalization. In the first section we will
show how the climate of terrorist attacks during the period prior to opening of the
RAUs not only engendered a warlike rhetoric that would overdetermine the decline of
trust in detention. It also engendered institutional improvisation whereby these special
units were set up one after another without much preparation. Secondly, we will detail
the RAU’s security organization and the warlike relationship that grew between the
guards and prisoners, between radical defiance and criminology of the Other. In the
third section we will return to the evaluation work itself. During this evaluation work in
the RAU, although each professional makes efforts to refine the prisoners’ profiles, the
job is deeply biased by an obsession to fight against the “taqı
ˆya” and against
“dissimulators”. Lastly, at the end of the evaluation, the evaluation summary and rec-
ommendations for final orientation are overdetermined by the imperative to avoid
professional risks.
Corresponding author:
Gilles Chantraine, Centre Lillois d’E
´tudes et de Recherches Sociologiques et E
´conomiques, Clers
e – Cit
e
Scientifique, Universit
e de Lille, Villeneuve d’Ascq 59655, France.
Email: gilles.chantraine@univ-lille.fr
Punishment & Society
2021, Vol. 23(2) 260–280
!The Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/1462474520952147
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Keywords
assessment, France, prison, radicalization, security
Introduction
“If the system tells you you’re the enemy, then you will become the enemy. And this
will prove them right ...”
(a prisoner under evaluation)
“There’s a line from a play that says: ‘unhappy the land that needs heroes’. But I
would say: “unhappy the land that needs monsters’...”
(Matthieu Chavanne, lawyer for a terrorist prisoner)
The series of attacks initiated in France between 2012 and 2019 – of which the
Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan incidents are just the bloodiest of a long list –
generated a strong collective emotion that produced or amplified intense political
controversies regarding terrorism and the fight against terrorism, reorganization
of the intelligence agencies (Foley, 2009; Thuillier, 2019), tensions between the
rule of law and the need for security, and the extension of police records
(Gautron, 2019), Islam in the suburbs (Bigo et al., 2008; Micheron, 2020).
More concretely, it represents a turning point in France for criminal and
security policies.
In a context of increasing incarceration of prisoners prosecuted for acts related
to terrorism, the role of the prison was quickly brought to the spotlight in two
distinct ways. First, by questioning the prison institution and its harmful effects on
the individuals it locks up: “Is prison a school of radicalization?” (Jones, 2014;
Silke and Veldhuis, 2017). Secondly, by questioning the prison administration’s
ability to adapt and provide solutions to this growing and specific form of crime
(Dugas and Kruglanski, 2014; Silke, 2014): “How should the prison identify,
manage and treat ‘radicalized’ prisoners in order to prevent proselytism, attacks
being committed on French soil and the strengthening of violent ideologies in
connection with ‘radicalized Islam’?” For the prison administration, these two
questions quickly posed a concrete problem of how to manage the individuals
and groups concerned (Jones and Morales, 2012). Should they be placed in isola-
tion, in order to prevent proselytism, but at the risk of further fueling their “hatred
for the Republic"? Should they be grouped together, again in order to prevent
propaganda and recruitment, but at the risk of strengthening their sense of belong-
ing to a common group, with links, networks and ideology collectively solidified by
the very effect of the grouping? And in the end, should they be dispersed in
Chantraine and Scheer 261
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