Police integration and support for anti-government violence in divided societies: Evidence from Iraq
| Author | Matthew Nanes |
| Published date | 01 March 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343319866901 |
| Date | 01 March 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Police integration and support for
anti-government violence in divided
societies: Evidence from Iraq
Matthew Nanes
Department of Political Science, Saint Louis University
Abstract
How does the demographic makeup of the police affect violent conflict in divided societies? I argue that following a
shift in relative group power, integrating the police rank-and-file addresses incentives to rebel by solving a commit-
ment problem between the powerful state and a weaker group. I test this argument using a survey experiment of 800
Baghdad residents. Providing Sunni (minority) respondents with an informational prime that the police are inte-
grated reduces support for anti-government violence. Consistent with the commitment mechanism, Sunnis, but not
Shias, who receive the prime are less fearful of future repression by the government. The key mechanism is the way in
which officers are distributed. It is more difficult for the state to renege on inclusion when minority officers serve in
mixed units rather than being isolated in minority-only units. Patrol-level heterogeneity makes it difficult for the
government to withhold equipment or information from officers on the basis of group identity, and makes the state
reliant on officers from all groups to serve all parts of the country. Among survey respondents in Baghdad, I find that
those who perceive the police as mixed between Sunnis and Shias, but not those who perceive officers to be primarily
members of their own sect, are less expectant that the government will try to harm them. This article contributes to
research on institutions in divided societies by identifying a form of inclusion which is self-enforcing, improving
long-term prospects for peace by resolving underlying insecurities in the shadow of historical conflict.
Keywords
civil war, ethnic conflict, Iraq, middle east, police
Introduction
Following Saddam Hussein’s fall and implementation of
democracy in 2003, Iraq quickly descended into vio-
lence. Much of the fighting occurred along sectarian
lines, with groups associated with the Sunni minority
rebelling against the Shia-dominated state. Iraq’s experi-
ence in which a sudden shift in power between groups
spiraled into intense fighting mirrors events in the Bal-
kans, Lebanon, colonial India, Burundi, and elsewhere.
Scholars frequently explain civil conflict as a commit-
ment problem between the powerful state and a weaker
group living within that state. The state cannot commit
not to take advantage of the weaker group, prompting
the weaker group to turn to violence (Posen, 1993;
Fearon, 1995; Lake & Rothchild, 1996).
I argue that integrating the police rank-and-file
addresses this commitment problem. Police integration,
meaning including officers from all groups in sufficient
numbers to balance power, and distributing officers into
heterogeneous units, makes future repression more
costly for the state. Integration arms and equips mem-
bers of the weaker group, aids coordination, and makes
service provision dependent on their participation. Per-
haps more than any other state institution, citizens see
police officers daily, allowing them to observe officers’
identities. Citizens exposed to police integration should
interpret it as a credible signal that the state does not
intend to initiate conflict, making them less likely to turn
to violence to defend themselves.
The extent to which police inclusion raises the state’s
costs of repression depends not just on the extent of
Corresponding author:
matthew.nanes@slu.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2020, Vol. 57(2) 329–343
ªThe Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343319866901
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