Phenomenology and information studies
| Date | 01 February 2005 |
| Published date | 01 February 2005 |
| Pages | 44-59 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/00220410510578005 |
| Author | John M. Budd |
| Subject Matter | Information & knowledge management,Library & information science |
Phenomenology and information
studies
John M. Budd
School of Information Science and Learning Technologies,
University of Missouri-Columbia, Columbia, Missouri, USA
Abstract
Purpose – To examine work on phenomenology and determine what information studies can learn
and use from that work.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper presents a literature-based conceptual analysis of
pioneering work in phenomenology (including that of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Paul
Ricoeur, and others), application of such ideas as intentionality and being in information studies work,
and the potential for greater application of the information seeker as other.
Findings – The literature on phenomenology contains thought that is directly relevant to
information studies and information work. Close examination of perception, intentionality, and
interpretation is integral to individuals’ activities related to searching for and retrieving information,
determining relevance, and using technology. Essential to the realization of phenomenology’s potential
is adoption of communication by dialogue so that an information seeker is able both to conceptualize
need and to articulate that need. Some promising work in information studies demonstrates an
openness to the ongoing and continuous perceptual experiences of information seekers and the relation
of that process of perceiving to the growth of knowledge.
Originality/value – Offers a different way of thinking about human-information relationships and
the ways that information professionals can interact with information seekers.
Keywords Phenomenology,Philosophy, Information science,Libraries
Paper type Conceptual paper
Introduction
One thing the library and information science (LIS) literature shows is a skepticism
regarding philosophical approaches to the field’s work. (At the outset I will
acknowledge and agree with Wilson’s (2002) recognition that there has been a lack of
cohesion across LIS; examination of one particular philosophical way of thinking will
not miraculously produce the kind of cohesion he speaks of, but it can awaken workers
in the field to some foundational imperatives from which to start.) Butler (1933) noted
the skepticism about seven decades ago. Others have echoed it more recently (Zwadlo,
1997). A collection of essays such as those in this issue of the Journal of Documentation
is an explicit response to the skeptical stance. Not only are several philosophical
schools of thought informative, but also they can actually improve practice in
information agencies. This is not an empty dictum; they can help us seek truth, and
truth is part of any reflective practice. The quest for truth and its link to practice is
acknowledged by Habermas (1973, p. 32):
The mediation of theory and praxis can only be clarified if to begin with we distinguish three
functions, which are measured in terms of different criteria: the formation and extension of
critical theorems, which can stand up to scientific discourse; the organization of processes of
enlightenment, in which such theorems are applied and can be tested in a unique manner by
The Emerald Research Register for this journal is available at The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/researchregister www.emeraldinsight.com/0022-0418.htm
JDOC
61,1
44
Accepted 21 August 2004
Journal of Documentation
Vol. 61 No. 1, 2005
pp. 44-59
qEmerald Group Publishing Limited
0022-0418
DOI 10.1108/00220410510578005
the initiation of processes of reflection carried on within certain groups towards which these
processes have been directed; and the selection of appropriate strategies, the solution of
tactical questions, and the conduct of the political struggle. On the first level, the aim is true
statements, on the second, authentic insights, and on the third, prudent decisions.
Bernstein (1971) closely examines the history of praxis and finds a consistent
purposefulness in the use of the word and what it stands for. Praxis refers to change in
activity as a means to achieve the ideal of free human action. This definition of praxis
is adopted here, and this word is used in preference to the narrower practice.
Phenomenological thinkers
Among the ways of approaching the key questions of intellectual and practical interest
to us in LIS is phenomenology. As is true of other schools of thought addressed in this
issue, phenomenology is complex and it has a rich and complicated history. There is no
single agreed-on definition of phenomenology; a number of philosophers have
developed phenomenological programs that have similarities, but they also have
distinct identities. To Hegel, phenomenology represented the appearances apparent to
human consciousness, particularly as human consciousness has changed thro ughout
human history and as it changes in the course of each person’s life. While
consciousness is integral to all conceptions of phenomenology, it is not Hegel’s idea
that will be the focus of this paper.
As we will soon see, there are differing stances (or at least stances with differing
foci) regarding phenomenology, but there are some very important commonalities.
Lyotard (1991, pp. 32-3) says:
The term signifies a study of “phenomena,” that is to say, of that which appears to
consciousness, that which is “given.” It seeks to explore the given – “the thing itself” which
one perceives, of which one thinks and speaks – without constructing hypotheses concerning
either the relationship which binds this phenomena to the being of which it is phenomena, or
the relationship which unites it with the I for which it is the phenomena.
It is evident in Lyotard’s definition that phenomenology is at odds with empiricism,
especially empiricism’s confidence in the reliability of sensory experience . Across all
conceptions of phenomenology there is a clear and explicit recognition that experie nce
is richer than what our physical senses can apprehend. Experience is mediated through
consciousness, and so has a cognitive element that is not explicable by empiric ism.
Through perception, intention, and cognition we seek to understand the world,
ourselves and others. As Scheler (1973, p. 137) points out, phenomenology is not a
methodology – it does not provide a formal construction for investi gation; it is an
attitude, a way of preparing oneself for inquiry, for seeing. Also consistent across the
thinking of phenomenological philosophers is the realization, not only of the centrality
of consciousness itself, but also of the object of consciousness:
Basic to phenomenology is the contention that the world has no meaning apart from
consciousness. But the relationship is reciprocal: consciousness has no meaning apart from
the world (Stewart and Mickunas, 1990, p. 43).
A journey through, mainly twentieth-century, thought informs phenomenology today,
and that journey, for convenience and with good reason, begins with Edmund Husserl.
Phenomenology
and information
studies
45
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