Piercing the Corporate Veil in the Statutory Context: Campbell v Peter Gordon Joiners Ltd.

Author
Published date01 January 2017
Pages103-109
Date01 January 2017
DOI10.3366/elr.2017.0393

The Supreme Court in Campbell v Gordon,1 an appeal from the Inner House of the Court of Session, has addressed an instance of piercing the corporate veil on implied statutory grounds.

THE FACTS

C, the appellant, was employed as an apprentice joiner of the company, the first respondent. The second respondent, G, was the sole director and principal controller of the company, responsible for its day-to-day operation. C suffered an injury whilst working with an electric circular saw on 28 June 2006. The company did have employers' liability insurance, but the policy, surprisingly, excluded claims arising from the use of ‘woodworking machinery’ powered by electricity. The policy therefore did not cover C's work accident. By virtue of the company's failure to carry the appropriate insurance policy, it was in breach of its obligations under the Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969.

In 2009, the company was wound up. Since the company was insolvent and did not have insurance against liability for C's particular injury, C also sued G on the basis of, inter alia, a breach of statutory duty to arrange proper insurance in terms of the 1969 Act. C's claim was upheld by the Lord Ordinary, but dismissed by the Inner House,2 who, curiously, referred to the Court of Appeal's decision in Richardson v Pitt-Stanley which carries a mixed or mildly negative judicial treatment.3 In that case the court held that Parliament intended the 1969 Act to be limited to criminal penalties for any failure by a corporate employer or director to provide the appropriate accident insurance.

THE DECISION

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the 1969 Act, which sets out a criminal penalty, also implicitly imposes civil liability on company directors if they consent or connive at, or are negligent in respect of, a company's failure to hold adequate insurance for the benefit of company employees. Put differently, the issue was whether the 1969 Act implies a legislative intention to impose civil liability on directors who are subject to criminal penalties under the legislation. Lord Carnwath gave the majority judgment, with which Lords Mance and Reed agreed.

It was pointed out that section 1 of the 1969 Act stipulates that every employer carrying on business in Great Britain must insure, and maintain insurance, under an approved policy with an authorised insurance provider against liability for employee bodily injury or disease that arises out of, and in the course of, employment in that business in Great Britain. Section 4 of the 1969 Act also puts the onus on employers to display insurance certificates so that employees are aware of the relevant information, as well as a requirement to produce, on demand, the certificates for inspectors authorised by the Secretary of State. Section 5 of the 1969 Act lays down that uninsured employers will be guilty of a criminal offence and be liable on summary conviction to a fine. It further orders that when a relevant offence is committed by a company, there is a criminal penalty imposed on any director bearing responsibility for failure to properly insure, which is linked to the criminal liability borne by a company.

Counsel for C relied on established case-law governing civil liability vis-à-vis statutory obligations. Generally, it was accepted that, where statute imposes a criminal penalty for failure to comply with an obligation, there is no civil liability. However, counsel for C cited examples4 of the exception to this rule, principally Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) (Lonhro).5 In Lonrho Lord Diplock opined that “where upon the true construction of … [a statutory obligation carrying a criminal penalty] it is apparent that the obligation … was imposed for the benefit or protection of a particular class of individuals” civil liability can also be attached.6 On that basis, counsel for C submitted that Lord Diplock's dictum was directly applicable to the case – the duty in Section 1, coupled with the penalty in Section 5, were...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT