Plural voting and political equality: A thought experiment in democratic theory
| Author | Trevor Latimer |
| Published date | 01 January 2018 |
| Date | 01 January 2018 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1474885115591344 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
E J P T
European Journal of Political Theory
2018, Vol. 17(1) 65–86
! The Author(s) 2015
Plural voting and political
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equality: A thought
DOI: 10.1177/1474885115591344
journals.sagepub.com/home/ept
experiment in democratic
theory
Trevor Latimer
Princeton University, USA
Abstract
I demonstrate that a set of well-known objections defeat John Stuart Mill’s plural voting
proposal, but do not defeat plural voting as such. I adopt the following as a working
definition of political equality: a voting system is egalitarian if and only if departures from
a baseline of equally weighted votes are normatively permissible. I develop an alternative
proposal, called procedural plural voting, which allocates plural votes procedurally, via
the free choices of the electorate, rather than according to a substantive standard of
competence. The alternative avoids standards objections to Mill’s proposal. Moreover,
reflection on the alternative plural voting scheme disrupts our intuitions about what
counts as an egalitarian voting system. Undue emphasis on Mill’s version of plural voting
obscures three important reasons to reject plural voting in favor of strictly egalitarian
voting systems: (1) that certain choices that generate inequalities of political power are
morally impermissible; (2) that even chosen inequalities may undermine the potential
epistemic benefits of democratic decision-making; and (3) that such choices may under-
mine citizens’ commitments to democracy understood as a joint project.
Keywords
Political equality, plural voting, John Stuart Mill, weighted voting, democracy, proced-
ures, egalitarianism
A number of well-known objections have been levelled against John Stuart Mill’s
(1977) infamous plural voting proposal. Mill thought that the well-educated (or the
occupationally privileged) ought to have extra votes.1 These objections cast serious
doubt on the proposal by showing that the departures from a baseline of equally
weighted votes (i.e. extra votes for some but not others) the scheme countenances
are normatively impermissible.2
Corresponding author:
Trevor Latimer, Princeton University, Department of Politics, 130 Corwin Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA.
Email: tlatimer@princeton.edu
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European Journal of Political Theory 17(1)
However, these prominent objections (discussed fully in a later section) do not
defeat plural voting as such. In other words, there are other plural voting proposals
– distinguishable from Mill’s – that escape standard objections to Mill’s scheme. In
this paper, I develop a thought experiment depicting one example of a plural voting
proposal of this kind.
Briefly, the alternative scheme, in contrast to Mill’s, allocates additional votes
procedurally. As such, the departures from equally weighted votes imagined by the
hypothetical proposal are qualitatively different than those in Mill’s proposal, in
which votes are allocated according to a substantive criterion. The difference is
critical because objections to departures from equally weighted votes in Mill’s
scheme are not straightforwardly translatable to the alternative proposal. The
question then becomes whether there are additional objections available with
which to defeat the proposal or whether (counterintuitively) it is an egalitarian
instance of plural voting.
Although plural voting schemes, by definition, permit some citizens to cast more
votes than others, it is not the case that, by definition, plural voting schemes are
inegalitarian, or so I argue. Therefore, in addition to showing that the objections to
Mill’s plural voting scheme do not address all plural voting schemes, I use the
alternative proposal to unsettle (and perhaps redirect) our intuitions about what
counts as an egalitarian voting system.
According to the working definition of political equality used throughout the
paper, a voting system is egalitarian if and only if the departures from a baseline of
equally weighted votes it countenances are normatively permissible. The definition
is intentionally broad, and it departs from the traditional literature in which ano-
nymity and neutrality conditions are considered essential (e.g. Christiano, 1990). A
narrower definition of political equality would defeat the purpose of the thought
experiment by ruling on voting schemes in advance.
The justification of the ‘baseline of equally weighted votes’ in the working def-
inition is roughly contractualist. Contractualism invokes ‘a conception of justifica-
tion that is particularly compatible with the aspirations of modern democratic
culture’ (Beitz, 1989: 103). It relies on the ‘fundamental ideal that, as citizens, we
are free and equal . . . and that our institutions should respect our freedom and
equality’ (Cohen, 1989: 728–729).
All of this matters because, despite Mill’s reservations, his plural voting pro-
posal has captured the attention of many contemporary theorists of political equal-
ity. It is supposed that Mill’s scheme provides an illuminating and instructive
contrast to more egalitarian theories. For example, Charles Beitz (1989: 34),
whose Political Equality offers one of the most thoughtful and comprehensive
treatments of the subject, notes, ‘Mill’s theory is of interest here because it is a
democratic theory that incorporates explicitly antiegalitarian procedural elements’.
Jeremy Waldron (1999: 114–116) and David Estlund (2008: 206–222), in addition
to Beitz (1989: 32–40), have explicitly contrasted their accounts of political equality
with Mill’s proposal. This means that some influential contemporary accounts of
political equality piggyback on critiques Mill’s plural voting scheme. They rely (at
least dialectically) on an overly specific inegalitarian institutional proposal to
Latimer
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make the case for equality. However, if I am right that there are alternatives to
Mill’s proposal that are immune to the standard objections, democratic theorists
ought to question theories of political equality designed, at least in part, to respond
to it. Put differently, a fully satisfactory theory of political equality ought to set for
itself the highest bar possible. In this essay, I raise the bar, and make some sug-
gestions at to how it might be cleared, but I do not develop a comprehensive
alternative theory.
A few preliminary remarks: first, before surveying three prominent objections to
Mill’s plural voting scheme, I provide a brief account of Mill’s justification of
plural voting. Such an account is needed in order to remind the reader of Mill’s
motivation for the scheme in Considerations on Representative Government.3
Furthermore, each of the objections hinge on Mill’s justification; plural voting is
thought to be problematic because of Mill’s reasons for (or method of) awarding
extra votes to some but not others.
Second, the alternative plural voting proposal I develop is merely hypothetical.
It is a theoretical tool with a limited purpose. Like Mill’s scheme, its details are not
fully worked out. Furthermore, I do not necessarily endorse the alternative pro-
posal. What the scheme does is allow me to imagine an institutional arrangement,
holding the inegalitarian features of Mill’s scheme (extra votes for some but not
others) fixed, while varying other features (the method by which extra votes are
allocated). If I can show that there is some method of allocating extra votes that
sidesteps the standard objections to Mill’s scheme, I will have shown that the
standard objections cannot defeat plural voting as such.
Third, throughout the paper I try to remain agnostic with respect to the various
conceptions of democracy – epistemic, deliberative, elitist, etc. The alternative
plural voting proposal is designed to probe our intuitions from any of these per-
spectives. I am operating at a level of abstraction that attempts to explore why any
democratic theory might be uncomfortable with plural voting.
Fourth, it is not entirely obvious what kinds of assumptions about background
conditions are appropriate in evaluating plural voting schemes. Clearly Mill
assumes non-ideal conditions; plural voting is a response to the ‘infirmities and
dangers’ of representative government.4 One might think that under ideally just
conditions our objections to plural voting would be less weighty. There may even
be morally acceptable versions of plural voting under fully just conditions. What I
would like to avoid – and this is the point of stressing that my alternative
scheme is hypothetical – is letting our objections to unjust background condi-
tions color our assessment of the hypothetical proposal. For it may turn out that
plural voting schemes are objectionable even under ideally just background
conditions.
The essay proceeds as follows. First, as mentioned above, I provide a simplified
account of Mill’s plural voting proposal. Second, I present objections to Mill’s
scheme raised by Beitz, Waldron, and Estlund. Third, I sketch the alterative
plural voting scheme and consider a conceptual objection. Fourth, I explain why
the objections raised against Mill’s scheme are insufficient to defeat the alternative.
Finally, I raise an additional set of objections tailored to defeat the alternative
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European Journal of Political Theory 17(1)
scheme. That is, I consider whether the departures from a baseline of equally
weighted votes the alternative scheme accepts are permissible or impermissible. If
they are permissible, the alternative scheme is egalitarian. If they are impermissible,
the...
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