Perrin v Morgan

Beebee for the appellants. The phrase “all moneys of which I die possessed” included the whole personal estate of the testatrix. If a will is drawn by a lawyer, it is proper to adopt the so-called strict legal meaning of the word “money,” according to the rule deriving from Shelmer's Case^F1, which includes only cash or currency in a testator's possession or due to him (e.g., choses in action, such as sums on current or deposit account at a bank, but not investments): see Lowe v. Thomas^F2; In re Taylor. Taylor v. Tweedie^F3; and Hawkins on Wills, 3rd ed., pp. 61, 62; but, in the case of the will of a layman who was inops consilii, “money” must be given its popular meaning which includes all personal estate: Forth v. Chapman^F4. To find the sense in which the word is used in a particular will it is necessary to look at the circumstances and the context, but, if there must be a fixed rule of construction, it should be that “money” in a will drawn by a layman should have its widest signification, save in so far as the context requires it to be construed in some more restricted sense. As a universal test the so-called rule as to the meaning of “money” “in the strict sense” is quite inappropriate. A layman who has not consulted the legal dictionaries cannot have heard of it, for it is not to be found in any non-legal dictionary: see, e.g., Oxford English Dictionary. Under the rule the courts have attached an esoteric meaning to the word “money,” which imposes an arbitrary technical meaning on the language of lay persons making their own wills and almost invariably operates to defeat their manifest intentions, thereby creating an intestacy. Its effect may be to deprive the judge of the right to use his common sense as in Byrom v. Brandreth^F5; In re Gates. Gates v. Cabell^F6; and In re Hodgson. Nowell v. Flannery^F7. The rule runs counter to the modern tendency to ascertain the intentions of a testator from the language of the will read in the light of all admissible circumstances without undue regard to previous decisions on more or less similar language in other wills made at other times and in other circumstances. It is also contrary to the recognized leaning of courts of construction against a construction which involves an intestacy. The appellants rely on Prichard v. Prichard^F8; In re Cadogan. Cadogan v. Palagi^F9; and In re Jennings. Caldbeck v. Stafford^F10. In the present case everything goes to indicate that “money” includes all the personal estate of the testatrix. There is no residuary gift. The effect of holding otherwise would be to create an intestacy to the extent of 32,000l. out of 33,000l., and it would be unreasonable to attribute to the testatrix this deliberate intention.

Danckwerts for the executor and the other legatees. The rule requiring a gift of money in a will primarily to be construed strictly as including only cash, currency and sums on account at a bank is not binding on this House. There is no presumption as to the meaning of “money,” which must be deduced from its context and the circumstances. If there be a presumption, it should be that the expression covers prima facie the whole estate, including, if necessary, land: see Chapman v. Reynolds^F11. On the context of this will and in the circumstances “money” covers the residuary personal estate, but as the testatrix has attempted to deal with her real estate separately that is not included.

Hewins for the next of kin. The established rule is that in a will the word “money” or “moneys” must be construed as meaning cash, i.e., currency in the testator's possession, sums to his credit at a bank on current or deposit account, and any other sums of which he was entitled at the time of his death to demand immediate payment. That is the proper construction in the absence of any context or admissible circumstances indicating that the word has been used in a more extended sense. A very slight context is sufficient to extend the meaning, and the context may justify the inclusion of the whole of the personal estate, but in the absence of any context “money” should be construed in the strict legal sense: Shelmer's Case^F12; Hotham v. Sutton^F13; Gosden v. Dotterill^F14; Lowe v. Thomas^F15; Glendening v. Glendening^F16; Ogle v. Knipe^F17; Collins v. Collins^F18; Byrom v. Brandreth^F19; Manning v. Purcell^F20; In re Taylor^F21; In re Gates^F22; In re Putner. Putner v. Brooke^F23; In re Collings. Jones v. Collings^F24; and Hawkins on Wills, 3rd ed., p. 67. Other...